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UNCOVERING THE PROGRESS OF PLANNING FOR VULNERABILITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE 
AND COASTAL STORMS: A PLAN EVALUATION OF NORFOLK, VA & NEW YORK CITY 
 
By Eric Karl Borchers, Master of Urban and Regional Planning 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Urban and Regional 
Planning at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017. 
 
Major Director: Meghan Z. Gough, PhD, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs 
 
In response to recent storms like Superstorm Sandy and sea-level rise influenced by climate change, cities, 
particularly those located at the coast, have taken initiative to combat these growing threats with adaptive 
urban planning. Although civilians residing in susceptible neighborhoods are often the most vulnerable 
socioeconomically, there has been minimal evidence that planning has accounted for the characteristics of 
vulnerability. This thesis evaluates the recent planning efforts and vulnerability of Norfolk, VA and New 
York City to gauge the progress being made toward reducing citizen vulnerability and raising adaptability 
and preparedness. The most recent peer-reviewed research is consulted to forge the evaluation framework 
and also to recognize breakthroughs and conformity. After analyzing the performance of the sets of 
planning documents in both cities, it is evident that the ability to effectively plan for the public’s 
vulnerability is contingent in part on inter-governmental capacity, but more specifically on disaster 
experience. 
 
 1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Extreme flooding caused by the one-two punch of coastal storms and sea-level rise constantly 
threatens to undercut the balance or aggravate the imbalances in society. Floods themselves are 
characterized as a hazard to communities but events that are devastating enough to severely 
disrupt life in communities are classified as natural disasters. Predicting the timing, severity and 
positioning of these disasters is an enigmatic task. What can however be anticipated is the people 
and places that are more likely to face their wrath and are unarguably predisposed to natural 
disasters. Under that very nature, people and their exposed places are specifically defined as 
vulnerable to extreme flooding. The planning profession, with the aid of government at all three 
levels, has championed a range of efforts to combat the present and future impacts of flooding in 
urban jurisdictions. To what degree these efforts are able to shift the tide whenever a disastrous 
flood strikes, in communities with the least political and economic power, from a scene of deep-
rooted recovery to one of burgeoning opportunity is inconclusive. 
To shed light on the consideration for social dynamics of cities on the front lines of the perpetual 
battle against extreme flooding events, I meticulously evaluate the planning efforts in Norfolk, 
VA and New York City. Both cities have experienced coastal storms declared federal disasters 
since 2010, both are prone to rising sea-levels influenced by climate change, and both have 
fought tirelessly to combat their impacts. This plan evaluation centered on the momentum in 
Norfolk and New York City aims to better unveil to what degree plans are fostering resilience in 
communities most vulnerable to the impacts of coastal storms and sea-level rise. The plan 
evaluation and hazards planning literature distinctly lay out a foundation for goals, fact base, 
strategies, coordination, participation and implementation in plans that is most directly 
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associated with reducing vulnerability to sea-level rise and coastal storms. Both cities have 
pursued the wide range of planning approaches like regenerative design, climate adaptation, risk 
reduction and mitigation, and disaster recovery to attempt to shape a future that is resilient even 
to worst case scenarios. Further evidence in the literature communicates characteristics of local 
communities such as low levels of income that make them most susceptible to these disasters. 
The evaluated plans are vessels of long-range planning efforts to prepare for and adapt to sea-
level rise and coastal storms. Both threats are identified as pervasive obstacles to resilience in 
each city currently and in the future, and in many other cities around the world. I consult the 
planning literature to forge the framework for evaluating the content and quality of plans and 
their ability to engender resilience in vulnerable locations. To equate the plan evaluation with 
vulnerable neighborhoods, I synthesize available information and data to formulate a 
vulnerability index that pinpoints areas of alarming vulnerability in each city from a social, 
physical and geographic perspective. Recent literature combined with the evaluation results 
begin to unveil the persistent barriers and limitations undercutting the ability of plans to 
successfully plan for vulnerable groups, and where areas of greatest emphasis in these recent 
planning endeavors lie. 
1.1 Rationale 
In response to recent “storms of the century” like Superstorm Sandy, that devastated the New 
York metro region, and Hurricane Katrina, experts have warned of an uptake in extreme weather 
on the horizon. The frequency and intensity of certain types of weather events can be attributed 
to a globally changing climate that is already affecting the United States and abroad. Risks from 
climatic events such as flooding, sea level rise, extreme weather, and higher temperatures are 
concentrated in urban areas (Melillo, Richmond, & Yohe, 2014). Storms and other extreme 
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weather events have been described by some as social equalizers, however in actuality these 
events exacerbate underlying economic inequities (Weiss, Weldman, & Bronson, 2012). 
The vulnerability of urban residents and communities to disasters is influenced by pronounced 
social inequalities reflecting age, ethnicity, gender, income, health, and mobility. Climate risks 
threaten urban infrastructure, flows of goods and services, natural resources, health, and 
livelihoods, especially in vulnerable low-income areas (IPCC, 2014; Melillo et al., 2014). Low-
income communities, specifically, have a high degree of vulnerability from a housing 
perspective, where residents are more likely to be confronted with poor-quality housing and 
infrastructure. Low-income housing is more vulnerable to extreme weather, is often located in 
areas with a high chance of experiencing extreme weather, and requires extensive rebuilding 
efforts (Baussan, 2015). Vulnerability, generally, refers to the propensity or predisposition of a 
population or group to suffer harm or be adversely affected by a hazard event (Glavovic & 
Smith, 2014). Risk levels from hazardous events will continue to rise unless cities are prepared 
to manage disaster risks and adapt to them (IPCC, 2014). 
Responses to climate change have, before recently, focused narrowly on energy efficiency and 
mitigation. The fight has since expanded to include adaptation as local governments become 
motivated by an understanding of the climate related risks and vulnerabilities that their city will 
face in the future (Aylett, 2014). By 2015, there were more than 90 cities in the U.S engaged in 
either the early scoping stage, the planning and analysis stage, or the implementation stage of 
climate adaptation planning (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). Despite the heightened perception that 
adaptation to climate hazards and disasters is an integral part of future planning, the inclusion of 
adaptation with respect to vulnerable sub-populations remains low across all actions. A 
vulnerability approach is a practical way to assess risks because it confines the analysis to people 
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and communities, which in turn allows planners to devise place-based adaptation strategies. 
These strategies alleviate adversity in local areas while making effective use of scare resources 
(Rumbach & Kudva, 2011). Progress is budding for adaptation initiatives drawn from impact and 
vulnerability assessments and adaptation research, though in practice a gap in understanding still 
persists (Ford et al., 2011; Lesnikowski et al., 2015). 
Lack of a public constituency has been a major impediment to action on public risks. In the case 
of climate adaptation, a lack of awareness cannot explain this deficiency. A low level of priority 
for action consistently accompanies a moderate-to-high level of awareness. Much of the public is 
aware of the risks of climate change and natural hazards but assigns low priorities to taking 
action. The perceptions are consistent with the temporal and geographic remoteness, broad 
distribution of risk, and limited individual understanding associated with public risks (Berke & 
Lyles, 2013). Arguably, the same is true of planning for disaster recovery. Natural disasters fall 
into a general class of planning issues like public risks that have a weak public constituency. 
Unlike issues that attract broad public interest, such as transportation improvements or 
neighborhood revitalization, disaster recovery lacks stakeholders who appreciate the issues and 
are actively engaged to deal with them. Lack of support may be because the costs of recovery 
planning are immediate, benefits are long-term and uncertain, and the physical manifestations of 
planning are not visible until after disaster occurs (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 
2014). 
In southeastern Virginia, Norfolk and the Hampton Roads region has garnered formidable state 
and national attention regarding sea-level rise. The coastal geography combined with regional 
land subsidence has led the region to experience the highest rate of sea-level rise on the East 
Coast. Since 1930, mean sea level has risen 14.5 inches in the region, compared with a global 
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average rise of eight inches since 1875 (ULI Advisory Services Panel, 2014; McFarlane, Coastal 
Resiliency: Adapting to Climate Change in Hampton Roads, 2013; VIMS, Center for Coastal 
Resources Management, 2013). At this rate of sea-level rise, the Hampton Roads region is the 
U.S.’ second largest population center at risk from sea level rise after only New Orleans 
(Mitchell, Stiles, & Hartley, 2014; Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program, 2008; 
Tompkins & DeConcini, 2014). Considering the extent of development in harm’s way, the 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach Metropolitan Area ranks 10th globally in value of assets exposed to an 
increase in flooding from sea-level rise (Tompkins & DeConcini, 2014). 
Despite how vulnerable the region is to flooding from rising water and coastal storms, Hampton 
Roads is in a profitable position to plan proactively for eminent disaster. Impacts on the region 
from recent major storms have been on the milder side, yet other locations like New York and 
New Orleans, that have been swept into the fight against these dangers, have served as wake-up 
calls for the rest of the country. Norfolk and Hampton Roads can simultaneously draw 
inspiration from these trailblazing cities as well as call upon the proliferating research field on 
hazards like coastal storms and sea-level rise. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Norfolk 
Being cited by experts that their region is highly susceptible to sea-level rise and coastal storms, 
regional government organizations, private industry and institutions of higher education in 
Hampton Roads have coalesced to derive the risks and causes of coastal flooding on their 
localities. Consequently, they have begun to identify ways to adapt to sea level rise. On the 
global scale, sea level rise is directly attributed to the amount of warming experienced from rise 
in both land and ocean temperatures. The rate of increase in sea levels locally in the Hampton 
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Roads Region is notably greater than the global rate because of both natural and anthropogenic 
causes. 
1.2.1.1 Flooding & Sea-Level Rise 
Two main forces that affect all sub-regions, are accounting for the disparity in the rate of sea 
level rise locally; one being ocean currents and the other, land subsidence (McFarlane, 2012; 
VIMS, Center for Coastal Resources Management, 2013). The Atlantic Ocean current that flows 
northward along the east coast tends to transport water away from the coast as it curves to the 
right, though recent analyses have posited that as the ocean warms, this current slows and 
suppresses the rate that water is pushed away in this manner (VIMS, Center for Coastal 
Resources Management, 2013). In some parts of the world where the ground is uplifting faster 
than the global rate of sea level rise, the sea is actually retreating relative to built infrastructure. 
In Hampton Roads, however, the sea is encroaching on the built environment and this 
phenomenon is exacerbated by land subsidence occurring from separate unrelated sources 
(McFarlane, 2012; McFarlane, 2013). 
Scientists have pinpointed these three effects being glacial isostasy, sliding of sediment toward 
the Chesapeake Bay Impact Crater, and sediment compaction from groundwater withdrawal. 
With these three effects in combination the consequence is a doubling of the rate of relative sea 
level rise as subsidence has been identified as accounting for one-half to two-thirds of 
experienced rise (McFarlane, 2012; VIMS, Center for Coastal Resources Management, 2013). In 
a survey of emergency managers in the region, about half of respondents claimed portions of 
their locality flooded during normal high tides, three-quarters that areas flooded during extreme 
high tides, and nearly all that their localities flooded during large storms. While coastal flooding 
is an observed issue for almost all municipalities in Hampton Roads, less than half of emergency 
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managers view sea level rise as a contributor to these problems (VIMS, Center for Coastal 
Resources Management, 2013). Separate detailed analyses conducted by the Virginia Institute of 
Marine Science and researchers at Old Dominion University revealed that not only has sea level 
rise been greater than the global average, but it has increased from a rate of 1 to 3 mm per year to 
4 to 10 mm per year as of 2011 and is accelerating at rate of 0.30 mm/year² (McFarlane, 2013). 
1.2.1.2 Recent Planning 
Emerging from the many diagnoses of the effects of climate change on the Hampton Roads 
region is a momentous intergovernmental effort to prescribe and implement a set of functional 
adaptation strategies. Before Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast, Virginia was inflicted 
with lesser impacts by Hurricane Isabel that spurred a more localized interest into the 
repercussions of sea level rise and a changing climate. Coastal inhabitants began to realize and 
be informed that damage from storms will only intensify as ample coastal development persists 
and frequency of violent storms escalates under predicted by climate scientists (Virginia Coastal 
Program, 2005). 
Early trends in planning policy to reduce the risks of hazards involved assigning prohibitive 
development controls in high risk areas (Serrao-Neumann et al., 2015). Having not yet 
progressed from also following this simplistic approach at the time of Isabel in 2003, Hampton 
Roads was not prepared for the pervasive impacts storms like Isabel could inflict on the region 
(Virginia Coastal Program, 2005). Amidst the aftermath of Isabel, the Virginia Marine Resources 
Commission and the now defunct Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department issued 
emergency guidance on rebuilding procedures, but this was faced with widespread confusion. 
Taking advantage of the opportunity to learn from the experiences of Hurricane Isabel, local and 
regional governments subsequently began the pre-disaster planning process, though several years 
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after the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 set national standards for hazard mitigation planning 
(Virginia Coastal Program, 2005).  
Fast forwarding to 2016, a versatile portfolio of planning reports, programs and projects have 
been implemented to further the ability of Hampton Roads to adapt to the adverse conditions it 
faces. Planning efforts ranging from private-sector and academic reports to federal programs and 
state plans to local projects are relevant to informing an assessment of whether Norfolk and 
Hampton Roads are forging a resilient future in regards to its most vulnerable residents. 
1.2.1.3 Federal/State 
In the years immediately following the aftermath of Hurricane Isabel, Virginia mainly adhered to 
Federal requirements and filtered Federal funding down to the localities in greatest need of 
assistance. In more individualistic fashion, the State has also distinguished itself in inventing 
programs to mobilize innovation around mitigating and adapting to natural hazards. The Virginia 
Coastal Zone Management Program under the direction of multiple coordinating state agencies, 
existing long before the mainstreaming of pre-disaster hazard mitigation, has latched onto this 
mobilizing role. 
Some initial needs at the state level that have already been identified for enhancing the efficacy 
of Hampton Roads to adapt to climate change include an updated statewide climate adaptation 
plan with detailed adaptation measures or a timeline for implementation across the sections 
examined, more dedicated funding, policies, or guidelines to improve resilience against 
exacerbated flooding from climate change and sea level rise, and more evidence of action to 
incorporate climate change projections into state-level programs, investments, and activities 
(Climate Central, ICF International, 2015). 
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1.2.1.4 Regional/Local 
Evidenced by the cohort of collaborative projects ongoing in Hampton Roads to adapt to sea-
level rise and climate change supported by state and federal agencies and programs, this planning 
movement is converging over a fairly condensed period of time, though locally, lesser efforts 
have occurred in the past with similar intentions in mind. The Hampton Roads region 
geographically encompasses all of the counties, cities and towns south of the Middle Peninsula 
Planning District in Virginia , north of the Virginia-North Carolina state line, and to the east of 
the Richmond Metropolitan Region. Politically, all of this region is governed by the Hampton 
Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC), however the region can be further broken down 
into the Peninsula as the spurt of land between the York and James Rivers, and Southside 
Hampton Roads, the area to the south of the James River and the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. 
Southside Hampton Roads, the economic engine of the region, happens to be the most at risk 
portion of the region and so it makes unequivocal sense that the percentage of resources directed 
at its municipalities for learning to adapt far surpasses that of the Peninsula. 
1.2.1.5 Vulnerable Households 
Norfolk has a majority rental-occupancy housing market with 55% of its 86,485 occupied 
housing units that are rentals. The existing housing stock is more mature in comparison with 
other municipalities in Hampton Roads in bolstering a stock that nearly two-thirds of which is 50 
years of age or older. This older housing stock places an unnecessary strain on low income 
residents with the compounding effects of deteriorating quality, absentee landlords, and limited 
financial resources available for maintenance and repair. In the city’s comprehensive plan, this 
dire issue is identified as an essential need to be addressed. Certain neighborhoods have received 
status as a redevelopment, conservation, or special service district through a partnership between 
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the City and Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA). In redevelopment districts 
the intent is for blight removal and new construction, in conservation districts it is rehabilitation 
via home improvement loans and grants and home buyer assistance, and in special service 
districts the emphasis is on rehabilitation loans and grants in targeted areas (Department of 
Planning and Community Development, 2013). 
The City has also targeted housing affordability for renters and homeowners alike as an utmost 
priority. Old Dominion University has offered its assistance to the city with its Community 
Development Corporation to increase affordable homeownership opportunities in several 
locations. The City of Norfolk and NRHA continue to reinforce affordable rental housing with 
the development of new apartments in the Broad Creek mixed-income community, and through 
the provision of over 3,600 public housing units and 3,500 housing choice vouchers. Norfolk 
also realizes that it must meet the housing needs of its large special needs population that it has 
identified as the most vulnerable in the city in requiring supportive services in addition to 
housing solutions. The extremely low income households is one group the City has categorized 
as among the vulnerable special needs population in its most recent comprehensive plan 
(Department of Planning and Community Development, 2013). 
1.2.2 New York City 
Benefiting from greater financial and governmental resources, the New York City region has 
taken initiative on sea-level rise and coastal storms earlier and more vigorously than most other 
cities and regions. Like Norfolk, New York faces the increasing challenges of coastal flooding 
and storms, and sea-level rise and coastal erosion. The city is compounded with an increasing 
population at risk to flooding and sea-level rise, an aging building stock, and growing income 
inequality. 
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1.2.2.1 Flooding and Sea-Level Rise 
With more than 520 miles of waterfront and 400,000 people in the highest risk areas for 
flooding, New York City is one of the most susceptible cities to hurricanes and coastal storms in 
the country. Exemplifying its position on climate change and sea-level rise, the city has relied on 
its own panel on climate change to model localized climate change impacts. The New York City 
Panel on Climate Change (NPCC) has determined, consistent with the IPCC that heavy rain 
events are increasing in frequency and intensity, and the sea is rising at its coastlines. 
Populations living in coastal and low-lying areas, and lower income neighborhoods are highly 
vulnerable to the risks associated with climate change. 
In New York City, the sea has risen on average 1.2 inches per decade since 1900 for a total of 
around 13 inches. Projections for future sea level rise range from 11 to 21 inches by 2050, 18 to 
39 inches by 2080, and up to 6 feet by 2100. The consequence of this amount of sea-level rise, 
which is greater than the global average rate, would be an up to 10- to 15-fold increase in the 
frequency of the current 100-year coastal flood by the 2080s. The most common coastal storms 
in New York are tropical cyclones and nor’easters. Filtering down information from the IPCC, it 
has been determined that it is more than likely that the intensity from winds and precipitation of 
hurricanes will increase in the North Atlantic Basin. The result is an increase in exposure of the 
city’s neighborhoods, businesses and infrastructure, with the aging building stock located in 
flood zones only growing (NPCC, 2015; Department of City Planning, 2015; NYC Recovery, 
2016). 
In 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated hundreds of thousands of New York residents with wind, 
rain, and water that left them without power, damaged the city’s critical infrastructure, and 
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destroyed some 300 homes. The city’s most vulnerable population was left with limited access to 
food, clean water, healthcare, and other essential life-dependent functions. 
1.2.2.2 Recent Planning 
Before the threat of sea-level rise and extreme coastal storms was a personal issue for New 
Yorkers, the city often ignored flooding and coastal erosion and built structures on beaches, 
dunes, barrier islands, and flood plains, subjecting them to damage and loss. To combat the 
problem the solution would be to install inadequately designed and constructed protective 
structures. During and after Hurricane Sandy, the city’s immediate response and preparations 
were among the largest efforts to mobilize public services in its long history. 
1.2.2.3 Federal/State 
The New York State Coastal Management Program, the equivalent program for channeling funds 
down from the national government via the Coastal Zone Management Act, elects to abide by a 
set of coastal policies that (1) steer development away from environmentally sensitive areas, (2) 
channel waterfront development and revitalization activities towards areas which are neither 
without ecological and physical development constraints or areas which had once been 
developed but need rehabilitation , (3) promote the proper use, development or preservation of 
coastal erosion hazard areas, and (4) encourage wide utilization of coastal resources which are 
renewable and nonrenewable (New York Department of State, 2007). 
HUD’s Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program 
provided the additional funding the city needed to divvy out resources to communities to address 
the wide range of development needs, to support continued recovery, and to build resiliency in 
the face of climate change. The CDBG-DR program provides communities impacted by disasters 
with resources to address a wide range of disaster-related needs. CDBG-DR allocations provide 
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funding to develop viable communities, particularly for low- and moderate-income persons, 
through decent housing, a suitable living environment, and the expansion of economic 
opportunities (NYC Recovery, 2016). 
In mid-2014, the National Disaster Resilience Competition was introduced as a partnership 
between the Rockefeller Foundation and HUD to remit funds to communities that suffered from 
a presidentially declared disaster between 2011 and 2013. 67 disaster affected jurisdictions 
competed for $1 billion in HUD leftover disaster recovery funding to implement disaster 
resilience strategies and projects that directly benefit low- and moderate-income groups by 
focusing on unmet recovery needs, as well as building regional resilience capacity to manage 
extreme weather events and adapt to sea level rise. The Rockefeller Foundation, pioneer of the 
100 Resilient Cities initiative, provided targeted technical assistance to states and communities 
and support a stakeholder-driven process to identify recovery needs and innovative solutions in 
the first and second phases of the competition. The partnership built on the Rebuild by Design 
model that awarded $930 million in 2014 to projects that demonstrated how private-
philanthropic resources and federal funding can be leveraged to support the design of innovative 
resilience projects that conceived a vision for protection from future disasters in neighborhoods 
and cities in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut that were affected by Hurricane Sandy. 
The State of New York, to expand on the city’s capacity for adapting to sea-level rise and coastal 
flooding and ensuring another Sandy does not breach the gaps in resources, has, through its 
Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, Homes and Community Renewal 
division, Disaster Preparedness Commission and Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, 
dedicated resources for coastal storms and other intrusive hazards to supplement resources at the 
local and regional levels. The New York Rising Community Reconstruction program through a 
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collaboration between the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery and the Homes and Community 
Renewal division culminated with a series of reconstruction plans for coastal areas throughout 
New York City that warranted supplemental long-term strategies post-Sandy (NY Rising 
Community Reconstruction Planning Committee, 2014). 
1.2.2.4 Regional/Local 
Suffering from the city’s worst natural disaster to the tune of $19 billion in damages and 
economic disruption in 2012, New York has been compelled to expand and enrich its portfolio of 
plans to combat and prepare for coastal flooding and storms and sea-level rise. Fortunately, the 
city has been greeted with enormous assistance from the state and federal government to both 
build back better post-Sandy and to serve as a hotbed for innovative solutions to extreme storms 
and flooding (Office of Recovery and Resiliency, 2015). 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, New York funneled resources from all places to rapidly 
recover from its impacts and return to a normal routine. Months after the brunt of the recovery 
work had been undertaken, the city began to think creatively to transcend its existing intelligence 
on dealing with extreme storms and flooding. The mayor commissioned a new wave of plans 
embracing resilience, preparedness and building back better to account for future disasters of the 
worst possible magnitude. 
Like Norfolk, New York received both funding and expertise through the 100 Resilient Cities 
challenge of the Rockefeller Foundation and the National Disaster Resilience Competition of 
HUD. The product of these grants is a groundbreaking comprehensive plan positioned toward 
resilience that incorporates the vision of 100 Resilient Cities while also going above and beyond, 
and an ongoing project to build resilience in low- and moderate-income areas of Lower 
Manhattan. 
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Foregoing these two grants, the Rebuild by Design initiative selected several pioneering projects 
designed by private-sector firms. One of the more esteemed projects awarded under this model 
was the self-proclaimed BIG team championed collaborative scheme that relied on the strengths 
of several high-profile firms (BIG Team, 2014). 
1.2.2.5 Poverty & Inequality 
Despite the overall prosperity of some New Yorkers, the city has been a poster child for high 
living costs and income inequality. Poverty and homelessness remain a significant challenge 
across all five boroughs. Affordable housing is in short supply and is dwindling in areas 
previously thought of as reasonably priced. New York is a different animal than Norfolk and as 
such, experiences similar modern urban plights but on a glorified scale. 
As certain neighborhoods and sections of New York become more attractive to live in thanks to 
investment, the areas left glanced over can become disconnected and eventually blighted. This 
issue has dissipated in most areas of the city as many sections and neighborhoods have thrived 
from investment and the recent urban immigration movement. As such, what was an issue of 
blight has transformed into a widespread affordability crunch that has left many reeling to remain 
in place. In its housing plan, the city has set a commitment to preserve or create 200,000 units of 
affordable housing and then expanding on that goal by setting a target of 240,000 new housing 
units in the immediate future. But presently, with the high cost of housing (making up more than 
30 percent of income in a majority of renters), and as wages stagnate among lower and lower-
middle class citizens, income inequality is increasing and nearly half of the population lives at or 
near the poverty line. Moreover, 1.4 million residents live in households that do not have access 
to sufficient food. As Hurricane Sandy made apparent, and as peer-reviewed studies will admit, 
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many of these strained residents are vulnerable to the consequences of sea-level rise and coastal 
flooding (Department of City Planning, 2015). 
1.3 Research Questions 
Undoubtedly, both Norfolk and New York City are accompanied by socioeconomic and 
physiographic characteristics that make them among the most susceptible urban centers in the 
U.S. to the alarming risks associated with sea-level rise and coastal storms. Hurricane Sandy in 
New York and the recurrent flooding in Norfolk has added another dynamic to the inequality 
present between neighborhoods to the extent that these two cities have been compelled to do 
something about it. They have concurrently taken action themselves and benefitted from the 
actions taken by their state and federal governments. Thus, they serve as prime subjects to apply 
this multi-faceted plan evaluation methodology with the aim of answering some of the most 
imperative questions in response to this new realm of planning: 
(1) Are recent planning efforts adequately accounting for the vulnerability of local communities, 
especially their social dynamics, such that they are better able to prepare and cope for future sea-
level rise and coastal storms? 
(2) What obstacles have persisted preventing planners from reducing vulnerability in these 
communities and what have cities like Norfolk and New York done to overcome them?  
Because Norfolk and New York City are in no way representative of all other cities in the U.S. or 
even the East Coast, my research acknowledges this and thus outlines the takeaways from the 
experiences of these two cities to inform other cities. I make judgments about the extent to which 
these two cities are able to answer these questions for this planning field.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
2.1.1 Role of Plans 
Plans continue to endure the test of time in the planning profession as they remain the ideal form 
to distribute information and share meaningful future intentions for a place. A planner’s chief 
responsibility has then been to produce plans to capture the creative process within the 
profession (Ryan, 2011; Talen, 1996). The planning profession’s dominant purpose has been to 
solve societal problems like congestion, environmental degradation, poverty and more recently, 
those caused by natural forces. Particularly, planning has extended its reach to tackling natural 
phenomena that are recurring like floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards (Brody, 2003). 
The value of plans lies in their capacity to capture visions for the future, guide and regulate urban 
development, and encourage democratic realization of visions for community conditions and 
growth. When adopted, plans own the ability to influence any range of matter such as 
environmental justice, quality of life, economic development, hazard mitigation, transportation, 
and other elements of community life (Berke & Godschalk, 2009; Lyles & Stevens, 2014). 
Despite the endurance of planmaking, only in the last couple decades has the importance of 
many of the aspects of plans been recognized among the upper tiers of government. Many state 
governments have mandated the preparation of local area plans that adhere to thorough, 
methodological and exhaustive requirements (Baer, 1997). Physical plans have proved to be an 
effective tool to actualize urban change and urban policy. As opposed to a process, plans record 
historical, cultural and intellectual concepts, a statement of social and political values, and an 
accord of the profession and society (Ryan, 2011). Traditionally, plans have steered urban 
facilities and set parameters for zoning and other regulatory measures on real property though 
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they have also ignited stakeholder action with images for the future. When it comes to 
visualizing a future, citizens and interest groups are more welcoming of planning decisions 
depicted through graphic images within a plan because it allows them to conceptualize the 
outcome (Neuman, 1998). 
2.1.1.1 Plan Quality 
Plans have been published and adopted for all sorts of purposes and intentions. Whether or not a 
plan is a vision, blueprint, land use guide, antidote, or any other action guide, it is accompanied 
by a different set of criteria that determines its quality and efficacy (Baer, 1997; Berke & 
Godschalk , 2009). Incidentally, plans of greater quality are usually those that hold greater 
precedence in the profession, or plans that bring about government action on the issues they 
address (Burby, 2003). Persuasive plans have the ability to inspire action through their images, 
designs, maps and visions that other instruments of public policy do not incorporate. 
Empowering qualities have elevated plans to be able to overcome barriers in planning (Berke & 
Godschalk, 2009). Plans have connected people to places by rallying them around a common 
future for their place and self. The pictorial depictions of place help to portray collective hopes. 
Plans coalesce together different perspectives and interests together in an institutional setting that 
nurtures conflict and contention. Plans derive power by being themselves an extension of the 
governing power structure. The spatiality of plans successfully conceptualizes what outcomes 
will occur where, to whom, and when they will occur (Neuman, 1998). Two dimensions of plans 
collectively reveal their quality that predict their ability to achieve these planning feats; internal 
plan qualities and external plans qualities. Internal plan quality is the content and format of key 
components of the plan whereas the external plan quality is the relevance of the scope and 
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coverage to reflect stakeholder values and the local situation to maximize use and influence of 
the plan (Berke & Godschalk, 2009; Lyles & Stevens, 2014). 
Plan qualities have been the impetus for evaluating plans and the progression of planning to 
change and adapt to new conditions. The whole notion of comprehensive plans and similar 
policy instruments is that in order to remain relevant by adapting over time to the needs, 
knowledge base, and experiences of a community they require continual revisions and updates. 
Similarly, it is the goal of communities to improve plans’ abilities to address particularly 
recurring problems like floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards. Strong factual basis, clearly 
articulated goals, and appropriately directed policies have been repeatedly identified as the core 
characteristics of plan quality, and with measurable indicators of each characteristic adapted to a 
particular planning domain (Brody, 2003). Communicative action theory has been a funnel for 
more contemporary principles of plan quality in evaluating local plans. Communicative action 
principles comprise of qualities that reflect conditions fostering democratic discourse like all-
inclusive clarity, emulation of stakeholder interest, liberating scientific accuracy open to 
interpretation, and sincerity and accountability (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012). Generally, plan 
quality is used as an outcome variable for assessing the planning process and as a causal variable 
for assessing the planning implementation process (Brody, 2003). 
2.1.1.2 Plan Evaluation 
To examine the quality of a plan is to conduct a content analysis to determine whether certain 
pre-set plan criteria or characteristics introduced in the analysis exist in the studied plan. Plan 
content analysis relies on replicable methods for content analysis that generate reliable 
information regarding the content of plans (Lyles & Stevens, 2014). Plan quality evaluation is 
the process by which data from a content analysis is linked to a determination of what constitutes 
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a superior plan based on normative criteria. Plan outcome evaluation then further incorporates 
plan quality evaluation by verifying that certain characteristics are akin to desired or intended 
outcomes. The normative criteria that ultimately distinguishes good plans from poor ones can be 
largely dependent on the context of a plan like its planning domain and geographic scale or 
location (Lyles & Stevens, 2014). 
After a plan has been implemented, a post hoc evaluation becomes a viable option to assess the 
outcomes of that plan. A post hoc evaluation is a tool that can verify performance and 
effectiveness. Certain criteria is essential to decide the appropriate timing for outcomes to be 
realized and what the actual outcomes should be compared to. The outcomes of a plan can be 
compared to the expected outcomes in the absence of that plan. Alternatively, the actual 
outcomes could be compared to the intended outcomes of the plan. Further comparisons could 
comprise of either evaluating the effects of any unanticipated outcomes, evaluating the influence 
the plan had on the reality for a place, or evaluating different expressions of outcome in instances 
where the intended outcome might not be tangible (Baer, 1997). Post hoc evaluation has been 
applied for more specific purposes such as assessing the distribution of outcomes versus the 
intended distribution linked to planning goals. The correlation between planned accessibility of 
public facilities and actual accessibility adds a spatial and socioeconomic dimension to post hoc 
evaluation that is complimentary to assessments of plan effectiveness and performance. Spatial 
interaction models, distance measures, and facility and demographic characteristics can be used 
to measure the socioeconomic component of distribution or the accessibility between public 
facilities and population groups (Talen, 1996). 
To attain conclusive evidence of how effectively plans have reduced the vulnerability of low-
income populations to coastal flooding and storms, ideally, an evaluation would want to look at 
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the outcomes of those plans. With the novelty of addressing these issues in the planning 
profession, outcomes have not been fully realized or are still in their early stages so this has yet 
to become a possible option. Evaluations then must resort to the second best option – plan 
quality evaluation. Compiling normative criteria from the latest research on this planning domain 
and linking the criteria to an identification of plan quality can create a veritable determination of 
future outcomes. The criteria conceived in research is generally influenced by several planning 
themes that have evolved out of other areas of research. In evaluating planning for low-income 
groups residing in coastal communities, vulnerability, resilience, adaptation, preparedness, 
anticipation, and equity are all guiding principles. 
2.1.2 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is interrelated with risks or hazards that pose a threat to the livelihood and 
wellbeing of people. Considering disasters are the by-product of extreme events and vulnerable 
conditions, the depth and magnitude of vulnerability is a predictor that a community will 
experience a disaster in the future (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). Vulnerability is a variable for 
equating the risk of suffering. The magnitude of suffering from risks is the product of hazards 
and vulnerability. Housing, infrastructure and land that is unsafe all characterize vulnerability, as 
does human susceptibility. Physical exposure and social circumstances function as 
interdependent agents of vulnerability to hazards (Jones & Andrey, 2007). Social vulnerability is 
defined as the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity 
to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (Rumbach & 
Kudva, 2011, Van Zandt, et al., 2012; Oulahen et al., 2015). Physical vulnerability, on the other 
hand, is the physiological, structural and infrastructural exposure to hazards (Highfield, Peacock, 
& Van Zandt, 2014; Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). 
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2.1.2.1 Physical Vulnerability 
Physical vulnerability can also be interpreted as the vulnerability of people, places and things 
according to innate traits that predispose them to ill-fated risk factors. Human vulnerability is the 
physiological disposition of certain people to be more susceptible to life-threatening 
circumstances from hazards. Youth and elderly are familiar images of human vulnerability but 
also representative of a component of social vulnerability. Agricultural vulnerability, the 
susceptibility of plants and animals to environmental impacts, also falls into physical 
vulnerability though poses less of a bearing in the urban settings of Norfolk and New York. 
Structural vulnerability, another form of physical vulnerability, is symptomatic of subpar roofs, 
foundation, exterior materials, and building standards, specifically their inability to resist damage 
(Jones & Andrey, 2007; Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). Ultimately, societies face no impact 
despite their accompanying physical and social vulnerability until they are exposed to hazards. 
Then, hazards have the ability to uncover the pervasive disparities among vulnerable populations 
and the potential to make a permanent imprint on communities. 
2.1.2.2 Hazard Exposure 
Hazard exposure arises from people’s occupancy of geographical areas where they could be 
affected by specific types of events that threaten their lives or property. For natural hazards, this 
exposure is caused by living in areas near or within the floodplains that sometimes extend only a 
few feet beyond the floodway (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). A hazard can be any event that 
poses an unavoidable danger or risk, but for these purposes, coastal flooding and storms are 
chosen as threats that low-income people are vulnerable to for their intensification from climate 
change and sea-level rise. When people, no matter vulnerable or not, are greatly impacted by the 
dangers of coastal hazards, those hazards are then regarded as natural disasters. Adaptation 
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strategies that directly address the inherent structural vulnerabilities and reduce exposure 
decrease the likelihood of harm, but preclude any socioeconomic characteristics that yield a great 
potential to suffer from hazards once they do occur (Jones & Andrey, 2007; Highfield, Peacock, 
& Van Zandt, 2014). 
2.1.2.3 Social Vulnerability 
Characteristics of social vulnerability easily dispute the consenting belief that natural disasters 
are undifferentiating events while suggesting that they are instead socially constructed (Peacock, 
Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014). Social circumstances are most often predictors of 
insufficiencies in the accessibility of social, economic, and political resources (Jones & Andrey, 
2007). Incidentally, damage from coastal storms and flooding are shaped by social, political, and 
economic vulnerabilities of people and societies. Disasters tend to amplify and accelerate 
trajectories already occurring in communities, thus preexisting conditions are key indicators of 
future outcomes (Mearns & Norton, 2009). 
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Figure 1. Intersectionality of Vulnerability & Social Impacts 
Vulnerability is also a function of the nature and types of resources that individuals and groups 
have at their disposal. Resources like human capital in the form of training, skills, and 
knowledge; social capital as relationships and institutional access; financial capital as liquid and 
non-liquid assets; natural capital in terms of natural resources; and built capital in the form of 
infrastructural resources, all reduce the vulnerability of people to disasters and climate variability 
(Mearns & Norton, 2009). Exploring the inner processes of a population’s vulnerability to risks 
and disaster and their detected anticipation potentials could culminate with coping strategies 
toward resilience enhancement (Mitrovic, 2015). 
2.1.3 Resilience 
Resilience has been increasingly leveraged to drive desired planning outcomes especially as 
attention to coastal hazards has burgeoned. Bouncing back from unforeseen circumstances has 
always been at the crux of resilience, even with all of its adaptations. Specific to bouncing back 
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from coastal flooding and storms, resilience is the ability of a community or society, along with 
the biophysical systems on which they rely, to resist or absorb the impacts of hazards, rapidly 
recover from those impacts and reduce future vulnerabilities through adaptive strategies (Berke 
& Lyles, 2013). 
Resilience can trace its meaning along a trajectory spanning varying fields. The field of ecology 
has been instrumental in giving rise to ideas on resilience related to global environmental 
change. Particularly, ecology has associated an understanding of social ecological systems with 
dynamic action on climate change and disasters (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013; Brown, 
2014). A social ecological system is purely a unit of interaction between people and the 
environment wherein ecology forms the basis for its body of thinking that the two are 
ubiquitously interdependent of one another. Repeated research has identified a strong correlation 
between human activity and ecosystems at a global scale. Whereas people have had a substantial 
influence on the global environment and in engendering ecological change, it is regarded that if 
ecological systems exceed a certain threshold then human well-being will be compromised, 
resulting in social change (Folke, 2010). 
This complex relationship can be understood in the example of a neighborhood of growing 
appeal adjacent to a coastal wetland. The neighborhood may choose to accommodate for growth 
by infringing on the wetland, and gradually erasing its existence. Once as a natural protective 
barrier from the dangers of the open shore, the wetland as a shadow of its former self no longer 
has the ability to mitigate the full effects of a threatening storm. The threatening storm is able to 
wreak full havoc on the neighborhood and permanently change its outlook. Had the 
neighborhood chosen to allow for growth more strategically it would have preserved the delicate 
relationship with an ecological system that returns the favor. 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change describes resilience as the amount of change 
that a social ecological system can undergo without experiencing a change in state. Some argue 
that social ecological systems and resilient societies may be unable to avoid transition to an 
alternative state, after exposure to previously unforeseen threats. Rather, the amount of change a 
social ecological system can absorb without sacrificing key structures, the capacity to reorganize, 
and the capacity to learn and adapt in the face of change are all characteristic of resilience 
(Glavovic & Smith, 2014). Concepts arisen out of social ecological resilience include capacity, 
complexity, connectedness, adaptation and feedback (Brown, 2014). 
2.1.3.1 Resilience Framework 
Resilience began as the idea of a dynamic system, responding to a shock, being brought into a 
brief chaotic state and returning back to its original state. This depiction does not account for the 
complexities of systems, of their environments, and of the changes that occur. Key findings on 
resilience thinking incorporate two other aspects with resilience that are interrelated and draft a 
more representative picture of resilience – adaptability, and transformability. Adaptability is 
defined as the capacity to adjust responses to changing external drivers and internal processes 
and thereby allow development along the current trajectory. Adapting can more tangibly be 
thought of as the process to achieve resilience and stability. Transformability is the capacity to 
cross thresholds into new development trajectories. Combining principles, they equate to the 
capacity to continually change and adapt yet remain within critical thresholds (Folke, 2010). 
Evolutionary resilience broadens the description of resilience to incorporate the dynamic 
interplay between persistence, adaptability and transformability across multiple scales and time 
frames (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). A persistent system subject to change remains 
within a stability domain, continually changing and adapting yet remaining within critical 
 27 
thresholds. When united, persistence, adaptability, and transformability forge a framework that 
carries thought about processes like climate adaptation into realms that are more dynamic and 
holistic. At the intersection of all three is preparedness, where social learning capacity is 
rendered as a human responsibility to enhance the chances of resisting disturbances, absorb 
disturbances, and move toward a more desirable trajectory (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 
2013). 
From a coastal disaster perspective, resilience thinking could be defined as the capacity of 
interconnected physical, social, and economic systems to rebound from an episodic shock or 
extreme event. The societal context within which disasters occur and the precondition to confront 
the agents of vulnerability that predispose communities to disaster are central to this capacity 
(Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
2.1.3.2 Adaptability 
Adaptability has an interdependent relationship with resilience. Adaptability captures the 
capacity of a system to learn and to combine experience and knowledge, in addition to adjusting 
responses to changing external drivers and internal processes, and continuing to develop within 
the current stability domain (Folke, 2010). 
Resilience thinking is critical to analyzing the complex dynamics of communities. Communities 
themselves, after enduring a shock to its status quo, emerge from an event in a multitude of 
manners. A social system such as a neighborhood may emerge from a threatening event in severe 
disarray - a worsened version of its preexisting state, in an adaptive state, or a transformative 
state (Folke, 2010). Deliberate transformation requires resilience thinking, first in assessing the 
relative merits of the current versus alternative, potentially more favorable stability domains, and 
second in fostering resilience of the new development trajectory (Folke, 2010). 
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Adaptability is achieved through flexibility and resourcefulness. Both flexibility and 
resourcefulness are pathways to resilience, with flexibility denoting the existence of networks 
and cooperation. Networks either facilitate the flow of ideas and resources or foster connections 
between people and institutions. In other words, in this manner, networks can increase the 
adaptability of systems. Cooperation across scales and times is equally as essential for 
adaptability. Resourcefulness is comprised of efficiency, quickness, and diversity. 
Homogenization is associated with an undermining of resilience. Biological diversity and 
diversified economies are both adept at dealing with the adverse consequences of macro-level 
instability (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). 
2.1.3.3 Preparedness 
In relation to the themes of resilience, adaptability and transformability, preparedness influences 
all three. Preparedness reflects the intentionality of human action and intervention that 
demonstrates learning capacity. In order to be prepared, groups must search for ways to enhance 
their ability to anticipate and plan (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Actions exhibiting 
preparedness, when planned for ahead of time, typically satisfy what to do during a disaster, 
what supplies are needed, evacuation protocols, points of contact, and where to find emergency 
shelter. Preparedness includes five mission areas – prevention, protection, mitigation, response, 
and recovery. Each area correlates with a stage in the overall process of reducing impacts, and 
tend to be sequential (Schwab, 2014). 
2.1.3.4 Transformability 
In the interplay between persistence, adaptability and preparedness, transformability syncs with 
innovation to bring a system from an undesirable state to a more desirable one. Transforming to 
a radically different and more desirable trajectory becomes an option in chaos and trauma 
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(Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Innovation is key to envisioning a fundamentally new 
system when a group or society is so entrenched in a stigma of distress that reconfiguration arises 
(Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). Adapting and transforming is as much about 
finding potential vulnerabilities as it is about identifying opportunities for reconfiguration. Desire 
for transformation over persistence is merely a difference in perspective where rather than 
viewing impacts as detrimental they are viewed as opportunistic and creatively destructive 
(Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Transformation that is unplanned can actually be 
detrimental to a community. Only when a transformative state is planned for can desirable social 
change be ensured. Resilience as transformation considers shifts in variables but also shifts in 
perception and meaning, patterns of interaction among political leadership and other power 
relations, and institutional arrangements (Folke, 2010; Brown, 2014). Transformational change 
occurs at all the interconnected scales of individual, society, institution, technology and 
economy. These changes can be embodied in practice, lifestyle, power relation, norm and value 
(Brown, 2014). 
2.1.3.5 Resilience in Practice 
By and large, three different views for reaching resilience have surfaced from recent research. 
The first, resistance and maintenance, indicates a controlling and defensive response to change 
and a decisiveness to maintain business as usual, even in the face of imperative change and 
intensifying risk. Maintaining stability may be socially desirable as long as resistance to change 
is concurrent with continued societal success; otherwise it may lead to collapse. The second 
interpretation, change at the margins, is typical incremental adjustments within communities and 
societies to adapt to change while still preserving the status quo. This view could be 
characterized as one that identifies the symptoms of climate change as they appear and 
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subsequently eliminates them, but not as one that addresses the underlying causes of climate 
change. The third view, openness and adaptability, demonstrates an awareness for addressing the 
underlying causes of risks and threats by embracing transformative or radical change. 
Considering existing power structures, building resilience in communities then requires planners 
to confront systemic barriers (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
Resilience in policy and practice is applied in responding to climate change uncertainties and 
socio-economic insecurities. Building resilience has become synonymous with the component of 
climate adaptation whereby a society has the capacity to bounce back or rebound to a stable 
state. Stability refers to the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary 
disturbance (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Resilience as coupled incremental and 
transformative change stresses the need to frame planning as a fundamental socio-political 
course of action that explicitly recognizes and confronts the perpetuated status quo of practices 
and inequitable power distributions that deepen vulnerability (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
2.1.3.6 Shortcomings of Resilience 
Independently, resilience has fallen short on several fronts and fails to address issues of equal if 
not greater importance. Resilience seldom applies to a specific population or group of people, but 
rather a species, a habitat, or a development, and has not achieved social contingence. When 
resilience does pertain to a human society or any multitude of systems, it’s most common 
application has been persistence, the mildest form of adaptation, and very seldom transformation. 
Part of what influences persistence as a prescription for resilience is the emphasis on troubling 
exogenous forces and ignorance toward internal social dynamics. Resilience in theory overlooks 
conflicts over resources and the importance of power relations, in assuming that there is 
consensus on the desired state or that a desired state is even identified. A prominent dialogue 
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stressing management for resilience exists, and so do powerful interests that threaten the 
implementation of a dynamic or adaptive strategy. Not taking into account the institutions within 
which practices and management are embedded and the politics of their distribution and 
management has driven resilience in practice to conservatism or a business as usual perspective, 
particularly in the fields of development and climate change. In the interplay of vulnerability and 
resilience to coastal disasters, resilience approaches have brought increased capacity, but evaded 
consideration of the root causes of vulnerability (Brown, 2014). 
2.1.4 Equity 
Coastal disasters and the changing climate that influences them correlate with contentious intra-
generational and inter-generational equity issues. The intra-generational inequities are a matter of 
the distribution of impacts across individuals and at different points in time. Inter-generational 
aspects relate to the discrepancy of consequences from climate change occurring across time 
between the near-term and the long-term. Intra-generational inequity is a fuel that incites action 
to guarantee preparedness and resilience in the most vulnerable and inflicted communities. 
Equity itself is based loosely on wellbeing or security, health, and education among others. This 
vision of equity encompasses not only economic goods and services but also individuals’ health 
and life expectancy, education and access to public goods, social and economic security, and 
capacity to partake freely in economic interchange and social decision-making (Markandya, 
2011). 
Inequality and climate change are in fact deeply interlaced. The causes and implications of 
climate change are entwined with patterns of inequality where climate change acts as a multiplier 
of existing vulnerabilities. It threatens to quickly erode at the long ensuing progress made in 
reducing poverty and enhancing overall wellbeing. The injustices of climate change are rooted in 
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the dilemma of responsibility for its causes which are inversely proportional to the degree of 
climate vulnerability. This pervasive dilemma demands equity, social justice, and environmental 
justice to be placed at the core of a reactive agenda (Mearns & Norton, 2009). 
2.1.4.1 Environmental Justice 
Three forms of environmental inequality have emerged or intensified from climate risks and 
disasters, one of which being environmental justice. Climate activism has increasingly 
galvanized around environmental justice, as the impacts of risks and hazards are unequally 
distributed across all populations. Environmental justice bears a resemblance to vulnerability and 
the moral obligation of unequal hardship wherein support for justice in the poorest communities 
is stimulated by an awareness of these unevenly distributed impacts. (Alario & Freudenburg, 
2010). 
2.1.4.2 Social Justice 
Coastal storms and extreme flooding often fracture down social lines. Those stuck in the lower 
end of the socioeconomic spectrum suffer an unequal share of impacts from these coastal 
disasters. Typical of environmental injustice, the ability to secure economic, social and political 
opportunities is sacrificed among those that are more vulnerable and impacted. By that undue 
limitation, coastal storms and extreme flooding are pressing social justice issues. Social justice is 
precisely the right for all to have equal access to economic, political and social opportunities. 
Climate change, a stimulus of storms and flooding, is often cited as the defining social justice 
issue of our time for its tendency to place a disproportionate burden on the livelihood of those 
most vulnerable and who have contributed the least to its causes. It raises equity considerations 
between generations because actions taken or not taken today will affect future generations. It 
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also has powerful implications for intra-generational equity today, among individuals and groups 
within societies (Mearns & Norton, 2009). 
Social justice has been approached from several views, but under the cost-benefit analysis tool, 
an outcome is considered most desirable or socially just if the net benefit or the difference 
between the added benefits and added costs is greatest. Although the proportionality does not 
hold unless the utility of net benefits is weighted more heavily and the distributional implications 
are taken into account. Alternatively, social justice can be judged in terms of the level of 
wellbeing of the worst-off member of society. On top of wellbeing, social justice denotes the 
capability of all individuals to freely make choices from a set of alternatives and engage in social 
and market transactions (Markandya, 2011). 
2.1.5 Anticipatory & Adaptive 
2.1.5.1 Anticipatory Governance 
Adaptation and flexibility go hand in hand, since the act of adapting to risks entails being open to 
change driven by expected risks. Therefore, adaptation is an anticipatory principle. Anticipatory 
governance is a model for planning and decision-making under volatile conditions that merges 
concepts of foresight, flexibility, and a range of futures to anticipate adaptation strategies. Actual 
change and uses of these adaptation strategies are monitored in order to guide decision making. 
The anticipatory planning model recognizes the limitations of managing environments based on 
previous experience, and it offers opportunities to build local networks and problem-solving 
capacity amid great uncertainty about the future (Berke & Lyles, 2013; Berke et al., 2014). 
Making adaptive policies under these circumstances requires policy makers to treat strategies and 
programs as iterative processes of exploration and learning, based on targets and milestones, 
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strong performance-based monitoring and evaluation systems, and enabling frameworks for 
interactive engagement with a host of stakeholders (Mearns & Norton, 2009). 
The pool of knowledge for local planmaking and implementation considers a range of possible 
future scenarios rather than a forecast derived from empirical evidence and historic variability 
for a single future scenario. Local planmaking that employs scenario development to account for 
a range of possible future climate conditions and associated impacts on communities and their 
environments provide local governments the foresight to reduce risks and to increase their ability 
to more vigilantly anticipate and adapt to events at early onset. Scenarios become anecdotes 
capable of aiding decision-makers, encouraging creativity and facilitating brainstorming about 
possible futures. While scenario development requires expert consulting, scenario planning can 
be extended to the affected public and other interested parties through focus groups and 
roundtable discussions to not only inform the public, but coordinate and collaborate on ideas. 
Involving the public, a diverse range of stakeholder groups, and experts together in a 
collaborative atmosphere enables expert knowledge and personable knowledge of existing 
conditions and future concerns to synthesize into a more expansive outlook (Berke & Lyles, 
2013). 
2.1.5.2 Adaptive Management & Policy Learning 
Adaptive policy making in the context of the climate challenge is a guide to ensuring an 
approach shaped by a socially inclusive learning process is infused into a portfolio of climate 
action. Three sets of features of the climate challenge influence this directive. The first features 
are the long time horizon over which decisions must be made, and the path-dependent nature of 
these decisions. The next feature is uncertainty such that even if some changes are inevitable, 
their precise timing, location, and distributional impacts usually remain unclear. And third, that 
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effective and coherent climate change adaptation involve coordinated action amongst an 
abundance and diversity of decentralized agents. Adaptive policy making then calls on public 
participation for defining place specific contexts for climate change adaptation (Mearns & 
Norton, 2009). 
An adaptive management approach is a highly effective framework for enabling policy learning. 
Constantly changing environmental conditions, drastic shifts in political interests and objectives, 
and a continuous barrage of new and often ambiguous information lends planners to be able to 
react to a range of situations. Hazard mitigation plans and policies then should function for 
uncertainty and surprise by acting as flexible instruments. Under adaptive management policies 
are designed as hypotheses and management is implemented as a series of experiments to test 
those hypotheses. Hypotheses are often predictions about how existing conditions will respond to 
management actions (Brody, 2003).  
Much like technical scientific experimentation, the consequences of the actions should be 
potentially reversible or replicable allowing for the experimenter to learn from breakthroughs 
and failures. When a policy meets its objectives successfully, the hypothesis can be affirmed 
resulting in the protection of human well-being. Fortunately a failed policy also has intrinsic 
value in permitting learning such that future decisions can be accompanied with a larger body of 
comprehension. In this sense, policy learning experimentation is a very pragmatic process, but is 
an effective tactic for devising innovative adaptation solutions to natural hazards like coastal 
flooding and storms. Each occurrence of a flood or severe storm offers ample opportunity to 
experiment by testing out ideas or hypotheses and determining their success. Thus, if plans are 
regularly updated after or prior to an event, the policy instruments themselves can demonstrate 
learning that takes place within the planning organization and community at large (Brody, 2003). 
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2.1.5.3 Adaptive Thinking 
Devising ideas for adapting to coastal flooding and storms is a more intellectually and 
emotionally demanding exercise than planners are accustom to and requires them to dig more 
deeply and think more creatively than they typically do. Planners and professionals representing 
the community are expected to think critically about the problems that can arise with these 
hazards. Critical thinking allows professionals to grasp the implications of any intended set of 
actions that affect the future of communities in some shape or form. Positive thinking emerges 
from ideas, or creative thinking that people gravitate to. Particularly in brainstorming for whole 
communities and audiences of citizen participants creativity flourishes in group environments. 
People can not only be creative individually, but collectively, building off of each other’s ideas 
and learning from each other. Collaborative creativity in this manner effectively engages citizens 
and generates public support for the strategies that are subsequently implemented, in part 
because such collective creativity is action provoking and empowering (Schwab, 2014). 
Plans generate the most buy-in among affected communities when they demonstrate emotional 
intelligence and the ability to empathize. Disaster survivors process emotional reactions that 
accompany their disaster experience. Without allowing time and space for these emotional 
reactions, planners are inviting delay to adaptation by suppressing natural response to 
catastrophe. Planners and public officials who can think intuitively and learn to respond 
constructively and empathetically to people will benefit the recovery process, most often. 
However, the attachment many people have to conditions and a sense of place preceding disaster 
can impede people’s ability to re-envision the future of their community, no matter how torn 
from hazards or other problems, such as poverty or social inequality, ultimately perpetuating a 
state of vulnerability. Adaptive thinking among planners and policy makers embodies more than 
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mere anticipatory thinking, though essential, but also thinking critically, positively, creatively, 
intuitively, and emphatically (Schwab, 2014). 
2.2 Measuring & Quantifying 
2.2.1 Vulnerability Assessment 
Many communities are inherently more able to overcome hazards and disasters, but in order to 
identify those that require extraordinary assistance to resist and adapt, communities’ 
vulnerability should be mapped, particularly their social vulnerability. Generally speaking, 
socially vulnerable populations are not evenly distributed throughout an urban area, but are 
instead clustered in neighborhoods. Pinpointing socially vulnerable neighborhoods can ignite 
action by public officials in developing an awareness of the exacerbation of impacts this 
clustering causes and the ability to target efforts spatially before and after disaster. Systematic 
application of social vulnerability perspectives at the community scale can identify 
concentrations of populations at the household level with particular social characteristics 
meriting special attention, planning efforts, and mobilization to respond to and recover from 
disasters and hazards (Van Zandt, et al., 2012). 
Social constructivist approaches to vulnerability assessment characterize the multitude of causes 
for individual outcomes in an entitlement and livelihood style. Rather than the risk-hazard 
approach to vulnerability analysis that defines the relationship between an exogenous hazard and 
its impacts, inadequately addressing social dimensions of risk, the social constructivist approach 
classifies people as vulnerable to undesirable outcomes. The climatic event or natural hazard is 
interpreted as an external episode, while the risk of disaster and suffering is socially ridden. The 
entitlements and livelihoods subsets depict vulnerability as an inadequate means to protect or 
sustain oneself in the face of climate events such that risk is determined by productivity and 
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social fortification. Whereas the external dimension is typified as exposure to climate variations, 
the internal dimension is in connection with sensitivity and adaptive capacity to stressors. 
Integrating both internal and external factors, the overwhelming objective of vulnerability 
assessment is to distinguish those that are vulnerable and ways to assist them (Mearns & Norton, 
2009). In all these approaches, there is acceptance that development and disaster preparedness 
must operate at the level of the community.  
An essential purpose is for the assessment to catalyze a process that empowers the people in the 
community and supports their capacity to control their own situation (van Aalst, Cannon, & 
Burton, 2008). Participatory risk assessment tools can be useful for building up awareness and 
capacities for adaptation to climate change and disasters. These tools could include risk mapping, 
transect walks, asset inventories and livelihood surveys, historical and seasonal calendars, focus 
group meetings, surveys and discussions, and key informant interviews (van Aalst, Cannon, & 
Burton, 2008). 
On top of impeding socioeconomic qualities is the trickle-down feature of housing whereby 
minorities and low-income groups reside in older and poorer quality housing concentrated in less 
desirable, higher risk neighborhoods (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014). Low-income 
people frequently inhabit poorer housing quality, are exposed to poor environmental conditions, 
and experience economic instability (Ross, 2013). Impoverished populations typically lack 
insurance and access to financial resources that can aid in disaster recovery. Minority groups 
reside in lower-quality neighborhoods in homes that appreciate at lower rates because of being 
racially discriminated against in the buying, selling, and renting of housing due to racial steering, 
redlining, and lender discrimination (Mearns & Norton, 2009).  
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Despite confidence that impoverished, elderly and minority groups are more at risk to storms and 
flooding, they uniformly display lower levels of preparedness, and respond less positively to 
warnings. Since they are more reliant on informal networks, minorities in particular may receive 
and confirm warning messages later, and once warnings are processed they have a reduced 
likelihood of evacuating because of lower income and education levels that limit material 
resources, knowledge, and skill. Their deficient preparedness and evacuation behavior is 
compounded by disproportionate damage inflicted by and hence their vulnerability to flooding. 
Being segregated into neighborhoods with poorer quality housing is a large influence into this 
risky phenomenon (Van Zandt, et al., 2012).  
When displaced, pre-existing housing and economic volatility can be worsened. Low-income 
residents displaced by climatic events experience more difficulty landing on employment 
opportunities than when remaining in their familiar vicinity. Migrants integrated into the fabric 
of a different community after being displaced can create civic tension in host communities. 
Mental illness and depression can also arise in those socially isolated following displacement 
(Baussan, 2015). Considering the multiple levels minorities are vulnerable to disaster they 
continue to be excluded from community post-disaster planning and recovery activities because 
they have less economic power and political representation (Van Zandt, et al., 2012). 
2.2.2 Disaster Impacts (Social) 
In correspondence with underlying physical and social vulnerabilities, disasters bring about 
physical and social impacts. The physical casualties and property damage caused by disasters are 
the most tangible and widely reported impacts, but social impacts, like psychological, 
demographic, economic and political develop over a longer period of time and can be more 
elusive in assessing them. Loss of structures as a measure of physical impacts results from 
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physical damage and destruction of property, but can also be caused by land use losses or loss of 
land induced by subsidence or erosion. Damage to the built environment can be classified 
broadly as affecting residential, commercial, industrial, infrastructure, or community services 
sectors. 
2.2.2.1 Psychological & Demographical 
Psychological impacts bridge emotional signs such as anxiety, depression, and grief, and 
behavioral effects like sleep and appetite changes, ritualistic behavior, and substance abuse. 
Typically, since the observed effects are mild and temporary, few disaster victims require 
psychiatric diagnosis. Most benefit more from a crisis counseling orientation than from a mental 
health treatment orientation, especially if their normal social support networks of friends, 
relatives, neighbors, and coworkers remain largely intact. However, the youth, elderly, disabled, 
and racial and ethnic minority segments of the population require special attention and active 
outreach. The major demographical impacts of disasters are likely to be the temporary 
immigration of construction workers after major disasters and the emigration of population 
segments that have lost housing (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). 
2.2.2.2 Economic 
The ultimate economic impact of a disaster depends upon the disposition of the damaged assets. 
Disaster losses are initially borne by the affected households, businesses, and local government 
agencies whose property is damaged or destroyed. The property damage caused by disaster 
impact creates losses in asset values that can be measured by the cost of repair or replacement. 
Some of these assets are not replaced, so their loss causes a reduction in consumption (and, thus, 
a decrease in the quality of life) or a reduction in investment (and, thus, a decrease in economic 
productivity). In addition to direct economic losses, there are indirect losses that arise from the 
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interdependence of community subunits. The relationships among the social units within a 
community can be described as a state of dynamic equilibrium involving a steady flow of 
resources, especially money. Specifically, a household’s linkages with the community are 
defined by the money it must pay for products, services, and infrastructure support (Lindell, 
Prater, & Perry, 2006). 
2.2.2.3 Political 
Disasters are capable of inciting political behavior that deviates from the norm that is generally 
free from civic disturbance. Disaster impacts can give rise to social activism that disrupts the 
political landscape, especially during the seemingly long-drawn-out process of recovering from a 
disaster. The disaster recovery process is a source of many victim grievances that cultivates 
opportunities for conflict within and conflict between communities and authorities. Threats that 
undermine existing patterns of civil governance can bubble up when individuals sharing a 
common grievance about the handling of the recovery process coalesce to seek reparations for 
their grievances. While it is uncommon for authorities to leverage disaster impacts as an 
exploitive opportunity, communities of minority groups with marginal political influence or are 
disregarded by elites can fall victim to detrimental change. Disasters can aggravate preexisting 
political tension, but generally, disaster impacts might not produce a worse outcome than a 
renewed set of victims and grievances, and a resultant modest shift in the political agenda 
(Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). 
2.3 Planning Approaches 
Given the complexity of coastal flooding and storm type disasters, many approaches and 
strategies have been employed to reduce their impacts and the vulnerability of those at risk. 
Collectively, planning strategies can eradicate social and environmental injustices, reduce 
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exposure, foster social connectedness, ensure preparedness, maintain resilience, enhance 
adaptive capacity, alleviate vulnerabilities, and guarantee swift and efficient recovery. 
Although each planning approach holds a unique assortment of attributes that distinguish each 
from one another, there are considerable overlaps in policies and outcomes. Individually, the 
outlined disaster planning approaches can achieve different types of resilience and in different 
magnitudes, but in certain coordinated efforts, multiple approaches in concert can attain positive 
results in surplus of their efficacy in isolation. Each planning approach represents a manner in 
which to reduce vulnerabilities of populations to disaster, but it is also possible to make plans 
that are insufficient and incapable of fulfilling their objectives pertaining to disaster resilience. 
Thus, each approach is accompanied by particular details and qualities that optimize their 
efficacy in the realm of vulnerability reduction and ultimately toward long-term resilience. The 
collection of detailed approaches shape the evaluation protocol that I employ later on to assess 
the desirability of their intended and engendered outcomes. 
2.3.1 Risk Reduction 
Since risks tend to lack evidence, public residents and officials tend to be apathetic toward risk 
consideration, especially climate change risks. With insufficient incentives for local jurisdictions 
to combat individualized risks, few at-risk communities have taken initiative. Left to their own 
devices, relatively few at-risk communities would be expected to initiate risk-reduction actions. 
Hazard mitigation plans are evidence of the nonexistent or sluggish response by communities to 
local risks (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Planners have had to overcome the debilitating obstacles of 
inadequate public buy-in and oppositional community groups motivated by proposed policies 
they seek to vanquish (Burby, 2003). 
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Risk reduction and general climate combatant efforts are not lost causes, however. Engaged and 
educated planners and publics can alter the perception of risk for the better. Risk reduction 
occupies the space between adaptation and climate mitigation and such could be considered a 
modest climate adaptation approach but an assertive approach to mitigation. 
2.3.1.1 Coastal Hazard Mitigation 
The predominant goal of hazard mitigation planning is to decrease hazard exposure and physical 
vulnerability to hazards in a particular area. State planning for mitigation to achieve resiliency 
has chiefly been shaped by the role the federal government has played in assisting disaster 
inflicted localities. State mitigation plans can serve a critical role in cultivating 
intergovernmental coordination, allowing for local plans to more easily comply with broader 
state goals, and establishing resilient conditions in communities to resist or absorb and swiftly 
recover from disasters. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 strongly encourages all state and 
local governments to prepare hazard mitigation plans based on a participatory process and 
technical vulnerability analysis or hazard assessment (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012). 
The DMA of 2000 was passed as an amendment to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, and it repealed the previous mitigation planning provisions and 
replaced them with a new set of requirements that emphasized the need for states and 
municipalities to coordinate mitigation planning and implementation efforts (FEMA, 2013). The 
act reallocated the focus of disaster resistance toward pre-disaster hazard mitigation measures 
that are cost-effective and designed to reduce damage and destruction (Disaster Mitigation Act of 
2000). A state mitigation plan is continued as a requirement for disaster assistance, and states are 
granted the authority to recommend a minimum of five local governments to receive mitigation 
assistance. Additionally, state and local governments alike are required to develop a hazard 
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mitigation plan in order to remain eligible for pre- and post-disaster mitigation funding. 
Communities with an adopted and federal approved hazard mitigation plan are eligible for 
funding via the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Hazard Mitigation Assistance, and the Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Program (Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Planning 
Committee, 2011; FEMA, 2013). 
Central to the hazard mitigation planning process, the hazards assessment, dissects a 
community’s exposure to hazard agents such as floods, storm surge, wave action, or wind. The 
assessments identify the potential exposure of populations, businesses, and the built 
environment. Physical characteristics of the built environment are also equally as critical, with 
features such as wind protection in buildings, structural elevation relative to potential floods, and 
engineered or natural environmental features not being overlooked. Solutions are devised 
accordingly to fill gaps in communities’ overall protection and absorption of hazards and 
disasters (Van Zandt, et al., 2012). 
Generally, three types of responses are commonly employed to mitigate coastal hazards under 
the direction of hazard mitigation plans. An argument can also be made for a fourth approach 
being the discouraged “do nothing” approach where the risk of damage to and loss of property is 
simply accepted. 
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Table 1. Three Hazard Mitigation Responses 
Structural response: the 
building of protective 
structures to defend coastal 
property against damage by 
flooding or erosion 
_________________________________________ 
Non-structural response: 
actions like planting 
vegetative cover, re-shaping 
of bluffs, or avoidance of 
hazards by siting buildings in 
safe locations 
_________________________________________ 
Insurance response: 
purchasing of insurance 
against the coastal hazards 
_________________________________________ 
 Only effective if structures 
are soundly designed and 
constructed 
 Strengthening of 
landforms 
 National Flood Insurance 
Program allows structural 
and non-structural 
measures 
 May accelerate the loss of 
a natural shield from 
erosion if designed 
improperly 
 Use of appropriate design 
features in buildings to 
protect against flooding 
 Insurance against property 
damage caused by 
flooding is offered 
 Structural solutions require 
strict maintenance to 
ensure they retain 
marginal effectiveness 
 Siting of development 
entirely out of hazard areas 
avoids difficulties and 
high costs 
 Property owners in 
participating communities 
may purchase insurance 
from NFIP 
 Protective devices are 
typically high dollar 
 Often used in combination 
with structural response 
 NFIP also provides for the 
sale of insurance to 
property owners against 
flood-related erosion 
damage 
(New York Department of State, 2007) 
2.3.1.2 Disaster Risk Reduction 
Disasters occur when natural or technological hazards interact with socioecological systems. 
Disaster impacts arise due to interactions among hazard exposure, physical vulnerability, and 
social vulnerability (Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014). Consequently, local 
governments’ responses to climate risks are commonly linked to hazard mitigation and disaster 
preparedness strategies. Disaster risk reduction emerged out of lasting efforts to deliver 
emergency disaster response and recovery services for inflicted communities. Actual disaster risk 
reduction planning to enable coordinated large-scale governmental and non-governmental 
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organization response often accompanies major catastrophes. As a response to climate change, 
disaster risk reduction encompasses several phases – disaster risk assessment and preparedness 
planning, response, relief and recovery for managing disaster, and structural and nonstructural 
hazard mitigation activities (Solecki, Leichenko, & O'Brien, 2011). 
Proficient disaster risk reduction does incorporate local vulnerabilities and risks in precise 
locations, such as communities potentially or actually affected. Disaster risk reduction remains 
an event-driven approach to adapt to disasters and emphasizes short-term interventions and 
actions particularly through humanitarian assistance agencies like the Red Cross and donor 
programs, because it is limited in being merely a mitigation approach despite including people 
into the equation (Birkmann & Pardoe, 2014). 
2.3.2 Disaster Recovery 
Though disaster risk reduction is classified as a mitigative approach to planning for disasters, 
considering it is event-based, much of the outcomes coincide with disaster recovery. The 
conventional view of disaster recovery is of responding to a disaster declaration in a manner that 
pieces communities back into working order as they were prior to the event. Following disaster 
there is ample opportunity to rebuild communities in an adaptive way while considering future 
climate change and to bring attention to policy failures (Birkmann & Pardoe, 2014; Corbin, 
2015). More often than not, impacted infrastructure is rapidly re-built back to pre-disaster 
conditions and standards. This conventional stability and persistence view of disaster recovery 
overlooks the internal social dynamics of coastal climate events and incidentally dismisses a 
possible need to promote transformative change (Birkmann & Pardoe, 2014). 
Social awareness calls for recovery planning to be proactive and forgo the conventional reactive 
attitude that drives technical measures (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 
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2015; Corbin, 2015). Also, rather than only concentrate on post-disaster states that are more 
desirable than pre-disaster, disaster recovery can recognize the importance of improved pre-
disaster conditions. In high pressure situations after disasters, opportunities for change are 
rapidly squandered as demand for resources politically and financially prohibits any considerable 
deviation from the norm (Corbin, 2015). Bouncing back to pre-disaster conditions under stressful 
conditions can only remain as a resilient state until the next event of equal or greater risk 
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Long term recovery requires 
planning for post-disaster recovery in the pre-disaster phase (Schwab, 2014). Pre-disaster 
planning can assure that communities and officials are more prepared to maneuver through 
complicated and high pressure situations for a variety of post-disaster scenarios (Serrao-
Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). 
Table 2. Four Stages of Housing Recovery Following a Disaster 
Emergency shelter Spontaneously sought locations that are intended to be a refuge and 
provide protection from the elements during a developing disaster 
Temporary shelter Offer food preparation and sleeping facilities in the short-term 
following a disaster and sought from those with immediate and 
greatest needs 
Temporary housing Allows disaster victims to reestablish household routines, though in 
non-preferred locations or structures 
Permanent housing Reestablished household routines for disaster victims in preferred 
locations and structures 
Source: (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006) 
2.3.2.1 Recovery Plan 
In order to siege opportunities before they vanish, a community should have a recovery plan in 
place long before a disaster strikes. A recovery plan is a policy document that guides short-term 
emergency and restoration protocol and long-term redevelopment decisions. A plan that is 
admired by all that are subject to its recommendations considers the problems and opportunities 
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for recovery and establishes responsibility among recovery officials. Pre-disaster recovery plans 
have been fashioned by local officials in one of two ways. The first being a recovery plan that is 
prepared as a stand-alone plan that is more manageable, viable, technically sophisticated, and 
less demanding. The second is of a recovery plan as a component of a jurisdiction’s 
comprehensive plan. The integrated approach is more capable of mobilizing additional resources, 
correlating recovery with other planning facets, and coordinating with existing symbiotic 
regulatory tools (Berke & Campanella, 2006). Altogether, recovery plans should accommodate 
for vulnerable populations, disaster mitigation, and long-term gain in considering pre-planning 
for rebuilding (Corbin, 2015). 
Planning should account for how post-disaster recovery efforts can be restrained by any 
combination of limited funds, lacking consensus and agreement, weak community networks, and 
inherent lines of communication and planning tools (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, 
& Choy, 2015). Without trusted community networks to help negotiate the bureaucracy of 
disaster recovery, low-income victims of extreme weather may also receive fewer benefits 
(Baussan, 2015). For other barriers to be overcome and for commitment to be maximized in the 
recovery process requires early and persistent participation by all pertinent stakeholders 
including especially those that are affected and marginalized (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, 
Schuch, & Choy, 2015; Corbin, 2015; Berke & Campanella, 2006). On occasion dramatic events 
can empower traditionally marginalized groups to advocate for policy proposals and capture the 
attention of particularly persistent policymakers to be more receptive of change (Corbin, 2015). 
A whole-community approach to emergency management policies that fosters community 
involvement and engagement with community nongovernmental leaders and state agencies can 
help to determine the unique needs of communities in emergency situations (Baussan, 2015). 
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2.3.2.2 Community Betterment 
The concept of betterment has emerged as an approach that forgoes the trend of rapid 
reconstruction and rebuilding of affected communities after being stricken by disasters. While 
reconstruction post-disaster is often seen as an opportunity to build better and more resilient 
structures, under a betterment approach reconstruction must also add ‘value beyond what existed 
before the disaster’. Hence, under a betterment approach to reconstruction there are opportunities 
for considering future spatial and societal impacts caused by climate change. However, 
reconstruction usually happens at a fast pace and conflicts arise between groups and institutions 
because different goals are not given sufficient attention in time, resources and values. 
Betterment extends beyond physical structures, including improved urban planning practices, 
greater social equity and economic development focused on the strength of local industries 
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). 
In terms of adaptation, betterment is synthesized by disaster risk reduction and climate change 
adaptation. Integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation demands greater 
collaboration between communities of policy makers, practitioners and researchers. Experiences 
from disaster stricken areas highlight the challenges involved in advancing planning strategies to 
incorporate trends put forward by concepts such as betterment. In post-disaster situations, overall 
impression that there is compression in time and space under which recovery efforts such as 
reconstruction work occurs impedes more robust solutions advocated by the betterment concept 
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). 
2.3.3 Climate Adaptation 
Climate adaptation has been a localized focus for community action to combat regional climate 
impacts utilizing organized resources (Picketts, et al., 2012; Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). 
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Modelling climate change impacts is an intellectually demanding and knowledge-intensive 
endeavor and thus typically occurs at scales larger than the specific options for responding to 
impacts account for. Because of its rootedness in scientific inquiry, the adaptation planning 
process resembles the rational model, from scoping the problem, to analyzing and weighing 
alternative adaptation strategies, and to implementing plans (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). The 
combination of resource intensity and modernity of climate has as of yet removed climate 
adaptation planning from political influence in confining it to nongovernmental organizations or 
environmental departments of local government (Solecki, Leichenko, & O'Brien, 2011). The 
conundrum of its current authority is that adaptation planning requires in addition to technical 
capacity and financial assets, political support in order to find success (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 
2015). 
Climate adaptation can either be anticipatory or reactive depending on when it occurs in relation 
to a hazardous event. Anticipatory adaptation occurs before climate impacts are experienced and 
thus is proactive while reactive adaptation is just the opposite, occurring after impacts have been 
experienced. Adaptation can also either be private, initiated by individuals, households or private 
entities, or it can public, undertaken by government to allow desired public outcomes to come 
into fruition. Adaptation can be impulsive or impromptu as an autonomous adaptation, or it can 
take the form of a planned style, where a calculated, deliberate course of action is taken 
(Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
If local governments were to champion adaptation planning efforts they would be tasked with 
translating scientific forecasts of future climate conditions into tangible impacts on local 
activities through risk and vulnerability assessments, and deciding on adaptation opportunities 
for unpredictable climate impacts across long planning horizons (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). 
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Local and regional government authority over climate adaptation efforts can translate into swift 
planning for specific impacts close to home, strategies that provide tangible benefits to residents, 
and policies derived from input and contribution of local stakeholders (Picketts, et al., 2012).  
Strategies that have been established under adopted adaptation plans include investments in 
ecological and engineering infrastructure, institutional reforms to existing plans, codes, insurance 
policies, and development approval processes, as well as programs to alter cultural and 
behavioral practices (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). These devised strategies are frequently tied to 
specific urban sectors, such as water supply and sanitation, public health, energy, and 
transportation as opposed to communities (Solecki, Leichenko, & O'Brien, 2011).  
An exceptional policy portfolio is one that exemplifies anticipatory governance and adaptive 
thinking. To recall, adaptive and anticipatory policies embody flexibility. Flexible policies are 
flexible because they consider both contingency and robustness. Contingent policies are tailored 
to a specific future, while robust policies are those that have a positive effect across many 
possible futures and can preserve future options. If a particular policy is preferred under one set 
of changes but not under other sets of changes, then the policy is contingent. If a future outlined 
by a particular scenario does not materialize, then the policy aligned with that scenario will 
remain unused, but without such a policy a community risks being unprepared. The worst case 
option is an instance of a contingent policy. Robust policies offer a vigorous decision that yields 
preferable results under multiple scenarios, and include two options. The no-regrets option is 
justified by current climate conditions, and further justified when climate change is considered 
across many possible scenarios. The low-regrets option is low cost in the short term and can be 
adapted over time to address several possible scenarios. This latter option allows for the 
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distribution of costs over time as opposed to one-time lump sum investments to carry out a 
particular policy that might be abandoned (Berke & Lyles, 2013). 
2.4 Planning for Vulnerable Groups 
2.4.1 Fundamental Considerations 
There are generalized public risks and susceptibility to extreme flooding and coastal storms that 
planners account for, but when planning for the most socially vulnerable and low-income 
segment of the public, special consideration should be given for certain socioeconomic 
limitations. Beyond their recognized characteristics that make them vulnerable to these disasters, 
low income groups are constantly faced with deficient resources, knowledge of risks, and 
capacity/influence that exacerbate their situation and less frequently get addressed by planners. 
2.4.1.1 Resources 
Those living in poverty are more likely to experience wage and food insecurity, lack homeowner 
or renter insurance, have fewer backing social resources, have access to transportation, and 
experience housing instability. Insufficient access to any one of these resources diminishes the 
ability of an impoverished family to properly prepare for and endure a disaster unscathed. 
Because of their economic vulnerability, low income households are unable to absorb the 
financial impact of a disruptive severe storm event. Necessary storm-related preparations in the 
form of food, fuel and logistics impose an unfathomable demand on the finances of these 
households. Living month to month, they lack the disposable income to bail themselves out of 
making risky decisions. Often working temporary or part-time jobs, they lack the luxury of 
supporting themselves for several days away from home that would require setting aside enough 
cash or credit, sacrificing pay, and sacrificing the ability to pay next month’s rent or mortgage 
payment and other mandatory expenses. These households also often have minimal or limited 
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familial or social networks to rely upon in these times of financial strain (Behr & Diaz, 2014; 
Baussan, 2015). 
Familial and social networks made up of extended family, friends, associates and colleagues are 
a component of social capital. The presence of these networks influence evacuation and 
sheltering decisions that low income households make as they may coordinate financial, 
emotional and knowledge-based resources with members of their networks. Low income 
households that have deficient social capital are both unable to bear the financial strain of a 
disaster and have no means to evacuate or seek shelter if no emergency facilities are nearby 
(Behr & Diaz, 2014). The social capital of many low income households is a direct reflection of 
their housing situation. 
The place of residence is arguably the most vital resource financially and in preventing potent 
impacts and harm from coastal disasters. An unfortunate truth is that even when low-income 
households are also homeowners they tend to miss out on adequate recovery assistance funds. 
Housing assistance after extreme weather events often favors middle-class victims as award 
amounts are based on housing values rather than the cost of repairs. Housing serves as a lifeline 
between the low-income household and the elements, with construction, age, weatherization and 
location all contributing to the effectiveness of their defense. Low-income housing is more often 
than not poorly constructed, aging, in less desirable neighborhoods that lack quality services, and 
are unfortified (Ross, 2013). 
2.4.1.2 Perception of Risks 
Failure to acknowledge the risks associated with weather events made worse by climate change 
is as a matter of fact, a generalized public dilemma. Vulnerable groups are one segment of the 
latent public that place a low priority on action except that they happen to be more at risk. 
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Planning domains like hazard mitigation and disaster risk reduction lack publics that have the 
same degree of appreciation of the problems as planners. 
Countless studies have shown that the public is aware of the risks from climate change and 
natural hazards but yet assign low priorities to taking action. By involving stakeholders, planners 
can increase public understanding of these issues and persuade potential constituency groups of 
the need for action. Planners motivate broader involvement by directly engaging more groups 
and by providing public forums for increasing awareness and understanding that public risks are 
mass-produced and shared problems (Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013). 
Connecting back to resources, a low-income household’s assessment of impending risk is shaped 
by their social resources or capital, as are their preparation, evacuation and sheltering decisions. 
Through their peer networks, households gather knowledge of available resources, and exit 
strategies, routes and destinations. Without peer anecdotes, isolated households can become 
complacent toward their safety when more frequent less severe storms given them a false sense 
of security. The most severe storms that are the largest threat to vulnerable groups are often 
thought of as off in a distant future or not a threat to their community as low-income households 
have dodged these storms before (Behr & Diaz, 2014). 
Until members of the at-risk public experience a severe hazard event or comprehend their 
urgency through engagement, they will continue to place them at a low level of priority for their 
own consideration. Disasters offer an opportunity for the public to become familiar with the 
response and recovery process and learn how to better prepare for the next event. Unfortunately, 
though, for those that are most vulnerable, they may not get a second chance to demonstrate their 
disaster readiness and learning progress from one event to the next (Schwab, 2014). 
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2.4.1.3 Capacity & Influence 
Residents of low-income communities are not as able to inform or influence government 
officials or are able to recover as quickly or completely as individuals who live in more 
financially secure neighborhoods (Baussan, 2015). Evidence from hurricanes in the 1990s and 
2000s revealed that income was a critical factor in the amount of damage and pace of recovery. 
Owner-occupied housing and housing located in higher income neighborhoods suffer less 
damage and recover more quickly than multifamily housing (Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & 
Highfield, 2014). Lower income minority neighborhoods in cities that endured substantial 
damage from a hurricane were more devastated and slower to receive back their original 
residents and return to normal than neighborhoods that were predominantly middle to upper 
income and non-minority (Green, Kouassi, & Mambo, 2013). 
Residents in more whole and connected communities have means to assist in recovery and 
prevent displacement while identifying local needs for officials during an extreme weather event, 
although many low-income neighborhoods are disengaged and declining (Baussan, 2015). With 
rental households often left out of outreach efforts or are deemed inaccessible, low-income 
families are regularly unaware of actions taking place or resources available considering a 
majority of low-income households are renters. Higher-income evacuees are able to secure 
surplus housing in a community during a disaster thanks to heightened knowledge and eligibility, 
and thus they restrict the ability of low-income renters to find affordable housing in the wake of 
being displaced. Even when low-income families seemingly benefit from government decisions, 
without consulting with affected individuals, officials may bring low-cost housing up to safety 
standards and unknowingly price families out such that they are no longer able to find safe and 
affordable housing (Ross, 2013). 
 56 
Without consulting with residents of poor neighborhoods, weaknesses in evacuation plans may 
never get exposed. Disaster plans of vulnerable communities are not saturated with local 
knowledge nor are they consistent with local conditions, concerns, and capacities of 
disadvantaged citizens. One study found that, in the comprehensive planning process, of the 
typical stakeholders included, groups representing disadvantaged people living in hazardous 
areas were present in 5% of jurisdictions (Burby, 2003). Compared with middle and upper 
income families, those belonging in the lowest income groups are inherently limited in self-
governance (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011). 
Accompanied by the general apathy toward disaster preparedness and mitigation among low-
income groups is uncertainty, distrust and suspicion that further strains their ability to influence 
as they are more consumed by discrimination and inequality (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, 
& Rausch, 2011). Directly correlated with having deficient social capital, isolated residents are 
less likely to be rescued, seek medical help, evacuate, and receive assistance from others. The 
highest prevalence of isolated individuals with few social ties is in poor African American 
communities (Aldrich, 2014). Getting often-neglected stakeholders into the planning process 
provides planners with an important tool for increasing their political effectiveness (Burby, 2003; 
Berke & Lyles, 2013). The economic situation of individuals and the sensitivity and disposition 
of personnel and officials present formidable barriers and opportunities for achieving full 
recovery and ultimately resiliency (Green, Kouassi, & Mambo, 2013). Breaking down barriers to 
resiliency among marginalized low-income groups hinges on planning that is in conjunction with 
a process whereby officials, residents and organizations work together to build community 
capacity to take on locally defined priorities (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 
2011). 
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2.4.2 Community Resilience 
A thriving community is a united district where face-to-face interaction is fundamental to 
building trust within and throughout. Individual members of the community can feel empowered 
through collective action to hold each other and their authorities accountable. A strategy for 
building capacity to achieve disaster resiliency within low-income groups finds a balance 
between engagement of local residents, reinforcement of expert and local knowledge, and 
activities that match marginalized populations’ values and accountability with goals within the 
community. Accountability and autonomy together grant low-income groups the authority to 
develop their own plans and to strive for communal ambitions (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, 
Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011). 
2.4.2.1 Combining Approaches 
The concept of community resilience is a framework for enhancing disaster resilience at the scale 
of the community that borrows from the strengths of disaster preparedness, response and 
recovery, and climate adaptation (Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014). Communities themselves are 
agglomerations of individuals and groups in a somewhat defined area that may have similar 
ideals, goals and perspectives, and certain cultural and social attributes. Community resilience 
describes the collective ability of a neighborhood or geographically defined area to deal with 
stressors and efficiently resume the rhythms of daily life through cooperation following shocks 
(Aldrich, 2014). A resilient community resembles a system of resilient socioecological systems. 
Communities as systems of systems are expected to function proficiently, but watchful design 
and engineering goes into ensuring they function effectively and resiliently in the face of crises 
like coastal disasters (Schwab, 2014). 
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Steps taken to make coastal communities more resilient can also make them more equitable in 
the long run. Efforts to achieve coastal resilience must acknowledge the disparate vulnerabilities 
of individuals and groups, as well imbalances in the distributions of benefits and costs associated 
with resilience outcomes. Resilience policies and projects should aim to reduce burdens on the 
most vulnerable in communities, and seek to distribute benefits and amenities fairly and in ways 
that fully benefit all socio-economic groups. Coastal resilience should be understood as a unique 
opportunity to raise the life prospects and living conditions of the most disadvantaged in the 
community and remove or at least reduce vulnerabilities as the next storm hits. Hurricane 
Katrina unabatedly demonstrated that the drivers and root causes of poverty and inequity need to 
be confronted if disaster risk is to be reduced (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
2.4.2.2 Social Policy 
Applying a social justice lens to climate change helps to direct policies toward priorities that 
most directly resonate with the communities that are most vulnerable to its destructive 
consequences (Mearns & Norton, 2009). Social capital and social equity are two concepts of 
social theory that can be adapted to the urban environment specifically in identifying unique 
attributes and areas of need in communities (Aldrich, 2014). A perennial need in dealing with 
coastal flooding and storms is to help poor and vulnerable people manage climate risks. Climate 
risk reduction and poverty alleviation can both be achieved mutually and fully when social 
policy approaches to adaptation are prioritized. Social policies have the added advantage of 
empowering the poor and helping them to realize the voice and political prowess needed to 
access risk management tools. Social policy can play a concerted role for climate change 
adaptation due to its unique ability to unveil an arena of policies where equitable outcomes are 
attained (Mearns & Norton, 2009). 
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The earliest known definition of social capital identified social capital as good will, fellowship, 
mutual sympathy, and social interaction among a group of individuals and families who make up 
a social unit. Several disciplines have adopted the concept of social capital which identifies how 
involvement and participation in groups can have positive outcomes for the individual and the 
community. A more recent definition refers to social capital as the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources that are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. This characterization is 
expanded to the role of social capital in generating benefits beyond individuals at the 
neighborhood and community level. From a community perspective, social capital is the features 
of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate action and cooperation 
for mutual benefit (Aldrich, 2014). 
Social cohesion and networks have been a proven method for nurturing long-term resilience 
during and after catastrophe. Social capital can be utilized as an asset for experts to be 
communicated what resources are accessed through social networks, levels of trust in 
communities, collective action, and other public goods by individuals. Disasters have become 
platforms for reform in communities wherein practitioners have accounted for the increase in 
those that are at risk to disasters and that disasters disrupt the fabric of community life and stress 
social systems (Aldrich, 2014). In times of stress and crises social networks and relationships can 
serve as critical support systems (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). Friendships, neighborly relations, 
well-developed patterns of community and neighborhood socializing and sharing exemplify 
ways that a community can be prepared for an extreme flood or severe storm (Glavovic & Smith, 
2014). Incorporating social enhancement and maintenance into resilience fostering can counter 
the perception of a paradoxical relationship between resilience and equity (Baussan, 2015). 
 60 
Integrating goals of equity, in the context of low-income communities, climate resilience is not 
necessarily about bouncing back, but rather about bouncing forward to eliminate inequities and 
the unsustainable use of resources. Shifting the pattern of attention in low income areas from 
stagnant underfunded initiatives and infrastructure to enhancing social cohesion reinforces 
climate resiliency and improves fiscal and human health. Improvements to hard infrastructure 
often comes at a cost to soft infrastructure, that includes institutions vital to maintaining the 
health, cultural, and social guidelines of a community. Planning for resilient communities that 
neglects reinforcing social interconnectivity overlooks the ability of social cohesion to protect 
highly vulnerable communities from the adverse impacts of dangerous coastal events (Baussan, 
2015). 
Table 3. Capacity Building to Maximize Interaction 
Time banking and community currency Provide incentives or rewards for those who volunteer 
Focus group meetings and social events Casual atmosphere to personalize planning and air 
out issues related to planning 
Visioning, charrettes and workshops For establishing goals and deciding on strategies that 
are consensus driven 
Planning community layout and 
architectural structures 
Careful planning of the physical layout of 
communities, neighborhoods, and housing 
complexes can affect creation and maintenance of 
social capital 
Source: (Aldrich, 2014; Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011) 
Breaking down barriers to disaster resiliency hinges on community planning that embraces the 
idea that public officials, local people, and independent mediating organizations work together in 
a process aimed at building community capacity to engage, organize, and take action on locally 
defined priorities (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011). Given the importance of 
social capital in determining resilience to shocks, NGOs and government agencies have adopted 
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a number of policies and programs shown to increase reservoirs of trust and deepen networks. 
The various methods build on existing networks and community activities as spaces for 
incorporating disaster issues and resilience actions or create whole new networks and activities 
focused specifically on disaster issues (Aldrich, 2014). 
2.5 Plan Qualities 
In a broad sense, two dimensions of plan quality principles are conceived for application in plan 
quality evaluations. The internal plan quality dimension captures principles that guide the 
content and format of the key components of a plan. The external plan quality dimension serves 
principles related to how well the plan is compatible with its local situation to maximize its 
efficacy and influence. Goals, fact base, policies and actions, and implementation and monitoring 
make up those internal plan quality principles. To be expected, inter-organizational coordination 
and participation then compose the external dimension of plan quality (Berke, Smith, & Lyles , 
2012). 
Goals, affected by the expanse of values, convey a vision for future desired conditions. Fact base 
delivers the empirical basis to which key hazard risks, susceptibilities and vulnerabilities are 
identified and prioritized for policy making to be free from gaps. Policies and actions ensure that 
the vision laid out in plan goals is achieved by guiding decisions influenced by fact and 
experience. Implementation and monitoring involves the coordinating of organizational 
responsibilities, timelines, and funds to implement a plan. Monitoring specifically, involves 
tracking the extent to which policies are carried out and how conditions have changed over time. 
Inter-organizational coordination is then a recognition and demonstration of the interdependence 
of actions among local and regional entities. Rather relatedly, participation is a recognition and 
demonstration of the role formal and informal actors such as governmental bodies, private-sector 
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institutions, nonprofits, and individual citizens have in preparing plans (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 
2012). 
2.5.1 Goals 
Typically, goals for resilience are conservative and conventional in accounting for efficiency and 
public safety but not other arguably more important values for long-range resiliency, like social 
and environmental equity. Maintaining efficiency and public safety are bases for persistence 
rather than constructive transformation that result from capitalizing on those windows of 
opportunity (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Goals that guide all other principles to secure long-term 
resilience and promote equity are transformative goals with a vision for building back better, and 
restorative goals for minimizing losses (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). 
Within a disaster recovery plan, goals are attentive to the nature and magnitude of a disaster, the 
needs of individuals and households, broader community characteristics, and a wide range of 
appropriate housing options to meet disaster needs and enable individuals, households, and 
communities to rebuild quickly and effectively (Cantrell, Nahmens, Peavey, Bryant, & Stair, 
2012). 
2.5.2 Fact Base 
A fact base that does not capture the whole picture is already debilitating for future action 
considering policymakers cannot change what is not measured. An inadequate fact base is based 
solely on maps that delineate hazards, and quantified current property and population exposure to 
hazards. These are neglecting potential future levels of exposure and alternative future scenarios 
of exposure and do not account for uncertainty and the possibility for a range of future changes 
(Berke & Lyles, 2013; Baussan, 2015). 
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A comprehensive fact base identifies localized hazards, estimates population and property 
exposed, and models disaster impact scenarios of varying severity and exposure from changing 
development patterns (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Glavovic & Smith, 
2014). 
2.5.2.1 Vulnerability Index 
Agencies can create a social and climate vulnerability index to reduce vulnerability and increase 
resilience in low income communities. Data from the index would also help planners and 
emergency preparedness personnel understand the geography and manner to which resources 
should be focused (Baussan, 2015). 
2.5.3 Policies 
Regardless of goals, action all too often focuses on structural projects rather than on 
comprehensive strategies that coordinate multiple economic, environmental, and social policies 
and investments (Berke & Lyles, 2013). A superior array of policies is one that is proactive not 
reactive (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
2.5.3.1 Preparedness, Recovery & Restoration 
Building back better can be realized through action by removing blight, smart growth, enhancing 
public safety, and distributing services and facilities equitably among others. Actions such as 
repairing and replacing development, and resuming economic activity satisfy restorative goals 
(Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). 
In planning for disaster recovery, policies should support individuals, households and 
communities in returning to self-sufficiency as quickly as possible, affirm and fulfill 
fundamental disaster housing responsibilities and roles, increase collective capacity and ability to 
meet the needs of those affected, build capabilities to provide a broad range of flexible housing 
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options (sheltering, interim housing, and permanent housing), better integrate disaster housing 
assistance with related community support services and long-term recovery efforts, and improve 
disaster housing planning to better recover from disaster. These policies might also be temporary 
building moratoriums, graduated standards for activating building acquisition and relocation, 
post-disaster housing siting and supply for sheltering, interim housing and permanent housing, 
provisions for adjusting public facility capital improvements, provisions for changing land use 
regulations, changing building code standards (Cantrell, Nahmens, Peavey, Bryant, & Stair, 
2012; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). 
2.5.3.2 Infrastructure & Assets 
Government policies should generally minimize displacement under extreme flooding and 
disaster scenarios. In tackling inequities governments can enhance the affordable housing stock, 
invest in urban infrastructure improvements, and improve access to public transportation 
particularly in low income neighborhoods. Weatherizing existing low income housing as a 
preventative measure for expecting the worst, and prioritizing post-disaster repairs to have the 
greatest impact in low income areas can increase climate resilience. In the event that portions of 
or whole communities are displaced, voluntary buyout programs should be in place and 
community relocation programs should be devised with communities to not sacrifice social 
connectedness or economic vitality (Baussan, 2015). 
2.5.3.3 Awareness & Knowledge 
Operating in the space where climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction overlap, policies can 
encompass awareness, training, education and capacity building programs targeted for specific 
communities including those most vulnerable. Sufficient resources should be reserved to sustain 
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them, and they should be presented in a way so as not to inject fear to citizens that might occur 
with negative messaging (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). 
2.5.4 Inter-Organizational Coordination 
Unlike the first three principles, inter-organizational coordination can either be present or not 
present in plans and not just of good quality or bad quality. Pulling from climate change 
adaptation, coordination would look like an enhancement of the role of local government, and 
adequate resources provided in support of collaborative governance and local capacity building, 
local advocacy and disasters as opportunity (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). In recognizing that 
recovery tasks are interconnected and that a systems approach to institutional management can 
enhance adaptive capacity, inter-organizational coordination applies systems thinking (Schwab, 
2014).  
2.5.4.1 Plan Integration & Horizontal Coordination 
Invaluable collaboration is achieved when there is effective horizontal and vertical integration 
and coordination of actions across a region or system. In a unified region or system, there is a 
free flow of information, transparent communication, shared resources, and parallel practices 
(Schwab, 2014; Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Significant 
interoperability between organizations at all levels is key to a whole government approach 
whereby policies, programs and actions are developed and implemented across a number of 
distinct actors (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). This is accomplished 
by decentralizing implementation where decision-making authority to carry out operations is 
spread out across departments, and accountability is emphasized in decision-making (Schwab, 
2014). Other components of coordination could be identifying representatives to serve on local 
recovery task forces charged with directing rebuilding, identifying external organizations to 
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serve as sources of resources from the network of disaster assistance, and identifying and 
building trust with elected and civic leaders of climate and economically vulnerable communities 
via vulnerability indexes (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Baussan, 2015). 
2.5.5 Participation 
An absence of robust participation in plans is rooted in the limited support for pre-disaster 
planning with considerable public indifference and local official reluctance to act on public risks. 
As a result, forward movement on action has been sluggish and limited (Berke & Lyles, 2013). 
Reserving a place for inclusive and continued participation can ignite communities and planners 
to improve on their plans, and if a standard of excellence is established, momentum may gather 
to increase the speed of learning and quality in plans (Brody, 2003). 
2.5.5.1 Diverse Communication 
Residents often become disconnected from the planning process when abstract policy issues are 
addressed during the development of the comprehensive plan, though they are more engaged 
when they become aware of the impacts of hazards and climate risks on their personal property 
and safety. This type of awareness can be achieved through targeted information dissemination 
in linking planning problems to specific sites or properties, and presenting problems to the public 
in a way that is comprehensible during the planning process. Positive and committed leadership 
in government, the private sector and the community is required to improve the communication 
about climate risks and establish planning and decisions horizons focused on combating future 
vulnerabilities. Community engagement processes and community partnerships for action can 
inform leadership. A bottom-up approach to community engagement should be positioned that 
facilitates a consultative partnership supporting, rather than being replaced by, strong leadership.  
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Leadership within low income 
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communities should be championed by state and local organizations by supporting community 
engagement programs (Baussan, 2015). 
2.5.5.2 Capacity Building 
Informed, engaged and prepared communities, inclusive of all citizens, that compliments 
leadership requires a community with high adaptive capacity capable of managing risks 
especially during the response and recovery phases and seizing opportunities that arise as a 
consequence of disasters (Brody, 2003). Informed and prepared communities also need the 
support of awareness, training, education and capacity building programs (Serrao-Neumann, 
Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Stakeholder groups can boost collective planning 
capacity by bringing knowledge, expertise, and resources to the planning process. Stakeholder 
participation can also educate the public through involvement in the process, which can facilitate 
and increase the pace of collective learning, and help prepare for the impacts of climate change 
to ensure that a range of development priorities are not undermined in the future (Brody, 2003; 
Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
2.5.5.3 Participation Techniques 
Participation in the planning, response and recovery process can take on different forms and 
involve many actors. Participation can and should occur in the pre-event phase and after to 
adaptively manage the recovery process and fit transforming conditions and needs. Participation 
involves community liaison designation, citizen advisory committees, public meetings, media 
releases through radio, television and local papers, and in public notices, public surveys and 
online. Participation should have record of all involved by including a narrative on participants, 
how they participated, and how they affected the progression of the plan (Berke, Cooper, 
Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014) 
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2.5.6 Implementation and Monitoring 
Elements of implementation often do not assign organizational responsibility or identify 
timelines and sources of funding for carrying out action, and monitoring programs often fail to 
specify indicators and sources of data to track progress toward plan goals and assign organization 
responsible for data collection (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Monitoring is necessary to ensure that 
decisions in the recovery process align with the community’s vision and long-term recovery 
goals and objectives outlined in the pre-disaster conceived recovery plan. It also ensures 
accountability, transparency, and equity in the recovery process in being able to set a time-table 
for reaching milestones and clearly communicate progress to the public and stakeholders. 
Monitoring allows damage and economic loss assessments to be reviewed and the need to 
modify or supplement post-disaster actions to be evaluated. Reviewing priorities for 
implementation on a regular basis is necessary post-disaster to accordingly adjust as 
circumstances warrant. The result of monitoring might be recommendations for enactment, 
extension, or repeal of emergency ordinances and procedures that affect long-term development 
(Schwab, 2014). 
Implementation and monitoring is represented in post-event roles and responsibilities, pre-
disaster maintenance to keep implementers familiar with the plan, criteria to guide determination 
of partial or full activation of the plan, monitoring indicators to track outcomes, use of recovery 
funds and evaluate and adapt policies, and a space provided for learning and increased financial 
support in climate change adaptation policy and practice (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & 
Horney, 2014; Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
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Chapter 3. Methods 
3.1 Research Strategy 
The core of this assessment is to analyze the ability of jurisdictional plans to tackle the 
intensifying coastal perils of storms and flooding, specifically for the low-income segment of the 
population that is statistically more vulnerable to these dangers. In order to successfully arrive at 
conclusive evidence of whether or not these plans are accomplishing that feat, I package 
recommendations from peer reviewed studies and protocol items from related evaluation 
protocol into a replicable plan evaluation protocol explicit to reducing the vulnerability and risks 
of low-income populations. 
The hazard mitigation, climate adaptation, emergency management, and disaster recovery plans 
of the two coastal cities of Norfolk and New York serve as the subject of evaluation. New York 
and Norfolk, VA are two cities that have been on the forefront of planning for coastal storms, 
flooding and climate change. As noted earlier, both cities have also experienced a federally 
declared disaster since 2010, both of which were hurricanes that brought damaging winds and 
widespread flooding, in Hurricane Irene for the City of Norfolk, and Hurricane Sandy for the 
City of New York. This is important as it means that both Norfolk and New York have received 
federal disaster relief and recovery funding, and have had motive to invest in improving their 
pre-event planning. 
To further emphasize the focus on reducing the vulnerability of the low-income portion of the 
most susceptible populations, certain customary principles in disaster plan evaluation protocol 
are omitted in place of more appropriate indicators. The resulting fine-tuned evaluation protocol 
is in the perspective of the planner and plan creator who plans for an area with a fairly high 
number of low-income residents, even if wealthy residents are also present. As income inequality 
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has increased in New York where low-income neighborhoods stagnate, and whole portions of 
Norfolk are overcome by poverty, both cities satisfy the low-income condition of the evaluation 
protocol. Ultimately, though the specially designed evaluation protocol correlates content present 
in plans with a determination of plan ability, the framework that is laid out on planning for low-
income vulnerable populations in the literature review shapes the interpretation of the plans’ 
proficiency in reducing vulnerability to low-income persons. 
3.2 Preliminary Data Collection 
The accumulation of plans from Norfolk and New York is the preliminary data collection phase 
while the principal data collection phase involves dissecting the quality and content of these 
plans as it relates to each item in the evaluation protocol. The score given to each protocol item 
or indicator for each particular evaluated plan represents points of data to be analyzed once all 
plans have been evaluated completely.  
Prior to evaluating the plans, to offer additional context to patterns of vulnerability in both cities 
and areas where social impacts are most likely to occur following a disaster, I conduct 
vulnerability assessments incorporating pieces of information that are most widely cited as 
indicators of vulnerability to coastal storms and flooding. This information provides a 
benchmark to validate that the plans are or are not justified in their approaches to enhancing the 
preparedness and adaptability of low-income communities particularly vulnerable. The 
vulnerability indexes that are created influence the plan evaluation process in relation to content 
relevant to low-income and other vulnerable populations. 
3.2.1 Plan Assimilation & Refinement 
Plans to be examined in detail under the evaluation protocol were predominantly assimilated 
from electronic sources. Government and organization, academic and private sector sites, and 
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academic journals were perused to acquire plans of interest. News articles, press releases, 
PowerPoint presentations, links from related sites, and journal articles offered knowledge of the 
existence of plans not immediately apparent in initial searches. Around twenty plans were 
identified for each city that included action for coastal hazards and climate change risks such as 
sea-level rise, flooding events, and coastal storms. The plans were produced over a period from 
around 2003 to the present and represented private-sector, local government, regional 
government, academic, and state plans. To limit the reach of plans that would be included in the 
evaluation I placed a limit on the date to be no earlier than 2011 for Norfolk and no earlier than 
2012 for New York, or around the time that each had a federal disaster declaration. The list of 
plans was narrowed down to six for each city. Individually the plans were quite different from 
each other without substantial overlap for its respective jurisdiction, though they had 
counterparts across jurisdictions. Collectively, the plans represent collaborative private sector 
efforts, nonprofit endeavors, resilience-themed comprehensive plans, 100 Resilient Cities funded 
reports, neighborhood scale plans, federally required hazard mitigation plans, and HUD funded 
disaster recovery plans. 
3.2.1.1 Norfolk Plans 
Specific plans for Hampton Roads and Norfolk were obtained from websites for the HRPDC; the 
City of Norfolk; Hampton Roads and Norfolk’s emergency management agencies; state divisions 
like the Department of Housing and Community Development, the Department of Environmental 
Quality’s Coastal Zone Management program, and the Department of Conservation and 
Recreation; the Mitigation and Research Institute and the Center for Sea Level Rise at Old 
Dominion University; Resilient Virginia; Wetlands Watch; federal agencies like HUD and 
FEMA; Structures of Coastal Resilience; and Norfolk Resilient City. 
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One criteria for plan selection was that the city of Norfolk must be within the geographic scope 
of the plan, though it was not required that it be the focus of attention. The second requirement 
was that the plan, as a means to capture a broad spectrum of plans, must address coastal storms, 
climate change (as adapting to), sea level rise, flooding, and/or coastal erosion. 
Once all pertinent plans for Norfolk were retrieved as complete documents, they were compiled 
into a full list by name of the document, planning domain or approach, name of the organization 
responsible, sector the organization belongs in, geographic scope of the plan, and date of 
publication. Each of these characteristics are important as they may come into play when 
interpreting and forging conclusions of plan evaluation data, to what degree a plan 
underperforms or outperforms its scope, and to understand unforeseen factors influencing the 
quality of the plans. All plans were published either around the time of Hurricane Irene or later, 
though plans published most recently were included more often. 
Table 4. Final List of Evaluated Plans for Norfolk, VA 
Document Title Domain/ 
Approach 
Organization Sector Jurisdiction Publish 
Date 
RE.invest City Report 2015 
Norfolk 
Risk reduction Re:Focus Partners Non-profit Norfolk 2015 
Southside Hampton Roads 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Hazard 
mitigation 
HRPDC Regional 
government 
Southside 
Hampton 
Roads 
8/1/2011 
PlaNorfolk 2030 Hazard 
mitigation 
City of Norfolk Local 
government 
Norfolk 3/26/2013 
Tidewater Rising Resiliency 
Challenge 
Regenerative 
design 
Wetlands Watch, 
ODU, Hampton U 
Non-profit, 
academic 
Norfolk 1/1/2016 
ThRIVe: Resilience in 
Virginia 
Community 
resilience, risk 
reduction 
Commonwealth of 
Virginia 
State 
government 
Hampton 
Roads 
10/1/2015 
Norfolk Resilience Strategy Risk 
reduction, 
climate 
adaptation 
Norfolk Office of 
Resilience 
Local 
government 
Norfolk 10/28/2015 
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3.2.1.2 New York Plans 
Specific plans for New York were acquired through websites for the Department of City 
Planning; the City of New York; New York’s emergency management division; state divisions 
like the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery; New York’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency; 
and Rebuild by Design. 
Both criteria were similar as for Norfolk, though the first requirement for New York plans was 
that the plans be either synonymous with the city itself geographically or be for a subarea of the 
city like a borough, group of neighborhoods, or neighborhood. The second requirement was that 
each plan must address coastal storms, climate change (adapting to), sea level rise, flooding, 
and/or coastal erosion. 
Once all pertinent plans for New York were retrieved as complete documents, like Norfolk’s 
plans, they were compiled into a full list by name of the document, planning domain or 
approach, name of the organization responsible, type of organization or its sector, geographic 
scope of the plan, and date of publication. All plans were published either around the time of 
Hurricane Sandy or later. Emphasis was placed on plans that were published most recently. 
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Table 5. Final List of Evaluated Plans for New York City 
Document Title Domain/ 
Approach 
Organization Sector Jurisdiction Publish 
Date 
Lower Manhattan Protect 
and Connect: NDRC Phase 
2 Application 
Mitigation, 
regenerative 
design, 
preparedness 
New York City Office 
of  
Recovery and 
Resiliency 
Local 
government 
Manhattan 10/1/2015 
Resilient Neighborhoods: 
Edgewater Park 
Risk 
reduction, 
adaptation 
Department of City 
Planning 
Local 
government 
Bronx 10/1/2015 
The City of New York 
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
2014 
Hazard 
mitigation 
NYC Emergency 
Management 
Local 
government 
New York 
City 
1/31/2014 
One New York: The Plan 
for a Strong and Just City 
Adaptation, 
mitigation, 
community 
resilience 
The City of New 
York 
Local 
government 
New York 
City 
4/22/2015 
PlaNYC: A Stronger, More 
Resilient New York 
Adaptation, 
mitigation, 
recovery, 
preparedness 
The City of New 
York 
Local 
government 
New York 
City 
6/11/2013 
The Big "U": Rebuild by 
Design  
Regenerative 
design 
Bjarke Ingels Group Private-
sector 
Manhattan 6/1/2014 
 
3.2.2 Plan Background & Status 
Accounting for the varying uses of plans from information document to policy document to 
implementation roadmap, the background and status of each plan is identified and noted. To 
ascertain an understanding of the generalized characteristics, introductory or appended 
information that does not contribute to the plan evaluations, is scanned. In regards to status, 
many plans written and published by local governments describe briefly the approval process 
and the data of plan approval by a respective governing body as a matter of protocol. Others, 
chiefly those created by consultants, non-profits and academia do not always make this 
information public in the document itself. Local governments typically are responsible for 
adopting consulted plans and putting the recommendations and information to use. Most recent 
budget and financial report information for Norfolk and New York City are inspected to find 
 75 
current, past or future spending on plans, policies, and programs based out of the evaluated 
plans. Whatever progress reports, annual updates, or press releases exist for the evaluated plans 
are also gathered and examined for key status information. All of this accessory information does 
not affect the plan evaluations in any way, but it does influence the analysis of the plan 
evaluations, specifically as to the connection between quality vs. scope, and quality vs. adoption. 
3.2.3 Vulnerability Assessment 
A vulnerability assessment of the two examined cities is conducted by collecting and analyzing a 
pool of information that illustrates the characteristics of these urban centers and of their 
inhabitants. This information is specifically representative of the social and physical 
vulnerability, and hazard exposure of the neighborhoods that make up their composition. Social 
vulnerability is comprised of socioeconomic status, household composition, minority status, 
housing type, transportation availability, and community facilities. All of the data except for 
community facilities can be assembled from the U.S. census and American Community Survey 
(Berke, et al., 2015). Physical vulnerability is composed of limited infrastructural conditions and 
construction data. Hazard exposure for neighborhoods in the two cities consists of concentrations 
of people and buildings located in flood-prone areas. 
3.2.3.1 Census Data 
Specific social vulnerability data points for each block group in both Norfolk and New York City 
are collected from the 2010 U.S. Census. The 12 variables of data gathered from the census are 
measures of social vulnerability from the Social Vulnerability Index for Disaster Management 
developed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. The Social Vulnerability Index typically 
includes 15 variables, however 3 were excluded that were not included in the most recent U.S. 
Census (Berke, et al., 2015). 
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Table 6. Social Vulnerability Index for Disaster Management Using Census Variables 
Domain Variable Description 
Socioeconomic status % Individuals below poverty Individuals below poverty =”under 
.50” + “.50 to .74” + “.75 to .99” 
 Per capita income Mean income computed for every 
person in census block group 
 % Persons with less than high 
school diploma 
Percentage of persons 25 years of 
age or older, with less than a 12th-
grade education 
Household consumption % Persons 65 years of age or older  
 % Persons 17 years of age or 
younger 
 
 % Male or Female householder, no 
spouse present, with children under 
18 
“Other family: male householder, 
no wife present, with own children 
under 18 years” + “Other family: 
female householder, no husband 
present, with own children under 18 
years” 
Minority status % minority Total of the following: “Black or 
African American alone” + 
“American Indian or Alaska Native 
alone” + “Asian alone” + “Native 
Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander 
alone” + “some other race alone” + 
“two or more races” + “Hispanic or 
Latino – White alone” 
 % Persons 5 years of age or older 
who speak English less than well 
For all age groups and all 
languages- the total of the persons 
who speak English “not well” or 
“not at all” 
Housing/Transportation % multiunit structure Percentage of housing units with 10 
or more units in structure 
 % mobile homes Percentage of housing units that are 
mobile homes 
 Crowding At household level, more people 
than rooms. Percentage of total 
occupied housing units with more 
than one person per room 
 No vehicle available Percentage of households with no 
vehicle available 
 77 
3.2.3.2 Vulnerability Mapping 
The data points for each data category are compiled and mapped by block group GIS layer for 
both the City of Norfolk and the City of New York. The census data provides socioeconomic and 
demographic information that might not be obtainable otherwise but is limited in its picture of 
social vulnerability. To supplement this data, several GIS datasets of community facilities are 
acquired from each city’s respective open data site. Facilities such as hospitals, police and fire 
stations, schools, senior and day care centers, shelters and other miscellaneous facilities are 
mapped to overlay on top of the census tracts. The GIS data depicts the social resources of 
people inherent in their proximity to critical facilities. 
To convert the qualitative associations of the facilities data into quantitative the distance between 
and from each spatial feature is measured. That is, the straight-line distance from each feature 
representing a specific feature is calculated city-wide. The distance is depicted as equally spaced 
rings where each ring symbolizes a set range of distance. The distance values are then averaged 
across census tracts so that each census tract can then contain a value for its average distance 
from a specified type of facility. Distance from critical facilities together with census 
characteristics of the population make up the complete social vulnerability index. 
In order to maintain accuracy and objectivity, first, percentile ranks are calculated for each data 
point. Otherwise, each data point would unequally contribute to the overall measure of social 
vulnerability. For instance, the percentage of those in poverty would inhabit a completely 
different numerical range than per capita income. Also, several data points would need to 
flipped, like per capita income, where the lower values represent the higher rank values and the 
higher values represent the lower ranks. Once all census tracts have rank values between 0 and 
100 for each social vulnerability data point, they are all combined into a complete measure of 
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social vulnerability. Since 17 individual data points were utilized in calculating the social 
vulnerability of all census tracts for Norfolk – 13 census data points and 4 types of facilities – 
values for social vulnerability can range from 0 to 1700, as a raw calculation. For New York 
City, in the same manner, 13 census data points were used and 10 types of facilities. The social 
vulnerability values for both though are further normalized, for the purposes of mapping, as 
percentile ranks. 
Physical vulnerability is then representative of the structural and infrastructural vulnerabilities of 
neighborhoods. In theory, the clearest image of structural vulnerability would be the structural 
condition of buildings of significant use or importance, however, no such information exists on 
any scale for either city. Still, road and shoreline conditions, green space, and building age and 
cost information supply enough data to formulate an acceptable physical vulnerability index. 
Road conditions only exist for New York City, while shoreline conditions such as wetlands, 
beaches, and green space exist in GIS form for both. 
Green space itself could be considered a quality of life measure, but for these purposes it is an 
indicator of the permeability and thus regenerative ability of the environment in each census 
tract. Green spaces are treated similarly to facilities, where the average distance from green space 
is the desired permutation for each census tract. Building age and cost data is collected through 
the American Community Survey and so it exists for both cities as well. Specifically, for housing 
cost, the percentage of housing that costs in the lowest or two lowest cost categories for New 
York and Norfolk is desired. All four data points (three for Norfolk) are normalized the same 
way through percentile ranks and added together to determine physical vulnerability. The 
physical vulnerability index is then similarly mapped, after normalizing and combining data 
points, by census tract to be illustrated at the same scale as the social vulnerability index. 
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Finally, mapping hazard exposure is more straightforward than social or physical vulnerability. 
Since hazard exposure is the proximity of buildings and people to hazard-prone areas, mapping it 
involves depicting the structures and population inhabiting areas in or near flood zones, storm 
surge zones, or future flood zones based on sea-level rise. Hazard exposure is precisely the 
product of density and exposure – in this instance flood exposure. Relying on census data and 
buildings GIS data, population and building density relying on tract areas, are calculated for each 
census tract. Both of these are overlaid on top of the 100-year flood zone, category 1-3 storm 
surge areas, and sea-level rise mapping. 
Flooding, storm surge and sea-level rise are all joined spatially, but each occurs in differing 
severities to warrant their depiction. The various flood zones are treated as a hierarchy of flood 
intensity and frequency. Values are assigned according to the number of different flood zones 
from current 100-year flood zone to 2050 category 3 storm surge zone, where the current flood 
zone is assigned a value of 1 and less frequent and future flood zones are assigned values higher. 
The distances from the lowest chance flood zone is measured and added to the value of that zone. 
All areas inside of the flood zones receive values according to which they are inside. The high 
and low values are reversed and normalized by percentile rank. To abide by the accepted 
equation for hazard exposure, the normalized density (population + building) is multiplied by the 
normalized exposure values. The resulting values for hazard exposure are again normalized 
through percentile ranks for mapping purposes. The hazard exposure index itself is thus the 
approximate number of buildings and people located within different degrees of at-risk areas 
measured according to density and the size of the at-risk area within each census tract. 
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3.2.3.3 Vulnerability Index 
Once all three – social vulnerability, physical vulnerability and hazard exposure – are mapped by 
census tract, they can be combined into a single measure for social impacts, the intersection of all 
three. To emphasize the focus on social vulnerability while also applying equal weight to each 
data point within the indexes, each data point is multiplied by a constant such that the collection 
of data points representing vulnerability and exposure add up to a total out of 100. The census 
blocks with resulting values closest to 100 are considered most likely to experience social 
impacts in the event of a disaster. Creating an index where values for total vulnerability are 
distributed between 0 and 100 is accomplished by normalizing the minimum and maximum 
scores for each measure of vulnerability before multiplying each by a constant. 
Since census tracts are not synonymous with neighborhood boundaries, neighborhood locations 
are mapped for each city alongside their census tracts data to aid in vulnerability determination. 
Neighborhood vulnerability potential is determined by observing the proximity of neighborhoods 
to their census tract counterparts. Whichever census tract a neighborhood is most closely related 
with becomes the basis for the level of vulnerability that is observed for a neighborhood. 
Because of the amount of estimation that goes into juxtaposing neighborhood units to census 
spatial forms, the neighborhood units are categorized as having either above average, near 
average or below average vulnerability. Neighborhoods with above average vulnerability are 
those at or above the 60th percentile compiled vulnerability score. Below average vulnerability is 
assigned for those at or below the 40th percentile. While near average vulnerability is determined 
as a value between 40th and 60th percentiles. Mapping is color coded according to each 10-point 
percentile range to dramatically simplify the process of categorizing the vulnerability of 
neighborhoods. 
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3.3 Plan Evaluation & Content Analysis 
3.3.1 Coding Instrument 
The coding instrument was developed based on a derivation of coding items to serve as a 
recording unit for the plan content data. Within the coding instrument, the protocol items are a 
holistic list of coding indicators that represent all relevant or necessary criteria adapted for this 
study. The items are selected to assess how well each of the plan quality principles for coastal 
storms and flooding are accounted for in the plans – specifically in enabling low-income 
populations to be better prepared and adaptable. The content analysis itself cannot forge a 
conclusion about whether a plan is of superior quality in that regard. The content analysis instead 
relies on the replicable coding instrument to generate reliable information regarding the content 
of plans (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Lyles 
& Stevens, 2014). 
To further emphasize the attention given to planning for the low-income, items that contribute 
more to the preparedness and adaptability of these groups are distinguished from other coding 
items. Their distinction lies in their weight that is greater than all other general population 
planning indicators. The weighting of coding items is done categorically, by criteria, rather than 
individually as all items are linked to similar items by a common criterion. Their specific 
weighting is detailed in the scoring process. These weighted items are cited as quality indicators 
that specifically enhance their ability to be prepared and adapt, or they are discussed in research 
and interpreted as influential indicators created for the coding instrument. All of these more 
heavily weighted items are subject to influence by the vulnerability index conducted prior to 
coding. Much of the lesser weighted criteria is still relevant to a degree in planning for low-
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income populations, though they are decidedly less important than the others holding greater 
weight either from emphasis or prevalence in the literature. 
3.3.2 Direction-Setting Principles 
The direction-setting principles for content analysis embody the vision and objectives of a plan. 
These principles encompass goals, fact base, and strategies/actions. Each of these principles are 
broken down into one or more criteria of which the protocol items are nestled under. General 
context and the overarching vision of the plan both greatly influence how the plan will transpire 
through goals especially, in deciding on what information is needed, and in making decisions on 
what strategies and actions to implement. 
3.3.2.1 Goals 
The principle of goals encompasses future desired conditions that the plan intends to achieve that 
reflects the breadth of values influencing the plan. In addition to general guidelines goals in all 
plans should follow, in applying to vulnerability reduction, this principle is divided up into the 
criteria of coordination, equity and social cohesion, restoration, adaptation and anticipation, 
minimal impacts, and sustainability. Though goals illustrate the intentions and purpose of a plan, 
no items under that principle receive added weight, even for equity and social cohesion, as goals 
do not specifically translate into anything physical or measurable. 
3.3.2.2 Fact Base 
The fact base of a plan to reduce vulnerability to coastal hazards is the evidence-based 
foundation to derive the characteristics of the people in harm’s way that contributes to their 
susceptibility. Therefore, the fact base is partial to the vulnerability assessment, but also includes 
more generalized existing conditions that set the standard. The vulnerability assessment, setting 
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the standard for the rest of the document, receives weight equal to that of other more critical 
planning criteria, and is thus subject to the results of the mapped vulnerability index. 
3.3.2.3 Strategies/Actions 
The strategy and action indexes are determinants of the approach that a particular plan takes to 
combat coastal storms, flooding, and climate change. These criteria are of the more ubiquitous 
awareness/knowledge and coordination, but also include the more specific smart growth and 
development, preparedness and response, structural and infrastructural controls, design tools, 
recovery and restoration, households and individuals, and community assets and services. 
Awareness/knowledge, smart growth and development, preparedness and response, recovery and 
restoration, households and individuals, and community assets and services are all weighted to 
be subject to the result of the vulnerability index. 
3.3.3 Action-Oriented Principles 
The action-oriented principles are linked to the process and implementation of a plan. These 
particular principles are of inter-organizational coordination, participation, implementation and 
monitoring. 
3.3.3.1 Inter-organizational Coordination 
Inter-organizational coordination is included as a principle for the mobilization of knowledge 
and resources, adherence and cooperation with other planning domains and organizations, 
exchange of ideas, and intergovernmental support. Thus, criteria for this principle include plan 
integration and horizontal coordination. Vertical coordination is typically also essential for plans, 
specifically with the state and federal level, though is not included as an indicator of quality in 
planning for vulnerable populations. The pooling of resources to support actions that benefit the 
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poor manifests through coordination, but is merely an indirect effect on the low-income 
population and so is weighted no differently than other general population criteria. 
3.3.3.2 Participation 
Participation is a measure of how the public is engaged to build a knowledgeable and 
empowered constituency able to devise a plan that reflects local values, risks, needs, capabilities, 
and enables ongoing public involvement. Participation consists of items that support the planning 
process, public engagement techniques, and stakeholder/public involvement in the process. 
Participation, viewed as a cornerstone in planning for low-income communities, is weighted and 
influenced by the vulnerability index for all three criteria. 
3.3.3.3 Implementation 
Implementation ensures that the document is not just a collection of information, but a plan that 
achieves what it recommends. To do this requires meticulous detail for each policy and program, 
and universality in language and understanding. Two types of implementation are pertinent for 
the purposes of this evaluation – responding to and recovering from coastal storms and flooding, 
and implementing policies and programs. Principles of implementation in the protocol are then 
responsibilities of organizations, responsibilities of individuals, timeline, and finances. Among 
implementation items, the responsibility of individuals is weighted with other more essential 
criteria. 
3.3.3.4 Monitoring 
The notion of accountability, important in following through on reducing vulnerability to low-
income populations, is central in monitoring plans. Monitoring occurs during implementation of 
the plan to track its performance. The principle of monitoring in the protocol then encompass 
monitoring implementation, self-monitoring, and updating the plan. Because of the political 
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capacity bestowed on communities in monitoring the process, items for monitoring 
implementation and self-monitoring are weighted. 
3.3.4 Coding 
The principles of the coding instrument can be separated into those that set the direction or 
purpose of the plan and those that involve action. A total of 100 protocol items for content 
analysis are divided up among the direction-setting and action-oriented plan principles. Each 
planning principle has certain criteria that all protocol items meet. For example, a plan principle 
might be the fact base of the plan, a criteria for fact base could be a vulnerability assessment, and 
a protocol item within that criteria could be identifying socially and physically vulnerable 
populations. Coding of each plan under the evaluation protocol is on an item-by-item basis rather 
than by criteria. A code assigned for a particular protocol item corresponds with a numeric value. 
A majority of items are coded using an ordinal 0-2 scale, while introductory and vision items are 
coded using a binary 0-1 scale. 0 denotes that the item does not exist or is not mentioned in the 
plan, 1 denotes that it exists or is mentioned in the case of a binary scale or that the particular 
item is mentioned but not detailed in the case of an ordinal scale, and 2 denotes that the item is 
mentioned and described in sufficient detail. In order for an indicator to be coded with a 2, when 
applicable, the item should be denoted by a clear and detailed narrative description with lists, 
tables, figures and maps etc. (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & 
Horney, 2014). 
3.3.4.1 Coding Process & Reliability 
Because coding the content of these plans is the most subjective and contingent data collection 
procedure, the various pieces that contributed to this process were arranged in a manner that 
maximize objectivity. The coding instrument reliably captures the meaning of desired content 
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through the consistent use of items concocted from contemporary literature, other precedent 
coding instruments, and my own interpretation of the literature. Where items breed subjectivity 
in their vague phrasing, relatively speaking, informative comments are placed to accompany 
each item and reinforce the structure and accuracy of the coding procedure. To further minimize 
subjectivity, I conceived of an overwhelming majority of the coding indicators directly through 
the literature I investigated rather than relying on personal inspiration. In most instances the 
indicators were conceived by triangulating the literary interpretations of items that determine 
plan quality. An issue that has been commonly expressed in coding plans using a succinct 
instrument is to experience fluctuating results because fewer opportunities exist to remedy 
human errors in coding. Many items representative of a type of content or approach reduce the 
chance that a particular piece of content will be omitted or that errors in coding will invalidate 
the results. Also, since I am the only coder, it is not necessary to instruct and acquaint other 
potential contributors with the prerequisite knowledge. This eliminates the natural effect of 
multiple coder subjectivity, but also a check on the potential subjectivity as a result of my 
exclusive coding (Norton, 2008). 
The actual coding of a plan first requires reading through plans as a basis to grasp their 
organization and become acquainted with the arrangement of content. After a preliminary “run-
through” of a plan, I scrupulously search through sections of the specific plan that would contain 
certain types of content. Key words are flagged to identify any associations that might satisfy the 
meaning behind comments accompanying coding indicators. When words and phrases closely 
match an indicator’s phrasing, a score is applied according to the detail included in that 
indicator’s comment. Once a section that includes a portion of content has been completely 
examined in this way, the corresponding portion of the coding instrument is revisited to both 
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ensure items were coded correctly and that if indicators were not coded because no content 
closely matched, then they are now coded accordingly. Although, due to the time-consuming 
nature of constantly revisiting the wording of every coding indicator, and because after enough 
practice the wording becomes ingrained, I eventually search sections and keep note of pertinent 
content to code accordingly, through memory of the criteria. Nonetheless, this incremental and 
adaptive procedure is repeated until all coding principles and criteria have been assigned a score 
throughout. 
3.3.4.2 Spatial Coding for Vulnerability 
Before tallying the coding results, and during the coding process, the 54 coding items that are 
weighted as a result of their subjectivity to the vulnerability index are supplementary scored 
according to the mapped spatiality of vulnerability. In order to correlate the two processes, the 
coding indicators for one weighted criterion or category that were identified in an evaluated plan 
are observed at the spatial level. That is, any mention or detail of the location (neighborhood or 
sub-area) within the city of a particular quality or piece of content is recorded. Using a table of 
neighborhoods and block groups with their level of vulnerability specified as either below 
average, near average, or above average, coding content is tallied for spatial reference into 
whichever neighborhood it falls within, or census block if, due to vagueness, a neighborhood 
label cannot be assigned. This is done for all plan content that satisfies one particular criterion. 
Once all spatial references for a criterion are recorded, a count is made of the number of spatial 
references. On a criterion by criterion basis, spatial references for neighborhoods of average 
vulnerability are negated while below average references are subtracted from above average 
references. If the operation results in a value of 1 or greater than a score of 1 is tacked on to that 
criterion’s total coded score – the total of scores coded for each coding item within a single 
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criterion. If the result is a value less than 0 then a value of 1 is subtracted from that criterion’s 
total coded score. In the instance that the count for above average and below average 
neighborhoods is equal, the score for a criterion is left unchanged. Additionally, if no spatial 
references are mentioned in the plan for a specific criterion, then this spatial coding process is 
not applicable and thus the score is also left unchanged. The value that is added or subtracted 
from a criterion’s total coding score acts as a potential bonus point or penalty. 
3.4 Data Manipulation & Interpretation 
The scores assigned for each coding indicator in the evaluation protocol determine how the data 
will be interpreted and the results of the interpretation. 
3.4.1 Scoring 
3.4.1.1 Total Score & Weights 
After all plans are scored according to each coding indicator within the protocol, each plan’s 
scores are tallied to determine a total score. The total score generates an idea of the amount of 
items present and level of detail of those items for each plan. The total score does not however 
convey the breakdown of scores for specific items and criteria. 
To calculate the total score of a plan’s evaluation, first, weights are applied to each of the 100 
coding indicators. The 54 indicators that were subjected to the vulnerability index receive larger 
weight than the other 46 indicators that are more broadly applicable for the general population. 
Hypothetically, a plan could receive a score of up to 200 in the absence of weighting. The score 
is normalized, however, to be out of 100, where the 54 vulnerability-specific indicators 
contribute to 75% of the score and the other 46 only 25% of the score. To achieve this result, 
each of the 54 indicators are multiplied by a ratio of 75/108 or about 69.4%. The other 46 
indicators are multiplied by the ratio 25/92 or roughly 27.2%. The vulnerability-specific 
 89 
indicators thus receive about 2.5 times as much weight as the other indicators. Including the 
spatial coding associated with the vulnerability index, the maximum possible score could be 109, 
in the event that each vulnerability-specific criterion receives a bonus point. In the absence of 
this supplementary coding, the highest score is 100. 
3.4.1.2 Spatial Coding Scores 
Similarly to the regular plan evaluation scoring, for the spatial coding, after all additive or 
deducted points are tallied, the value assigned to each eligible plan criteria is totaled for every 
plan. Since 13 plan criteria are coded spatially, each plan can receive up to an additional 13 
points added on to its overall evaluation score. The average total spatial coding score is then 
calculated for each city’s set of plans. Finally, to add tangibility, the percentage that would be 
added or subtracted from each plan’s weighted evaluation score is calculated. The total spatial 
coding score of each plan is multiplied by the fraction of a percentage point that each weighted 
coding value is worth, 0.694. 
3.4.1.3 Plan Principle Percentages 
To accompany overall weighted plan evaluation scores, each plan’s score is broken down into 
grouped totals for each of the seven plan principles. The maximum total score for each principle 
is equal to two times the number of indicators among them. Principles like fact base and inter-
organizational coordination appear to have lower scores than all others, but they merely consist 
of fewer indicators or content. Once calculating the proportion of the total amount that each plan 
scores for each principle do fact base and coordination more closely resemble other totals. The 
proportions are determined by calculating the ratio of principle subtotals to maximum principle 
subtotals. Since the weighted plan evaluation totals are out of 100, the proportions indicate which 
principles the plans performed better in and which they performed worse in. For instance, a plan 
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that received a total weighted score of 50 points could have an implementation score of 40% of 
the total with a participation score of 60% of the total, to balance out to its overall score. 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics describing and summarizing the spread, commonalities, and central tendencies in the 
data are attained to analyze and reach certain conclusions.  
3.4.2.1 Criteria Statistics 
During the process of tallying all scores, the codes applied to indicator are grouped into subtotals 
for each criterion. The maximum value for each subtotal would be two times the number of 
coding indicators among each particular criterion for general population criteria. For vulnerable-
specific criteria, the maximum value would be the same plus one point for coding spatially. As 
an example, the vulnerable assessment criterion inside the fact base principle has three indicators 
that satisfy its determined requirements for quality. Since the vulnerability assessment criterion 
is specific to vulnerable populations, it can receive a subtotal value of up to seven. The existing 
conditions criterion on the other hand can only receive a subtotal value of up to six since it 
applies to the general population, even though it also contains three indicators. 
These subtotals are then averaged by dividing the number of contained indicators by the total 
score applied for all those indicators for the entire set of plans. This average would be, for a 
subtotal summing three indicators, the mean of eighteen individual scores. Similarly to mean, 
standard deviation is calculated for each identical subset of scores. For determining the minimum 
and maximum of each subset, averages are also generated of the scores applied to each indicator 
for an entire set of plans. The maximum value is the highest average value for a criterion’s set of 
indicators. The minimum value is the lowest average value indicator. Descriptive statistics in this 
manner are calculated universally for all criteria for both sets of plans. The statistics are then 
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packaged and presented as groups of criteria under respective plan principles, direction-setting 
and action-oriented. 
3.4.2.2 Evaluation Score Statistics 
Once all plan evaluation score totals are tallied including applying weights, descriptive statistics 
are calculated for each set of scores. Mean and median are computed to measure central tendency 
and be able to contrast the scores of each set of plans. Standard deviation and range disclose the 
spread of scores among each set of plans, and minimum and maximum simply indicate potential 
outliers in the scores. 
3.4.3 Evaluation Scores by Initiative 
Relying on the accumulated plan background information for support, the sets of plans for both 
cities are paired up based on any combination of parallels in approach, type, economic sector, 
geographic scale, and/or initiative. Not all of the plan pairs are of the same initiative per se, but 
each one is consistent enough to be decidedly referred to as a type of initiative. After pairing the 
plans in this way, the average weighted evaluation scores are computed for each set, regardless 
of the difference in performance. The scores are then further presented by reproducing the plan 
principle percentage scores for the plans as pairs. The proportions are created by totaling the 
indicator score averages for each pair of plans again within each individual plan principle. The 
plan evaluation scores are thus essentially recreated in the format of the plan evaluation tables, 
but for the set of six pairs where each coding value is an average out of two. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Analyzing the results of the research requires examining trends in the data individually and 
finding associations when paired together with the prevailing research findings. The conditions 
revealed and outcomes produced across the two jurisdictions by the vulnerability mapping and 
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spatial coding processes are highlighted, as are the results of the plan evaluations, the heart of the 
analysis. 
3.5.1 Vulnerability & Spatial Coding Analysis 
While maps were created representing social vulnerability, physical vulnerability and hazard 
exposure independently, only the maps portraying social impacts potential – the product of the 
three measures of vulnerability – are interpreted. After all, this dimension of vulnerability was 
the impetus behind the supplementation of evaluating plans for their content geographically. 
To provide evidence supporting the results of the geographic portion of the plan evaluations, the 
two maps, one for each city, are deciphered by locating areas with clear concentrations of low or 
high impacts potential. 
The scores assigned to plan criteria for the spatiality of content, influenced by the vulnerability 
maps, are then examined individually. The bonus points or penalties incurred by each plan is 
observed. Later, the spatial coding results are associated back with the vulnerability mapping. 
The spatial coding indicates which areas are receiving more than their fair share of investment 
and which areas are not, when correlated with the inventory of areas with a high impacts 
potential and those without. Again pulling in research to tie in to spatial content, the types of 
outcomes to expect in impact prone areas is inferred. 
3.5.2 Plan Quality Analysis 
An analysis of the plan quality according to the statistics and qualitative associations linked to 
the data is explored. The analysis begins with an overall look into the quality of the plans 
individually and collectively for Norfolk and New York City for the general population and how 
they are either meeting or transcending the limits of their scope or approach. The plan quality 
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scores are then linked to adoption and reliance on plans through recent government spending 
trends and budget leveraging. 
3.5.2.1 Planning to Prepare and Adapt 
The normalized plan evaluation scores for each plan are indicators of their quality and potential 
to adequately meet the needs of the general population and especially the most vulnerable in the 
face of worsening coastal hazards. The total evaluation score for each plan is compared with one 
another, with the highest score denoting the plan that has the greatest potential to improve the 
preparedness and adaptability of the population. Certain plans may receive higher overall scores 
simply due to a broadened vs. narrow scope and/or a primary vs. secondary focus. That is, a 
comprehensive plan that addresses flooding hazards complimentary to economic development or 
housing will have an advantage score-wise over an emergency management plan that is produced 
not typically by urban planners and tailored for a specific purpose while meeting certain 
protocol. 
The initial analysis of the plan content is organized akin to the character of the plan evaluation 
protocol itself. The content observed in the two sets of plans is extracted and dispersed among 
the direction-setting and action-oriented segments of the plan. More successful evaluation scores 
with certain types of goals can be equated with a certain type of vision. Despite being 
autonomous documents each city’s set of plans are analyzed as a unit rather than as they were 
originally intended in conception. Analyzing their content in this manner allows more dominant 
themes to emerge that might not have been as perceivable in investigating a single plan. Thus, it 
becomes possible to speculate within the analysis the intentions of the plans’ authors and 
influential decision-makers. The observed action-oriented content that typically follows later on 
in the plans can either be associated back with conclusions and hypotheses of the direction-
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setting content or serve as a departure from the chronicled prevailing direction of each city’s set 
of plans. 
3.5.2.2 Plan Adoption vs. Plan Quality 
The plan adoption information compiled from within plans, from progress reports and plan 
updates, and from financial/budget releases is revisited to compare the plan quality scores of 
plans with their adoption and reliance. To be able to anticipate what might ensure in the coming 
years, the progress reports and financial information are summarized independently of the plans 
themselves and their quality. The implementation and monitoring actions declared in the plans 
can then be validated or discredited through this information. Rather than report on the adoption 
and implementation of coupled plans, the analysis is instead returned to investigating the 
individual plans, since each plan is carried out autonomously. 
Many published local and regional government plans, as a matter of requirement for their 
advertisement for public use, have been adopted. Several of these plans may emerge as superior 
quality in planning for vulnerable populations and be adopted, but have had little visible impact 
on the community because of inattention and lax reliance on them by governments. On the 
contrary, in-house plans may prove to be severely underperforming in quality yet be 
apportioning off local resources and funds, and be idealized by their creators. A detailed 
assessment is made of plans on one end of the spectrum, the other end of the spectrum and 
everywhere in between, in terms of adoption, reliance and quality. In the instance that specific 
information on the progress of implementation exists for a plan then the quality of the 
implemented actions is outlined based on their performance in the plan evaluation. 
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3.5.2.3 Planning for the Vulnerable 
Plan evaluation scores are revisited to dissect the results as evidence to support the degree to 
which these plans are enabling the vulnerable and low-income populations to be better prepared 
and adapted to coastal storms and flooding. Each plan quality principle broken up into multiple 
criteria and their subordinate indicators contributes to the adaptability and preparedness of the 
general population, but only certain criteria and indicators represent enhancements for the low-
income population. Since some of these criteria and indicators arose out of socially intent 
literature repackaged in frameworks for special low-income considerations and community 
resilience, the composition of the analysis mirrors these frameworks. These frameworks, 
underscoring the many deep-seated facets of vulnerability among the poor, allow the analysis to 
plunge deeper into the details of the plan quality and content. 
To begin, the quality of vulnerability assessments is commented on in relation to theoretical and 
empirical declarations for locating and understanding vulnerable populations. Then, theoretical 
associations are made between the quality of awareness and capacity building programs and 
formulas for informing risk and strategies to these vulnerable low-income groups. The quality of 
preparedness and emergency operation strategies and actions to involve individuals together 
relate to the ability of the plans to prepare and involve the poor. The types of smart growth and 
housing strategies together with recovery actions in the plans then illustrate how well they are 
solving potential affordability and disaster housing crises before and after extreme events. To 
discern the wealth-building and quality of life enhancing abilities of the plans, the quality of 
household and individual strategies, and community asset and services strategies are critically 
examined. The extent to which the plans are expanding the capacity and ensuring just 
representation of the low-income groups is discovered through the quality of inclusion in the 
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planning process and the landscape of engagement. To round off the analysis, monitoring and 
individual responsibility quality is critically reviewed by way of the findings on accountability 
and responsibility. 
During extrapolation of the evaluation results – both for the indicator and criteria performance 
and for the performance of the spatial coding – the vulnerability assessment itself is embedded in 
the analysis of the plans for low-income population beyond what is directly interpreted from the 
evaluation results. Characteristics of the mapped vulnerability add an additional layer to surmise 
the capabilities of the plans in context with the distribution of social and physical vulnerability 
and hazard exposure. Further associations can then be made between the vulnerability 
assessment, evaluation results and community resilience/low-income frameworks to equate 
quality with identified needs. Particularly, characteristics of the vulnerability assessment can be 
linked with restated literature on low-income linked vulnerability to chronicle the shortcomings 
and successes of the analyzed plans in fulfilling their moral obligations for low-income 
communities. 
3.5.3 Making Conclusions & Recommendations 
Leveraging the foretold analysis as a template, I make conclusions for each of Norfolk and New 
York on their progress they have made to reduce vulnerability and increase the adaptability and 
preparedness for future coastal disasters. Relying on the literature for extra support, 
recommendations are made regarding what could be done better or differently, and what is 
notably missing in the plans that have been published and adopted in the last several years. 
Analyses of the quality of each city’s plans allows for recommendations to be made for the two 
urban centers, what each could benefit from the other, and generally which city has been more 
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innovative and on track with recent theoretical and empirical verdicts on planning to allow for 
the most vulnerable residents to adapt and prepare for the worst. 
3.6 Limitations & Potential Problems 
3.6.1 Data Availability 
Because of the scope of this study, not all information and knowledge that could have 
contributed to evidence that supports the conclusion was available. Limited information was 
available in the time frame of this study to conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment 
that accounts for social behavior and capital, political power, hazard and disaster awareness, etc. 
of the residents at the neighborhood level in each city. In-person surveys, interviews and 
assessments might have strengthened the ultimate conclusion or lead to an entirely different 
conclusion. Furthermore, while the cities may have reported on the progress of their plans, not all 
aspects of implementation and monitoring can be known without an assessment from the 
perspective of the low-income residents themselves. Lastly, the range of variability of plans may 
be so great that it becomes challenging to compare them with one another and also when several 
plans may be missing substantial content. 
3.6.2 Inter-coder Reliability 
When a single coder is employed, the audience has no means of assessing whether the judgments 
made represent those that would have been made by others using the same protocol to evaluate 
the content. This limitation can hypothetically be reduced by employing two or more coders. The 
process of using two or more coders enables the audience to be provided with information 
regarding inter-coder reliability, or the degree to which members of a designated community 
concur on the readings, interpretations, responses to, or uses of given texts or data. When a single 
coder is used in content analysis, individual biases will affect the coded data and the analytical 
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results derived from the data (Stevens, Lyles, & Berke, 2014) Without a second individual to 
code the plans, the reliability of the plan evaluation data in this study can be put into question, 
though as outlined earlier, there are also benefits to employing a single coder to obtain the 
results. Nonetheless, the results of the plan evaluation analysis lay heavily on my own judgment 
of the content within the plans and my interpretation of the results. 
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Chapter 4. Results 
4.1 Introduction 
Presented in proceeding are the results of the two sets of six plan evaluations outlined in the 
previous chapter that are central to subsequent declarations and conclusions. Remaining 
consistent with the order of research, observations from the vulnerability mapping process are 
shared, including data sources used, the influence of individual variables on the distribution of 
vulnerability, and areas with distinctively higher or lower than average vulnerability. Next, the 
results of the spatial coding process, which utilized the vulnerability maps for reference, are 
presented. Even though the spatial coding process was conducted after the plan evaluation 
process, the final evaluation scores could not be tallied until each plan evaluation was 
supplemented with the bonus scoring. Thus, the entire plan evaluation results are introduced as 
the final round of data collection. Once all data results are shared, descriptive statistics 
generating evidence for trends in the plan quality and content are provided. 
4.2 Plan Background 
4.2.1 Plan Compliance 
4.2.1.1 Hazard Mitigation 
In compliance with the Commonwealth of Virginia Hazard Mitigation Plan and the Disaster 
Mitigation Act and its subsequent amendments, Southside Hampton Roads has continually 
released a hazard mitigation plan of its own, partially funded by FEMA, to remain eligible for 
disaster assistance funding. Similarly to the state hazard mitigation planning process, the regional 
hazard mitigation planning is iterative and is updated at regular intervals of every five years 
(Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee, 2011). The first rendition of 
the Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan was contracted out to a private company, 
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without having the internal knowledge and expertise to conduct a sufficient assessment in-house. 
The entire series of hazard mitigation plans for the sub-region is paid through by the same 
FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant under the Disaster Mitigation Act (Southside Hampton 
Roads Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee, 2011). 
New York City’s Hazard Mitigation Plan also meets all requirements under the Disaster 
Mitigation Act, while expanding on the role of the plan. The New York State Department of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Services promotes the production of jurisdictional hazard 
mitigation plans across the state, like New York City’s, through planning initiatives and select 
grants. As is the case with the Southside Hampton Roads Plan, NYC’s plan is a living document 
to be refined and updated every five years (NYC OEM Hazard Mitigation Unit, 2014). 
4.2.2 Planning Initiatives 
4.2.2.1 RE.Invest Initiative 
The RE.Invest Initiative is a partnership between Re:Focus Partners and the Rockefeller 
Foundation, both of whom have resilience at the core of their goals. The Rockefeller Foundation 
supplied a stream of funding and oversight for the eight selected partner cities to use public 
resources more efficiently and attract new sources of private investment (Gardner & Damm, 
2013). The initiative joined the ranks of others to apply a personal approach to enhancing 
community resilience, while taking into account locational attributes and character. The 
RE.invest report specialized for Norfolk focused on rethinking stormwater, energy and 
communications infrastructure based on the team’s findings that these systems embodied gaps in 
investment that undermine the ability of Norfolk to achieve resilience. The team then designed 
and engineered projects that fell into one or more of those categories, for various locations 
around the city (Re:focus Partners, 2015). 
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4.2.2.2 Rebuild by Design 
The Rebuild by Design competition was launched by the executive ordered Hurricane Sandy 
Rebuilding Task Force in June of 2013. It was intended to be a multi-stage planning and design 
competition to promote resilience in the region most greatly affected by Hurricane Sandy. HUD 
administered the competition in partnership with philanthropic, academic and nonprofit 
organizations. The competition aimed at promoting place-based resilience-enhancing strategies 
that could be replicable and scaled up to be applied to the region (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding 
Task Force: Rebuild by Design, 2014). 
By June 2014, the interdisciplinary selection committee identified seven winning entries to 
receive a cut of $930 in Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) 
funds that would be directed toward implementing the first phase of the projects. Four affected 
regions including New York City incurred further funding from HUD’s CDBG-DR in October 
2014 to supplement Sandy recovery and assist in implementing the winning ideas from the 
Rebuild by Design competition (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force: Rebuild by Design, 
2014). The competition’s mission, to cultivate holistic designs that resolve reoccurring flooding 
and other vulnerabilities pre-disaster, was supposed as a directive to rethink the traditional 
rebuilding disaster response. 
4.2.2.3 Rising Resiliency Challenge 
The Tidewater Rising Resiliency Design Challenge, born out of the Dutch Dialogues, was the 
product of years-worth of deliberation between local government, nonprofits and outside 
consultants, to fill a void in adaptation work. The Dutch Dialogues was a series of brainstorming 
discussions and workshops spanned over several days hosted by an international panel, notably 
from the Netherlands, that is accustom to adapting to sea level rise. The panel handed off 
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responsibility to the coalition of local stakeholders representing higher education, local 
government, the general public, and the private and non-profit sectors (Dutch Dialogues 
Virginia, 2015). 
The Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge arose from the series of sessions to carry on the 
progress made in envisioning site-specific regenerative strategies by scaling down. The exercise 
facilitated by a collaboration between professors at Hampton University and Old Dominion 
University assigned their students from backgrounds in architecture and civil engineering to 
explore viable place-based solutions to sea level rise and coastal vulnerability. Their work 
centered on the Chesterfield Heights neighborhood in South Norfolk, after whittling away three 
other candidate neighborhoods located in Hampton, Newport News and Portsmouth. The 
selected Chesterfield Heights neighborhood fronts the Elizabeth River and is adjacent to several 
low income neighborhoods of interest (Stiles, 2014; Stiles Jr., Andrews, & Erten-Unal, 2015). 
4.2.2.4 Resilient Neighborhoods 
Resilient Neighborhoods is an initiative administered by New York’s Department of City 
Planning that rides the momentum started by Rebuild by Design, New York State’s Community 
Reconstruction Program, and other place-based resilience initiatives. The initiative was launched 
in 2013 to work with communities adjacent to or in the floodplain so that they conform to the 
newly codified Flood Resilience Zoning Text Amendment, adopted in October 2013. After 
firsthand experience of coastal flooding risk, land use, zoning, and development is revamped 
through infrastructure investment and other policies and programs. All of the neighborhood 
studies under the initiative are funded by HUD’s Community Development Block Grants for 
Disaster Recovery. A similar initiative – PLACES (Planning for Livability, Affordability, 
Community, Economic Opportunity and Sustainability) – was started to address affordable 
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housing, economic development and community resources, in accordance with Housing New 
York, the city’s housing plan published in 2014 (Resilient Neighborhoods, 2016). 
4.2.2.5 100 Resilient Cities 
The challenge is a global initiative evoked to inspire cities to join the resilience movement and 
combat their most pervasive problems in innovative ways. The pioneer of the 100 Resilient 
Cities movement, the Rockefeller Foundation, engaged in a selective process to grow the 
network of cities that are extended the opportunity to participate. A panel of experts comprised 
of 100 Resilient Cities’ team members reviewed the many applicant cities that sought inclusion. 
The selection process consisted of three separate rounds of cities to be awarded membership into 
the network. Both Norfolk and New York City were among the first 32 cities to spearhead the 
challenge beginning in December 2013. Subsequent groups of 35 cities in 2014 and 33 cities in 
2016 followed their lead in devising resilience strategies (100 Resilient Cities, 2016). 
As members of the network of 100 Resilient Cities, participants gain access to financial and 
logistical guidance; expert support for development of a custom-fit resilience strategy; solutions, 
service providers and partners from the various sectors for formulating and implementing; and 
mutual accountability from the global network of cities (100 Resilient Cities, 2016). 100 
Resilient Cities’ City Resilience Framework, the foundation of its advisory approach, was 
developed by Arup in collaboration with the Rockefeller Foundation. The Framework is built 
upon the four dimensions of urban centers – health and wellbeing, economy and society, 
infrastructure and environment, and leadership and strategy. The four dimensions and set of three 
drivers that influence each dimensions are ubiquitous across all city reports (The City Resilience 
Framework, 2016). 
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4.2.2.6 National Disaster Resilience Competition 
More recently, coinciding with broad adoption of resilience, HUD organized a competition 
among communities that suffered from a federally declared natural disaster occurring between 
2011 and 2013, to devise innovative solutions for recovering from these prior disasters and 
improving their ability to withstand and more swiftly recover from future disasters and hazards. 
The National Disaster Resilience Competition (NDRC), in partnership with the Rockefeller 
Foundation, was a two-phase competition that awarded up to $1 billion in HUD Disaster 
Recovery funds to eligible communities (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
2015). The NDRC also pulled from the successes of the Foundation’s Rebuild by Design 
competition to inform a participatory and stakeholder-driven process (Gonzalez, 2016). 
The first phase of the competition requested applicants to frame their ideas for recovering from 
the effects of the affecting disaster, advancing community development objectives, and to 
improve the ability to absorb or rapidly recover from the effects of future events, threats or 
hazards (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2015). Applicants were required 
to consult with stakeholders, and frame the recovery needs, personalized risks and 
vulnerabilities, and associative development opportunities within the targeted area. The intention 
was for applicants to demonstrate a connection between unmet recovery needs from the 
applicatory declared disaster to the revealed objectives (Taffet, 2014). 
Those applicants that were selected to proceed into the second phase of the competition then 
were required to conceptualize their ideas into a resilience-enhancing disaster recovery or 
revitalization project that addresses their identified risks, vulnerabilities, and development 
opportunities (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2015). Phase 2 applications 
were deemed worthy of funding if they demonstrated how the proposal would help the target 
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community recover from the effects of the disaster, achieve community development objectives 
like economic development, and enhance the community’s ability to remain resilient when 
confronted with a future extreme event or stressor. The implementation proposals were also 
required to include a benefit-cost analysis to further their case for funding (Taffet, 2014). 
4.3 Plan Leadership Composition 
4.3.1 Norfolk’s Plans 
4.3.1.1 Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Planning Committee: Municipal Planning, Emergency Management, Administration, and Utility 
representatives from the cities of Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach, county of 
Isle of Wight, and towns of Smithfield and Windsor. 
Planning support from the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission and Salters Creek 
Consulting. 
Sponsored by the Virginia Department of Emergency Management and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. 
4.3.1.2 PlaNorfolk 2030 
Contributions from Norfolk City Council, Norfolk City Planning Commission, Norfolk Design 
Review Committee, Norfolk Historic and Architectural Review Committee, City of Norfolk 
Administration, and the Norfolk Department of Planning and Community Development. 
4.3.1.3 RE.invest Initiative 
Planning comprised of team members from RE.focus Partners. Initiative supported by the 
Rockefeller Foundation. 
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4.3.1.4 Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge 
Partnership between the Department of Architecture at Hampton University and the Department 
of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Old Dominion University. Support from Skip Stiles 
of Wetlands Watch. 
4.3.1.5 Norfolk Resilience Strategy 
Norfolk Office of Resilience. 
Resilience Steering Committee: City Administration, non-profit leaders, business leaders, higher 
education, Hampton Roads Planning District Commission, City Planning Commission, City 
Council. 
Coastal Resilience Working Group: Department of Public Works, Department of Planning, 
Department of Utilities, Department of Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of 
Development, City Administration, Non-profits, Businesses, Higher education 
Neighborhood Resilience Working Group: City Administration, Police Department, Department 
of Human Services, Department of Planning, Department of Public Health, Norfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Department of Neighborhood Development, Department 
of Public Works, Department of Fire and Rescue, Social service organizations 
Economic Resilience Working Group: Department of Economic Development, Economic 
Development Authority, Office of Budget and Strategic Planning, Commission on Poverty 
Reduction, Business leaders, Non-profits, Chamber of Commerce, Higher education 
4.3.1.6 ThRIVe: Resilience in Virginia Phase 2 NDRC Application 
Oversight from the Governor’s Commission on Climate Change. Leadership from the Virginia 
Department of Housing and Community Development. Support from the City of Norfolk (Office 
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of Resilience), City of Chesapeake (Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Department of 
Public Works), and the City of Newport News (Fire Department, Division of Emergency 
Management, Engineering Department, Planning Department, Codes Compliance Department, 
Development Department). 
4.3.2 New York City’s Plans 
4.3.2.1 New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Planning Team: Office of Emergency Management, Department of City Planning, Office of 
Long-Term Planning and Sustainability. 
Mitigation Planning Council Steering Committee: Dept. of Buildings, Dept. of Environmental 
Protection, Dept. of Parks & Recreation, Dept. of Transportation, Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority, Regional Plan Association, Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, Mayor’s Office of 
Housing Recovery, Police Dept., Fire Dept. 
Mitigation Planning Council: 39 agencies, public authorities, non-profits, private utility 
providers from 2009 Hazard Mitigation Plan plus City University of New York, HRO, Mayor’s 
Office of Environmental Remediation, Office of Management and Budget, Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner. 
4.3.2.2 PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York 
Building Resiliency Task Force: real estate owners, property managers, architects, engineers, 
contractors, utility representatives, subject matter specialists, city officials, code consultants, 
coast estimators, attorneys (steering committee, working groups, buildings committees) 
Lead City Agencies: Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, Dept. of Parks & 
Recreation, NYC Economic Development Corporation, Dept. of Environmental Protection, Dept. 
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of City Planning, Dept. of Small Business Services, Mayor’s Office of Housing Recovery 
Operations, Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development, NYC Housing Authority, NYC 
Industrial Development Authority, Dept. of Citywide Administrative Services, Office of 
Emergency Management, etc. 
4.3.2.3 BIG “U” Rebuild by Design Report 
Co-leadership from Bjarke Ingels Group (BIG), and One Architecture. Support from private 
firms Starr Whitehouse, Buro Happold, Level Infrastructure, Arcadis, James Lima Planning & 
Development, Green Shield Ecology, AEA Consulting, Project Projects, and the School of 
Constructed Environments at Parsons the New School 
4.3.2.4 Edgewater Park Resilient Neighborhoods Report 
Leadership from New York Department of City Planning. 
4.3.2.5 OneNYC 
Project Director: Office of Sustainability 
OneNYC Team: 70 leaders from deputy mayoral offices, mayoral offices, social service 
organizations, private sector boards, NGOs, non-profits, commissions, and municipal agencies 
representing health, economic development, housing, environment, transportation, utilities, 
technology, finances, sustainability, recovery, emergency management, and resident services. 
Steering Committee: Deputy Mayor, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, 
Deputy Mayor for Strategic Policy Initiatives, Advisor to the Mayor for Recovery, Resiliency, 
and Infrastructure, Office of Operations, NYC Planning Commission, Department of City 
Planning, Office of Recovery and Resiliency 
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4.3.2.6 Lower Manhattan Protect & Connect Phase 2 NDRC Application 
Leadership from Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development, New York City Economic Development Corporation, New York 
City Housing Authority, and the Trust for Public Land. 
4.4 Vulnerability Assessment 
Maps depicting social vulnerability, physical vulnerability, hazard exposure, and most 
importantly social impacts potential were created. All maps shared are of the social impacts 
potential, an index of social vulnerability, physical vulnerability and hazard exposure, in each 
respective city. In reaction to conducting content analysis, seldom did the plans of interest 
provide measures of vulnerability mapped equivalently to the maps to follow, much less rely on 
them. 
4.4.1 Norfolk 
The measure of potential for social impacts among each census tract not purposefully but 
coincidentally favors social vulnerability more heavily than physical vulnerability or hazard 
exposure. Each available type of geographic data was represented consistently across all used 
variables. There was more data available to illustrate social vulnerability. Variables included the 
12 census data points, distance from facilities such as public transportation, emergency facilities, 
hospitals, and police and fire stations, housing age and cost, parks, population and building 
density, and distance from flood zones. Each variable was standardized by converting data points 
into percentile ranks to ensure each one has equal effect on social impacts potential. 
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Figure 2. Norfolk's Potential for Social Impacts by Census Tract 
All census and other geospatial data are mapped at the census tract level. Norfolk Naval Station 
is depicted as excluded for its absence of available data. Generally, areas of Norfolk with the 
highest impacts potential/vulnerability are those tracts located along the southern shore of the 
Lafayette River that cuts through the center separating northern neighborhoods from those to the 
south. Incidentally, a majority of neighborhoods with the highest level of vulnerability are 
synonymous with those having the greatest concentration of affordable housing and city-owned 
public or mixed-income housing. With 80 census tracts and as many individual neighborhoods, 
maps are separated into northern and southern halves to zoom in on and declutter neighborhood 
names. 
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Figure 3. Norfolk's (North) Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations 
Neighborhood labels overlaid on top of the vulnerability data represent names applied to civic 
league territories. Many are not identical in size and location to census tracts, although are useful 
in identifying neighborhoods nearest to and intersecting census tracts. 
In far northern Norfolk, along the shoreline, areas of heightened impacts potential are 
concentrated on the eastern end. The western half of the East Ocean View, eastern half of the 
Cottage Line, northeastern section of the Bayview, and the Camellia Gardens neighborhoods all 
experience the greatest potential for social impacts. Despite the Willoughby Spit in the far 
northwest being almost entirely within the flood plain, its density is extremely low in comparison 
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with the rest of Norfolk. Its population and building density being at the bottom causes its hazard 
exposure (1.4) to be well below average (29.4) despite the high probability of flooding. 
Compounding this is the fact that almost all of its census-based vulnerability statistics are below 
average. However, since Willoughby and the rest of the shoreline neighborhoods are distant from 
many facilities, their facilities access is above average. 
The worst social vulnerability in this region is in lower East Ocean View and Camellia Gardens. 
Most noticeably, this high social vulnerability stems from housing and transportation, though 
also in every other category. Other neighborhoods in the northern half with high social 
vulnerability (between 85 and 90 compared to the average of 57) include all those bounded by I-
64, Little Creek Road, and Military Highway such as Partra, Chesapeake Gardens, and 
Oakwood. In spite of the prevalence of minority and low economic status in these 
neighborhoods, impacts potential is less, between 550 and 750, than in the poorer shoreline 
neighborhoods, between 840 and 900. These inland neighborhoods have slightly better access to 
facilities and are less prone to flooding. 
As noted before, many of the neighborhoods to the south and east of the Lafayette River have 
some of the highest levels of vulnerability. One neighborhood, bounded by Military Highway 
and Wayne Creek, Norview, has among the worst overall vulnerability. In particular, it is 
physically vulnerable. Norview consists of predominantly out-of-date single family homes with 
little open space to absorb the impacts of flooding. And while it is relatively average in most 
social vulnerability indicators, its hazard exposure is in the top tier with the combination of a 
high built density and close proximity to the flood plain. 
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Figure 4. Norfolk's (South) Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations 
To the southwest of Norview is Fairmont Park which stretches from Chesapeake Boulevard to 
Tidewater Drive east to west and from Wayne Creek to the Lafayette River north to south. 
Hazard exposure is above the average of 29.3 at 58.1 in the northern half and 54.5 in the 
southern half of the neighborhood, but it is not as high as in some other neighborhoods bordering 
the Lafayette River. The flood plain largely inundates peripheral areas of the neighborhood 
nearest to the two bounding waterways. Like Norview, there are many aging single-family 
homes, but also many older multifamily units. Similarly, Fairmont has little buffer against 
flooding with a high built density and a negligible amount of open space. On whole, Fairmont 
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Park has a potential for impacts that is well above the city-wide norm at between 850 and 890 
that mostly accounts for its hazard exposure and physical vulnerability than social vulnerability. 
The five most vulnerable neighborhoods of Highland Park, Colonial Place, Riverview, 
Lindenwood, and Barraud Park all border the Lafayette River to the north. Highland Park, 
Colonial Place and Riverview are all fairly compact low-lying neighborhoods meaning they are 
partially surrounded by the flood plain. Hazard exposure is expectedly high, especially in 
Colonial Place/Riverview where it is the highest in all of Norfolk at 93.7 due to the combination 
of high density and flood probability. Social vulnerability is relatively average in these three 
neighborhoods (slightly higher in Highland Park), but physical vulnerability is again high in 
Colonial Place/Riverview. Upstream in Lindenwood/Barraud Park, hazard exposure is also 
above the 29.4 average, though much less than in the downstream neighborhoods, at 47.9. Social 
vulnerability is instead the Achilles heel of Lindenwood/Barraud Park. A vast majority of 
residents are rent strained, poverty is substantially high, educational attainment is low, access to 
transportation is poor, and the neighborhood is almost entire made up of minority groups. 
The three census tracts bordering the Elizabeth River that have an impacts potential value of 800 
or above also have astronomically high social vulnerability. Neighborhoods in these tracts such 
as Tidewater Gardens, Grandy Village, Oak Leaf Forest and Diggs Town are all known for their 
public housing developments. South Brambleton, Chesterfield Heights, and 
Campostella/Campostella Heights are other neighborhoods inside of these tracts. Tidewater 
Gardens and South Brambleton together have the highest percentage in several census variables. 
They are also even more flood prone than Colonial Place/Riverview. However, because 
Tidewater Gardens/South Brambleton are fairly low density and have a subsequently high 
amount of open space, hazard exposure is only slightly above average at 38.5, and physical 
 115 
vulnerability is on the low end. Grandy Village/Chesterfield Heights also have high percentages 
in census variables but not as high as in Tidewater Gardens/South Brambleton. Furthermore, 
even though poverty is prevalent, few residents are rent strained, as affordable single family 
homes are the dominant housing type especially in Chesterfield Heights. Chesterfield 
Heights/Grandy Village fare a little better in floods than Tidewater Gardens/South Brambleton 
with a hazard exposure of 31.7, but they are much more vulnerable physically. South of the 
Elizabeth River, Campostella/Oak Leaf Forest/Diggs Town actually have a hazard exposure that 
is less than average at 17.5. Due to both aged and poor quality housing, these neighborhoods 
have among the highest physical vulnerability, and score low in several socioeconomic 
indicators. 
4.4.2 New York City 
The geography of impacts potential in New York City is several times more complex than in 
Norfolk, although the vulnerability of many of these locations in the city surfaced during and 
after Hurricane Sandy. New York City dwarfs the number of census tracts in Norfolk with a total 
of 2,167. More geographic data exists for each census tract making it possible to measure certain 
variables that data did not exist for in Norfolk. Data employed for New York City not available 
in Norfolk include road conditions, wi-fi access, access to evacuation centers and homeless 
shelters, access to medical and care facilities, and access to food pantries/soup kitchens. Unlike 
the vulnerability maps created for Norfolk, these maps are further divided into one for each of 
the five boroughs. Trends in vulnerability are described more broadly as a result. 
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Figure 5. New York City's Potential for Social Impacts by Census Tract 
Notable hot spots across the city with higher than average social impacts potential include much 
of the Bronx and northern Manhattan, eastern lower Manhattan, scattered neighborhoods along 
the Brooklyn/Queens riverfront, Southern Brooklyn, the far eastern shoreline, and northern 
Staten Island. 
4.4.2.1 Bronx 
On the whole, the Bronx is the most vulnerable borough of New York City, with the most 
prominent pockets of vulnerability located at the southern end nearest to Manhattan. Borough-
wide, the Bronx has an average impacts potential of 623 compared with the average of 542 
citywide. Specifically, the impacts potential from Hunts Points heading west and from the 
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Melrose neighborhood south is about 783 (among 32 census tracts). The social vulnerability 
averages at about 73.3 and hazard exposure around 55.7 in these neighborhoods compared to 
citywide averages of 52.3 and 36.1, respectively, and Bronx-wide averages of 62.5 and 37.9, 
respectively. Of the census tracts in the Bronx with impacts potential under 500, a considerable 
amount of them are of parks and open space. Many of these parks stand out as islands of low 
vulnerability in a sea of high vulnerability. Along the riverfront from Hunts Point to Marble Hill, 
these 16 census tracts have an average social vulnerability of 75.5. This scale of social 
vulnerability exists nowhere else along a waterfront. To illustrate the magnitude of vulnerability 
in the Bronx, 36.3% of its census tracts have an impacts potential above 680 compared to only 
19.2% in all of New York City. At about 14% of the city’s total territory, the Bronx contains 
around 30% of New York’s extremely vulnerable tracts. 
 
Figure 6. Bronx, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations 
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4.4.2.2 Manhattan 
Stark contrasts exists between less vulnerable and more vulnerable areas in Manhattan. From 
about Carnegie Hill north, high vulnerability is fairly concentrated. Meanwhile, from Carnegie 
Hill south to Stuyvesant Town none of the tracts here have an impacts potential as high as the 
average in the Bronx. About 34.7% of New York’s tracts have an impacts potential either below 
384 or above 680. In Manhattan, about 40% of tracts have impacts potential values at those two 
opposite ends of the spectrum. Thus, Manhattan has a higher inequality of impacts potential, 
mostly from the unequal distribution of social vulnerability. 44.8% of New York City census 
tracts have a social vulnerability above 62.4 or below 40.6. In Manhattan, 70.5% of census tracts 
have a social vulnerability in these two zones. Two hotspots of vulnerability in Lower Manhattan 
are the Lower East Side and Two Bridges below Chinatown. These two neighborhoods contain 
12 census tracts with impacts potential above 750 yet they are located adjacent to the major 
economic hub that is Lower Manhattan. The East Harlem Neighborhood alone also contains 9 
census tracts with impacts potential values this high. Overall, Manhattan has the highest hazard 
exposure of all of the boroughs with a value of 44.4. Specifically, from Midtown southward, in 
this densest of places, hazard exposure averages around 51.3. 
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Figure 7. Manhattan, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations 
4.4.2.3 Queens 
Unlike, Manhattan and the Bronx, Queens has a wider dispersion of vulnerability and few 
concentrations of extremely high vulnerability. As would be expected, generally the higher 
potential for social impacts occurs on the periphery nearer to bodies of water rather than in the 
interior. A couple notable vulnerable locations are in north and western Queens. The 
neighborhoods of North and South Corona has an average impacts potential of 694 and an 
average hazard exposure of 52.3. The Ravenswood and Long Island City neighborhoods, 
bordering the East River, have an average impacts potential of 635 and an average hazard 
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exposure of 55.7. Small pockets of high social vulnerability are in these four neighborhoods and 
also in Jackson Heights and Jamaica Hills, though the latter is far from any water. 
 
Figure 8. Queens, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations 
4.4.2.4 Brooklyn, and Queens Beachfront 
Brooklyn is not unlike Queens in that of the vulnerable areas, most of them are nearer to the 
waterfront than the interior. However, unlike Queens, Brooklyn has several areas where the 
potential for impacts is more pervasive. Although the Rockaway Peninsula is part of Queens, the 
distribution of vulnerability follows the trend of Brooklyn. In northwestern Brooklyn 
Williamsburg stands out in an area of low to moderate vulnerability. Between the 25 census 
tracts of Williamsburg, the potential for social impacts averages around 701.4. Williamsburg is 
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relatively equally influenced by social, physical, and exposing characteristics. To the southeast is 
Canarsie that is not quite as distinctly vulnerable but is comparable in size. Canarsie is bordered 
by water on three sides and has an average impacts potential of 673.7 among its 24 census tracts. 
In far southern Brooklyn, where the Bath Beach, Gravesend, Homecrest, Gerritsen Beach, 
Sheepshead Bay, Manhattan Beach, Brighton Beach, Coney Island and Sea Gate neighborhoods 
are all located, the impacts potential is highest. The region, home to almost 285,000 residents, 
has an average impacts potential of 709.8. Like Williamsburg, southern Brooklyn has above 
average values across all vulnerability types but none that are astronomic. 
 
Figure 9. Brooklyn, NY and Queens Waterfront Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood 
Locations 
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On the Rockaway Peninsula, southeast of Coney Island, a deep division is present. The Peninsula 
transitions gradually from west to east, where impacts potential starts between 250 and 450 in 
Breezy Point and ends at between 650 and 900 in Edgemere and Far Rockaway. The entire 
peninsula is highly susceptible to flooding, but since the western tip is sparsely populated its 
hazard exposure is much lower, as is its social vulnerability. 
4.4.2.5 Staten Island 
Broadly speaking, Staten Island has a lesser potential for social impacts than any of the other 
four boroughs. Even still, it has its fair share of tracts holding high vulnerability, almost 
exclusively in the northern part of the island. Staten Island has an impacts potential that is lower 
than the 542 citywide average at 488 on average. Both its social vulnerability and hazard 
exposure are somewhat less than their counterpart citywide averages. Its hazard exposure 
averages close to 33.5 (2.5 less than the city) while its social vulnerability is close to 46.6 (5.7 
less than the city). Focusing in on the 31 census tracts on the northern brim of Staten Island 
uncovers an average impacts potential misaligned to this overall average. The waterfront 
neighborhoods stretching from Howland Park in the northwest to Shore Acres in the northeast all 
boast a combined impacts potential of 640, slightly higher than the Bronx-wide average. Their 
average social vulnerability is 56.9 and their average hazard exposure is 47.8. As would be 
expected, no other series of census tracts have above average combined vulnerability. 
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Figure 10. Staten Island, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations 
4.5 Spatial Coding 
The results of the aforementioned vulnerability assessment served as the foundation to equate the 
spatiality of plan content with. Relying on the automatic divisions in the legends of each series of 
vulnerability maps, the top four categories counted as high vulnerability and the bottom four 
counted as low vulnerability. Those varying number of categories in between denoted medium 
vulnerability. On occasion, geographic references in plans would indicate areas larger than one 
or two neighborhoods, which in that instance, would sometimes render the level of vulnerability 
as undetermined. Only if more tracts implied higher vulnerability than otherwise, were broad 
references labelled as high vulnerability, and to the opposite effect, if more tracts implied lower 
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vulnerability, the reference was labelled as low vulnerability. The middle category had, in effect, 
no influence on spatial coding scores as it either represented an indistinguishable value or 
moderate value. 
4.5.1 Norfolk Spatial Scores 
The desired outcome from spatially coding the content of evaluated plans coming out of Norfolk 
and Hampton Roads would be the discovery that these plans are allocating their ideas, resources 
and processes to areas that most need them. If that were to be the case, then the plans overall 
should be scoring higher with the addition of the spatial coding scores than without. For Norfolk, 
on average, that is the case, however, only minimally. 
Table 7. Spatial Coding Scores for Norfolk, VA 
  
RE.Invest 
Report 
Southside 
Haz. Mit. 
PlaNorfolk 
2030 
Resilience 
Strategy 
Rising 
Resiliency 
ThRIVe 
NDRC 
App Average 
Vulnerability 
Assessment           1 0.17 
Awareness/Knowledge -1       1 1 0.17 
Smart growth & 
development     1 1 1 1 0.67 
Preparedness & response -1 -1         -0.33 
Recovery & restoration     1   1   0.33 
Households & 
individuals -1       1   0 
Community assets & 
services -1   1 -1 1 1 0.17 
Planning process -1           -0.17 
Public engagement 
techniques -1 1     1   0.17 
Stakeholders/Persons 
involved -1   1 1 1   0.33 
Responsibilities -1       1   0 
Monitoring 
implementation -1     1 1 1 0.33 
Self-monitoring         1   0.17 
Total -9 0 4 2 10 5 2 
% Added to Score -6.25% 0% 2.78% 1.39% 6.94% 3.47% 1.39% 
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After summing the total spatial codes awarded to all plan criteria for each plan and then 
averaging them across all plans for Norfolk, the end result is an added 2 points to each plan. This 
equates to a supplementary 1.39 percent added on to the total plan evaluation scores, after 
normalizing them to be out of 100. A total of 2 additional points also means that even though 
more plans received bonus points rather than penalties as a result of the process, the chance that 
any single plan criterion received one additional bonus point is roughly 1 in 6. While it is true 
that there were nearly as many negative points as positive points given, around 44 perent of 
eligible plan criteria received any score for spatial references. 19 of the 23 positive points given 
to plan criteria were distributed to only 3 of the 6 plans. PlaNorfolk and the ThRIVe NDRC 
received a modest 4 and 5 points out of 13, respectively. The Rising Resiliency Challenge Report 
collected nearly half of all positive scores given across the 6 plans in receiving 77 percent of the 
total possible bonus points awarded to a single plan. 
The average spatial code value given to each plan criterion ranges from -1/3 to +2/3. Smart 
growth and development received by far the most positive coding scores with four to reach an 
average of 2/3. Recovery and restoration, stakeholders/persons involved, and monitoring 
implementation were all 2nd with a total of 2 positive points granted or an average of 1/3 among 
all 6 plans. Most other plan criteria received an insignificantly positive or negative value from 
spatial coding. The only two negative total values is planning process with -1/6 and preparedness 
and response with -1/3 or 2 out of the 6 receiving a negative point. 
Certain plans commonly had multiple spatial references satisfying a single plan criterion. For 
instance, Table 7 above shows that a single point was awarded to the PlaNorfolk evaluation 
under Smart growth and development. It received that point because there were more spatial 
references describing smart growth and development in vulnerable neighborhoods than 
 126 
invulnerable ones. The complete data table that was utilized during the coding process shows 
that there were actually 8 more spatial references in vulnerable neighborhoods (23 in high 
vulnerable neighborhoods and 15 in low vulnerable neighborhoods). PlaNorfolk did indeed have 
the largest average margin for points given. The ThRIVe NDRC Application was shortly behind 
in terms of margin, while all other plans only referenced a handful of neighborhoods total. 
4.5.2 New York City Spatial Scores 
Initial reactions assert that plans in New York City more often than not received positive values 
for a set of spatial references. Digging deeper, it is quite apparent that four plans collected all of 
the positive coding scores and the other two were coded minimally. Erasing those other two 
plans from the bunch and the New York City plans would add close to 11 points to their overall 
evaluation scores or about 7.5 percent. However, due to the inclusion of the Edgewater Park 
Report that is exclusively for a neutrally vulnerable neighborhood, and the city’s Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, the average score added is 7.17 points or about 5 percent. Of the four plans that 
received the most positive spatial coding scores, all of them were relatively close to receiving the 
maximum number of additional points. Both the Lower Manhattan NDRC Application and One 
NYC received 77 percent of the maximum possible bonus points, PlaNYC received 85 percent of 
the maximum possible points, and the BIG U Rebuild by Design Report only missed out on one 
point in receiving 92 percent of the maximum total possible. 
Average spatial code scores assigned to the plan criteria ranged from .17 to .83. No plan criterion 
had an average coding value of 0 or less meaning the spatial coding process ubiquitously aided 
the evaluation of vulnerability-specific criteria. The lowest average value of .17, for self-
monitoring, was this low not because of negative values counteracting the positive but since 
spatial reference only existed for one plan. Two of the three average values that equaled 1/3 were 
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reduced from negative values in preparedness and response, and monitoring implementation in 
the city’s hazard mitigation plan. The third, households and individuals, was positively coded in 
just two plans. The five criteria with values above half had a majority positive scores because 
there were spatial references in at least all four of the highest scoring plans. Smart growth and 
development, recovery and restoration, and public engagement techniques were most frequently 
associated with distributing to highly vulnerable areas. All three criteria had the highest average 
score of .83, with the city’s hazard mitigation plan serving as the critical piece to bring them to 
this value. 
Table 8. Spatial Coding Scores for New York City 
  
Lower 
Manh. 
NDRC 
Edgewater 
Report 
NYC 
Haz. 
Mit. 
One 
NYC PlaNYC 
BIG U 
Rebuild Average 
Vulnerability Assessment 1   -1 1 1 1 0.50 
Awareness/Knowledge       1 1 1 0.50 
Smart growth & development 1   1 1 1 1 0.83 
Preparedness & response 1   -1 1 1   0.33 
Recovery & restoration 1   1 1 1 1 0.83 
Households & individuals 1         1 0.33 
Community assets & services 1     1 1 1 0.67 
Planning process 1     1 1 1 0.67 
Public engagement 
techniques 1   1 1 1 1 0.83 
Stakeholders/Persons 
involved 1     1 1 1 0.67 
Responsibilities       1 1 1 0.50 
Monitoring implementation 1   -1   1 1 0.33 
Self-monitoring           1 0.17 
Total 10 0 0 10 11 12 7.17 
% Added to Score 6.94% 0% 0% 6.94% 7.64% 8.33% 4.98% 
 
Though New York City’s plans evidently fared well in the spatial coding process, if the margin 
between high vulnerability and low vulnerability spatial references was taken into account, 
scores would have been even higher. All of the plans, with the exception of the Edgewater Park 
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referenced over 15 distinct locations in relation to content satisfying the 13 plan criteria. 
PlaNYC, the city’s de facto comprehensive plan, referenced locations representing every 
vulnerable region of New York, in accordance with the vulnerability maps. Consequently, 
though PlaNYC received 11 of the 13 bonus points for spatial coding, the average margin for 
each set of references to warrant a point was an impressive 25.4. By comparison, the BIG U 
Rebuild by Design report had an average margin of 4.75, despite receiving an additional bonus 
point. OneNYC and the Lower Manhattan NDRC Application came in with a margin of 8 and 
9.2, respectively. 
4.6 Plan Evaluation Scores 
Reiterating the coding process, the scores applied to plans for their content reflect the determined 
satisfaction for each coding indicator and the distribution of desirable content to expressed 
locations. The separately scored spatial codes were added after all indicators were properly 
scored to be included in the overall total and the totals broken down by plan principles and 
criteria. The following scores represent the raw data culminating from the plan coding and 
spatial coding processes prior to standardizing through weight. The highest possible score for 
each plan principle is as follows: goals – 44, fact base – 12, strategies – 66, coordination – 8, 
participation – 28, implementation – 16, monitoring – 26. 
4.6.1 Norfolk Plan Evaluations 
Goals are not vital in determining the quality of a particular plan per se, but, since they correlate 
with the accompanying content, can foretell the substance of a plan and its value. The goals in 
Norfolk’s plans satisfied the requirements to receive between 15 and 31 points out of the 
possible 44. The 15 points met by the RE.Invest Report equals roughly one third of the possible 
points while the Resilience Strategy’s 31 equals about 70 percent of the total. The scores given to 
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each plan for their goals turn out to be a mild predictor of the entire performance of plans in their 
evaluation. The total score applied to a plan according to the quantities in each section is 
essentially an average performance across all sections not accounting for the size of each section. 
Using this baseline, most plans performed exceptionally well in goals considering their final 
total. The RE.Invest Report, which performed worst in the evaluation, should hover close to 14 
percent in each principle based on its total score, however, its 15 points in goals is nearly 3 times 
what would be expected. The two highest coding values for goals occurred with, coincidentally, 
the two best performing plans of the Resilience Strategy and the ThRIVe NDRC Application. 
The 31 points and 29 points the Norfolk Resilience Strategy and ThRIVe NDRC Application 
received for goals, respectively, is still above what their total scores would imply they might 
receive. 
The two plans that performed best in fact base, which included existing conditions and the 
vulnerability assessment, received 75 percent and 83 percent of the total possible points. The 
coding values for the strategies principle more closely matched the overall plan evaluation scores 
than even goals. The proportion of possible points that each plan received for its strategies were 
all within 8 percentage points of their respective total score values. The Southside Hazard 
Mitigation Plan scored worst in strategies compared to its score with 33 percent compared to 
37.35, while PlaNorfolk scored the best with 59 percent compared to 51.78. The percentages for 
coordination were ubiquitously higher than the average percentage across all plan principles. 
Participation scores were fairly divided between the better scoring plans and the poorer scoring. 
The three overall highest scoring plans received just over double the amount of points (17.3) on 
average in participation than the three overall lowest scoring plans (8.3). Implementation and 
monitoring scores were low across the entire set of plans, ranging from 4 percent to 50 percent of 
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the maximum possible points. The two lowest scoring plans, the RE.Invest Report and the Rising 
Resiliency Challenge Report, scored about a quarter of the possible points or less. The lone plan 
that scored higher in implementation and monitoring than in other principles, on average, was the 
Southside Hazard Mitigation Plan, faring considerably better in monitoring than any other plan. 
Table 9. Norfolk, VA Plan Evaluation Scores 
Principle   
RE.Invest 
Report 
Southside 
Haz. Mit. 
PlaNorfolk 
2030 
Resilience 
Strategy 
Rising 
Resiliency 
ThRIVe 
NDRC 
App 
Goals 
Score 15 20 20 31 22 29 
% of 
Possible 34% 45% 45% 70% 50% 66% 
Fact Base 
Score 2 9 5 7 6 10 
% of 
Possible 17% 75% 42% 58% 50% 83% 
Strategies 
Score 11 22 39 41 23 43 
% of 
Possible 17% 33% 59% 62% 35% 65% 
Coordination 
Score 3 4 8 8 4 7 
% of 
Possible 38% 50% 100% 100% 50% 88% 
Participation 
Score 3 9 16 19 13 17 
% of 
Possible 11% 32% 57% 68% 46% 61% 
Implementation 
Score 2 6 7 8 4 8 
% of 
Possible 13% 38% 44% 50% 25% 50% 
Monitoring 
Score 1 13 10 10 7 8 
% of 
Possible 4% 50% 38% 38% 27% 31% 
Total Weighted Score 13.86 37.35 51.78 58.64 36.26 59.36 
 
Together, the set of plans varied greatly in their overall performance from the plan evaluation 
process. The standard deviation of 17.41 reinforces the fact that none of the plans score within 5 
points of the average overall score of 42.87. Even though the top three scoring plans are about 9 
points or more higher than the average, the abysmally low score of 13.86 by the RE.Invest 
Report sways the average significantly. In a way, the spatial coding process sort of reconciles the 
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dismal performance. The RE.Invest Report was the only plan to have its score reduced, since its 
spatial references were exclusively for low vulnerability neighborhoods. Had the spatial coding 
not supplemented the plan evaluation scores, the report would have actually scored 9 more points 
than it did, increasing its total score to around 20. 
Table 10. Norfolk, VA Plan Evaluation Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 42.87 
Standard 
Deviation 17.41 Minimum 13.86 
Median 44.57 Range 45.5 Maximum 59.36 
 
4.6.2 New York City Plan Evaluations 
Of the six evaluated plans from New York, five of them received a total score of 60 or more, 
above the highest scoring plan from Norfolk. Rather remarkably, a majority of the plans did not 
score particularly high in goals, in comparison with their total evaluation scores. The plans 
generally scored better on the heart of the plan content than on this precursory content. Four of 
the six plans scored three quarters or more of the possible points in fact base, and the other two 
still scored a majority. With strategies, for the most part, the evaluated plans performed 
exceptionally well. Only one plan, the BIG U Rebuild by Design Report, scored a worse 
percentage in comparison with its total score on strategies. The top four scoring plans received 
between 77 and 86 percent of the possible points. 
The highest minimum score of points received for a principle was with coordination. Like with 
strategies, five of the six scored better in comparison with their average scores across all 
principles, in coordination. Even the Edgewater Park Report, which scored only 36.99, received 
63 percent of the coordination points. Participation saw the highest average point totals among 
the five top scoring plans. Other than the Edgewater Park Report that received just under half, 
 132 
the plans collected between 79 and 93 percent of the participation points. The scores for 
implementation were more varied than with any other principle. The bottom half of plans 
received 25, 44 and 56 percent of points, whereas the top half received 75, 88 and 94 percent. 
The City’s hazard mitigation plan was the only to receive over 90 percent of points in both 
participation and implementation. Monitoring was far and wide the worst performing principle 
after the results of the plan evaluations. The four plans that performed better than the average 
total score for all plans captured only between 31 and 50 percent of the points (three of them all 
receiving 31 percent). The BIG U Rebuild by Design report was the only to receive enough 
points to be close in comparison to its total score with 54 percent of monitoring points. 
Table 11. New York City Plan Evaluation Scores 
Principle   
NDRC 
P&C 
Edgewater 
Report 
NYC Haz. 
Mit. 
One 
NYC PlaNYC 
BIG U 
RbD 
Goals 
Score 30 18 27 22 20 20 
% of 
Possible 68% 41% 61% 50% 45% 45% 
Fact Base 
Score 9 7 9 7 9 10 
% of 
Possible 75% 58% 75% 58% 75% 83% 
Strategies 
Score 52 26 55 57 51 35 
% of 
Possible 79% 39% 83% 86% 77% 53% 
Coordination 
Score 6 5 7 8 5 7 
% of 
Possible 75% 63% 88% 100% 63% 88% 
Participation 
Score 22 13 26 22 24 24 
% of 
Possible 79% 46% 93% 79% 86% 86% 
Implementation 
Score 7 4 15 12 14 9 
% of 
Possible 44% 25% 94% 75% 88% 56% 
Monitoring 
Score 8 4 13 8 8 14 
% of 
Possible 31% 15% 50% 31% 31% 54% 
Total Weighted Score 66.43 36.99 75.54 70.77 68.57 60.66 
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As further indication of the more successful performance of New York City’s plans, the average 
score was roughly 20 points more than the Norfolk city average. The standard deviation of 13.73 
would imply that the scores were valued slightly more tightly. This is reinforced when 
considering that four of the plans scored within 8 points of the average, a feat not one of 
Norfolk’s plans can claim in regards to its average. The median value being four points higher 
indicates the skewness influenced mostly by the minimum score, put forth by the Edgewater 
Park Report that is over 20 points lower than the 2nd lowest score. Still, at 36.99 points, the 
Edgewater Park Report outperformed Norfolk’s two lowest scoring plans. 
Table 12. New York City Plan Evaluation Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 63.16 
Standard 
Deviation 13.73 Minimum 36.99 
Median 67.5 Range 38.56 Maximum 75.54 
 
4.7 Evaluation Statistics 
The ensuing descriptive statistics are the result of the complete scores for all coding indicators 
for each set of plans. The mean, standard deviation, and minimum/maximum are calculated for 
each plan criterion in regards with the scores of the coding indicators contained within. The 
mean value would be the average score between 0 and 2 given to the division of indicators across 
a set of six plans. The standard deviation is the spread of those coding indicator scores, and the 
minimum/maximum are the lowest or highest single average coding indicator score. A plan 
criterion containing a single coding indicator would report the same value for minimum and 
maximum. 
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4.7.1 Norfolk 
4.7.1.1 Direction-Setting Principles 
The plan evaluation results revealed that Norfolk’s plans performed well under goals. Goals are 
merely representative of a literal sense of direction-setting and can be pertinent to any amount of 
issues and populations. Investigating the breakdown of goals, it becomes apparent that the best 
performing segments of goals were the more interchangeable items. Goals – general was most 
frequently coded with the maximum value or close to it, with a mean of 1.5. As its name alludes, 
general goals includes common practice items such as tangibility, relevance and articulation. The 
types of goals that are counterparts to vulnerability-specific items like equity and cohesion, 
restoration, and adaptation/anticipation were coded with the minimum value most often, with 
averages all under 1. 
The ever-important vulnerability assessment was one of the lowest average scoring criteria in the 
plan evaluation among Norfolk’s plans. Two of the three indicators shared a maximum average 
value of 0.5 and the third indicator was rarely present with an average of 0.17. Existing 
conditions on the other hand inflated the average scores for fact base in each plan. The combined 
mean between existing conditions and vulnerability assessment of 1.08 conceals the low average 
value for the vulnerability assessment. 
The strategies and actions in Norfolk’s plans were coded more liberally on the front end of the 
nine criteria or groups of strategies. The high coding scores for coordination actions matches the 
prevalence of coordination in other parts of the plan and plan evaluation. The more traditional 
structural strategies were fairly frequent in the plans with a mean of 1.22 and maximum indicator 
score of 1.83. The two most prevalent vulnerability-specific strategies in the plans were 
awareness/knowledge and smart growth. Their respective averages of 1.25 and 1.39 were 
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bolstered by the high coding values for “data collection/assessment tools” and “community 
educational awareness” for awareness/knowledge and “preventative development” for smart 
growth/development. Design tools were the least prevalent generalized strategy type in the plans 
with an average of 0.58 and minimum indicator score of 0.33. Of the lowest scored vulnerability-
specific strategies, preparedness/response and households/individuals both averaged 0.5 or less. 
Two of the coding indicators for households and individuals were not present in any of the plans 
and as such, have an average score of 0. “Flood insurance” slightly remedies the low scores with 
an average score of 1.33. The coding indicator scores were unanimously low under preparedness 
and response as only one of them, “emergency services and resources distribution”, had an 
average score approaching 1. 
Table 13. Norfolk, VA Direction-Setting Coding Scores 
Principles (# of indicators) Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
Goals         
General (3) 1.50 0.71 1.00 2.00 
Coordination (3) 1.11 0.76 0.50 1.83 
Equity & Cohesion (4) 0.79 0.72 0.67 1.00 
Restoration (3) 0.67 0.77 0.33 1.17 
Adaptation/Anticipation (4) 0.92 0.83 0.17 1.67 
Minimal Impacts (3) 1.33 0.59 1.17 1.50 
Sustainability (2) 1.08 0.79 1.00 1.17 
Fact Base         
Existing Conditions (3) 1.72 0.57 1.50 1.83 
Vulnerability Assessment (3) 0.44 0.61 0.17 0.50 
Strategies/Actions         
Awareness/Knowledge (4) 1.25 0.78 0.83 1.83 
Coordination (3) 1.67 0.59 1.33 1.83 
Smart Growth (3) 1.39 0.99 1.00 1.50 
Preparedness/Response (4) 0.46 0.59 0.33 0.83 
Structural (3) 1.22 0.73 0.67 1.83 
Design Tools (2) 0.58 0.79 0.33 0.83 
Recovery & Restoration (5) 0.60 0.57 0.33 0.83 
Households & Individuals (4) 0.50 0.72 0.00 1.33 
Community Assets & Services (5) 0.80 0.86 0.17 1.33 
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4.7.1.2 Action-Oriented Principles 
The scores received by plans for their inter-organizational coordination were greatly boosted by 
the perfect score of “organizational and agency coordination” in horizontal coordination and 
formidable score for “coordination with other plans” under plan integration. The average score of 
1.17 for nonprofit coordination lead horizontal coordination to have the highest mean of 1.58 
among the action-oriented criteria. 
Among participation scores, planning process was the lowest, although it only includes two 
coding indicators. Planning process consisted of “description of participation” that averaged 0.83 
points and “participation schedule” that averaged 0.67 points. The average indicator scores for 
public engagement techniques varied greatly, likely in part due to the spread of seven indicators. 
“Practice emergency protocol” was seldom present with an average score of 0.17 while “public 
meetings/workshops” was much more common at 1.5 points on average. “Focus groups” was the 
2nd most common indicator in the plans at 1.33 points on average. As a whole, between the seven 
indicators the average score was slightly below 1. 
Implementation scores were rather low, with the exception of the single-indicator timeline and 
finances, compared with most direction-setting principles. Organizational responsibility scores 
were lowest of all, averaging just .28 and not including an indicator that scored on average more 
than 0.5. “Recovery responsibilities” did not exist in any of the six plans. “Immediate 
responsibilities” did not fare much better by scoring 0.33. As a criterion, individual responsibility 
averaged more than either of these two indicators, but it also included one that averaged just 
0.17, volunteers. 
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On a criteria basis, monitoring was emblematic of poor performance. The single mildly prevalent 
criterion, monitoring implementation, averaged 0.97, though it constituted of an indicator 
averaging 0.17 – “review stakeholder membership” – and one averaging 1.5 – “monitoring 
performance of actions and policies”. No indicators averaged as high as 1 point within either 
self-monitoring or plan updating. “Manage conflicts/resolve disputes” was not present 
whatsoever, and both “review biases/assumptions” and “ensure accountability, transparency, 
equity” averaged just 0.17 points. Plan updating had two indicators that averaged 0.17 points – 
“update vulnerability assessments” and “update organizational makeup and responsibility” – and 
two that averaged 0.83 points – “review assessments and changing conditions” and “update goals 
and policies”.  
Table 14. Norfolk, VA Action-Oriented Coding Scores 
Principles (# of indicators) Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
Inter-Organizational 
Coordination         
Plan Integration (2) 1.25 0.97 1.00 1.50 
Horizontal Coordination (2) 1.58 0.67 1.17 2.00 
Participation         
Planning Process (2) 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.83 
Public Engagement Techniques (7) 0.90 0.74 0.17 1.50 
Stakeholders/Persons Involved (5) 1.03 0.72 0.33 1.50 
Implementation         
Organizational Responsibility (3) 0.28 0.46 0.00 0.50 
Individual Responsibility (3) 0.72 0.67 0.17 1.00 
Timeline (1) 1.33 0.82 1.33 1.33 
Finances (1) 1.50 0.84 1.50 1.50 
Monitoring         
Monitoring Implementation (5) 0.97 0.71 0.17 1.50 
Self-Monitoring (4) 0.33 0.55 0.00 0.83 
Updating Plan (4) 0.50 0.72 0.17 0.83 
 
 138 
Collectively, the average coding score for general population action-oriented indicators was 
about 0.87 versus 0.81 for vulnerable-specific action-oriented indicators (with spatial codes 
added on). By comparison, the 33 general population direction-setting indicators averaged about 
1.15 versus 0.76 for the 28 vulnerable-specific indicators. Clearly plans performed most 
successfully on general direction-setting items and only marginally better on all direction-setting 
items as opposed to all action-oriented. The scoring gap was close between vulnerable and 
general items among action-oriented indicators compared to the nearly half point difference 
between general and vulnerable direction-setting indicators. However, there are 62 direction-
setting coding indicators and only 39 action-oriented indicators in total. 
4.7.2 New York City 
4.7.2.1 Direction-Setting Principles 
The scores under the evaluation of New York City’s plans started out in a similar manner to the 
scores for Norfolk’s plans. The highest scores among goals were for the commonplace general 
goals (1.5). The indicator “objectives linked to goals”, as evidenced by its perfect average score 
of 2, was universally present and the only one to be so in goals. The complete picture of coding 
values for goals, if relied on as a predictor of content to come, would foretell that the plans 
would score much better on the general population indicators than on the vulnerable-specific 
indicators. Together with general goals, the plans also scored well with minimizing impacts 
(1.39) and sustainability (1.42), both of which could arguably equate with content for the general 
population. The plans scored poorly in equity/cohesion and adaptation/anticipation goals with 
scores averaging 0.63 and 0.75 on average. Both “connecting with socioeconomic factors” and 
“accounting for all scenarios” scored just 0.33 on average and were never present as prescribed 
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in any of the plans. The scores for restoration goals were neither low nor high with an average 
value of 1 for all 3 of its indicators. 
Fact Base is again a tale of two criteria. Existing conditions averaged a near perfect 1.89 points, 
influenced by the actual perfect score of 2 points by “land use and development trends” and the 
1.83 points given to both “geographic extent” and “demographics and economic characteristics” 
on average. Vulnerability assessment received just shy of a point one average, with indicator 
averages ranging from 0.33 to 1.33. Socially and physically vulnerable populations were most 
often identified (1.33 points) while local knowledge was least often included in the vulnerability 
assessments (0.33 points). Maps depicting social and/or physical vulnerability were present in 
any form in only half of the plans and as such, that pertinent indicator scored 0.67 points on 
average. 
Most strategies criteria scored fairly well or better. Coordination strategies fell just short of a 
perfect coding score with 1.94 points on average, supplemented by the 2 points received by both 
horizontal and vertical coordination. The two other general population criteria of structural 
strategies and design tools both scored somewhat less than coordination and close to the average 
scores for all strategy types of 1.39. The average coding score for general population strategies 
was 1.64 for only 8 indicators compared to an average of 1.31 points for 25 vulnerable-specific 
indicators. Both, however, are above the equivalent averages for the strategy scores in Norfolk’s 
plans. Awareness and knowledge (1.63), smart growth (1.72), and community assets and services 
(1.6) all scored higher than the overall strategies average, but their combined averaged scores 
were diminished by the coding values for preparedness and response (1), recovery and 
restoration (1.2) and households and individuals (0.79). Households and individuals, the lone 
strategy grouping that averaged less than 1 point, would have scored greater than 1 had it not 
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been for the two indicators that scored 0 in all plan evaluations, as they did for Norfolk plan 
evaluations. Like with Norfolk, “Flood insurance” again scored quite well in averaging 1.83 
points. 
Table 15. New York City Direction-Setting Coding Scores 
Principles (# of indicators) Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
Goals         
General (3) 1.50 0.79 0.83 2.00 
Coordination (3) 0.94 0.80 0.83 1.17 
Equity & Cohesion (4) 0.63 0.77 0.33 1.00 
Restoration (3) 1.00 0.77 1.00 1.00 
Adaptation/Anticipation (4) 0.75 0.74 0.33 1.17 
Minimal Impacts (3) 1.39 0.78 1.17 1.67 
Sustainability (2) 1.42 0.79 1.33 1.50 
Fact Base         
Existing Conditions (3) 1.89 0.32 1.83 2.00 
Vulnerability Assessment (3) 0.94 0.73 0.33 1.33 
Strategies/Actions         
Awareness/Knowledge (4) 1.63 0.72 1.17 1.83 
Coordination (3) 1.94 0.24 1.83 2.00 
Smart Growth (3) 1.72 0.70 1.17 1.67 
Preparedness/Response (4) 1.00 0.88 0.17 1.33 
Structural (3) 1.61 0.78 1.33 2.00 
Design Tools (2) 1.25 0.75 1.00 1.50 
Recovery & Restoration (5) 1.20 0.72 0.67 1.50 
Households & Individuals (4) 0.79 0.91 0.00 1.83 
Community Assets & Services (5) 1.60 0.73 1.17 1.83 
 
4.7.2.2 Action-Oriented Principles 
Plans performed exceptionally well on certain action-oriented criteria, but not as much so on a 
couple criteria – mainly in monitoring. The coordination indicator scores ranged from medium to 
peak value. Plan integration’s average was formidable at 1.42 where “coordination with other 
plans” was more prevalent with a score of 1.83. “Coordination with housing/poverty reduction 
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plans” was less extensive in the plans with an average of 1 point. Both indicators within 
horizontal coordination performed well under the plan evaluations. “Coordination with other 
organizations” impressed in scoring 2 points in every plan while “coordination with nonprofits” 
was shortly behind at 2 points in two-thirds of plans to average 1.5 points. 
At face value, it appears that, in participation, planning process scored perfectly on both 
indicators. However, participation criteria benefited greatly from the spatial coding process. 
Seven-tenths of a point on average was added to all of the participation criteria, resulting in a 
larger effect on the two indicators of planning process. The spatial code additions had a lesser 
effect on the average scores for the seven public engagement technique indicators and the five 
stakeholders/persons involved indicators. Still, “description of specific outreach and 
participation: averaged 1.83 points and “participation schedule” averaged 1.5 points. The results 
for the public engagement scores were quite mixed. While overall, the scores averaged 1.4, 
including the spatial coding, “practicing emergency protocol” scored 0.83 on average and 
“volunteer opportunity” averaged just 0.67 on average. The best performing public engagement 
indicators were “focus groups” at 1.83 points, “public meetings/workshops” at 1.67 points, and 
“information distribution” also at 1.67 points on average. 
The sole vulnerable-specific criterion of implementation performed moderately well in 
comparison with the average implementation scores. All implementation indicators combined 
averaged 1.27 points. Meanwhile, the three indicators contained within individual responsibility 
scored 1.44 points on average after including the 0.5 point average added from the spatial 
coding. Organizational responsibility and timeline hovered around a point, and finances scored 
1.83 points on average. The most popular indicator other than finances was individual 
responsibility’s “public officials and employees” with an average score of 1.67 points. Also 
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under individual responsibility, “volunteers” and “public participants” scored 1 and 1.17 points 
on average, respectively. 
The six evaluated plans were most deficient in monitoring by a sizable margin. Whereby none of 
the criteria under coordination, participation, or implementation averaged less than a point in 
their evaluation scores, two of the criteria in monitoring averaged less than 0.6 points. 
Monitoring implementation, the only criterion to average greater than 1 point, ranged from 
averaging 0.17 points with “reviewing stakeholder group membership” to 1.67 points with 
“monitoring performance of actions and policies”. “Ensuring progress is clearly communicated” 
also fared well, scoring 1.5 points on average. Self-monitoring’s score of 0.54 was this low zeros 
across the board for “reviewing biases and assumptions” and “managing conflicts/resolving 
disputes”. “Assessing community engagement and reactions” prevented self-monitoring from 
dipping any lower by averaging 1.67 points and being present to some degree in all six plans. 
Plan updating received the lowest scores on average of all criteria, direction-setting or action-
oriented. None of its indicators scored 0 points on average, however, both “updating 
vulnerability assessments” and “updating organizational makeup and responsibility” scored 0.17 
points and “updating goals and policies” scored 0.5 points on average. 
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Table 16. New York City Action-Oriented Coding Scores 
Principles (# of indicators) Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
Inter-Organizational 
Coordination         
Plan Integration (2) 1.42 0.79 1.00 1.83 
Horizontal Coordination (2) 1.75 0.62 1.50 2.00 
Participation         
Planning Process (2) 2.00 0.65 1.50 1.83 
Public Engagement Techniques (7) 1.40 0.75 0.67 1.83 
Stakeholders/Persons Involved (5) 1.60 0.78 0.67 2.00 
Implementation         
Organizational Responsibility (3) 1.00 0.97 0.83 1.17 
Individual Responsibility (3) 1.44 0.67 1.00 1.67 
Timeline (1) 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 
Finances (1) 1.83 0.41 1.83 1.83 
Monitoring         
Monitoring Implementation (5) 1.03 0.76 0.17 1.67 
Self-Monitoring (4) 0.54 0.78 0.00 1.67 
Updating Plan (4) 0.46 0.72 0.17 1.00 
Altogether, the action-oriented coding indicators were coded with scores of 1.22 on average. The 
13 general population action-oriented indicators scored below this average at 1.08 points, and the 
26 vulnerable-specific action-oriented indicators scored above this average at 1.29 points (with 
spatial codes added on). The first half, in effect – the direction-setting indicators – was coded on 
average with a score of 1.27 overall. The first half of the evaluation’s 33 general population 
indicators scored almost identically at 1.26 points on average and its 28 vulnerable-specific 
indicators scored exactly 1.27 on average. 
4.7.3 Plan Quality by Initiative/Approach 
Plan quality scores can also be grouped by the plan design or approach as a method to convey the 
general advantages of each. Average scores are taken by plan principle and overall evaluation 
score for each approach that comprise of one plan from Norfolk and one from New York. Not all 
pairs of plans carry the same exact approach under each initiative/type, but they are 
 144 
overwhelmingly similar. Each pair shares a common characteristic that binds them together to be 
analyzed as a combination against other all other attached pairs. Characteristics like type are 
shared by the hazard mitigation plan, comprehensive plan, and private-sector report pairs; 
approach shared by the hazard mitigation plans; sector or organization type by the private-sector 
reports; scale by the neighborhood reports; and initiative shared by the 100 Resilient Cities 
initiative plans and NDRC applications. 
Table 17. Plan Commonalities by Matched Pair 
Initiative/Type Hazard 
Mitigation 
Comp 
Plan 
Private-
Sector Design 
Neighborhood 
Scale 
100 Resilient 
Cities 
NDRC 
Application 
Norfolk plan Southside PlaNorfolk 
RE.invest 
report 
Rising 
Resiliency 
Resiliency 
Strat. 
ThRIVe 
NYC plan NYC Haz Mit PlaNYC BIG U RbD Edgewater Park OneNYC 
Lower Manh 
P&C 
Commonality Type/Approach Type Sector/Type Scale Initiative Initiative 
The gap in performance among the duos of plans dominates the story. The scoring disparity is 
more pronounced from the plans in Norfolk than those in New York. Although none more so 
than with neighborhood plans that both plans score poorly, because of the impact that the 
RE.invest report’s score has on private-sector plan performance, both plan types fall far behind 
all others. 
Again, the RE.invest Report deserves the bulk of the blame, but the private-sector reports fared 
worst in goals, fact base and strategies in comparison with other plan pairs. In other words, they 
scored lowest on the direction-setting half of the plan evaluation. The low average score in fact 
base is entirely because of the outstandingly low performance by the RE.invest Report. 
Ironically, the BIG U Rebuild by Design report had the highest total fact base score of all plans. 
The BIG U does in fact contribute to the low private-sector scores in goals and strategies, 
however. 
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On the other hand, the neighborhood plans scored worst on average in the action-oriented half of 
the evaluation. Thus, they exhibited the lowest scores in coordination, participation, 
implementation and monitoring alike. The pair of plans scored worst, out of all plan principle 
totals, on the two that would occur post-planning phase – implementation and monitoring. 
Implementation received only about a quarter of the total points on average and monitoring 
received even less, only 21% of the total points on average. Participation also received a slightly 
troubling score, with 46% of the total points between the pair. 
Then, the hazard mitigation, comprehensive, 100 Resilient Cities, and NDRC plans were more 
triumphant in their measured quality. The only plan that did not receive at least a decent 
evaluation score (above 50 points) was the Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
At only 37.35 points in total, it counterbalanced the 75.54 points total, highest overall, by the 
New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan. Unlike the neighborhood plans, the hazard mitigation 
plans scored well in the post-planning phase principles of implementation and monitoring. In 
what is widely a poor performing plan principle, they were the only pair of plans to average half 
of the possible points in monitoring. Together with the pair of comprehensive plans, the 
mitigation plans also scored two-thirds of the available implementation points. 
Of all the plan combinations, the two pairs that received the most significant guidance and 
funding were on average the best performing. The 100 Resilient Cities scored the highest with 
64.7 points on average, and the NDRC applications scored inconsiderably less with 62.89 points 
on average. Both pairs scored exceptionally well on strategies, collecting over 70% of the 
possible points. They specifically performed well on awareness, smart growth, preparedness, and 
community asset/service strategies. Between the two pairs of plans, the average score for smart 
growth strategies was actually greater than 100% of the possible points by virtue of favorable 
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spatial coding outcomes. The 100 Resilient Cities reports were completely coordinated, accruing 
100% of the available points in inter-organizational coordination. Both pairs also received 70% 
or more of participation points, though were average or slightly below in their monitoring 
performance. 
The Hazard Mitigation and Comprehensive Plans scores, though above average, rely on higher 
level mandates and local revenue for success in plan quality. The Comprehensive plans scored 
best in coordination and participation and worst in goals and monitoring. The comprehensive 
plan, with a versatile approach, also scored fairly well in strategies, with an average score just 
below that of the 100 Resilient Cities and NDRC application reports. Averaging all twelve of the 
plans together, the hazard mitigation, comprehensive, 100 RC, and NDRC plans exceeded the 
private-sector and neighborhood plan scores by almost 25 points. 
Table 18. Plan Evaluation Scores by Matched Pair 
Principle   
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Comp 
Plan 
Private-
Sector 
Design 
Neighborhood 
Scale 
100 Resilient 
Cities 
NDRC 
Application 
Goals 
Avg. Score 23.5 20 17.5 20 26.5 29.5 
% of Possible 53% 45% 40% 45% 60% 67% 
Fact Base 
Avg. Score 9 7 6 6.5 7 9.5 
% of Possible 75% 58% 50% 54% 58% 79% 
Strategies 
Avg. Score 38.5 45 23 24.5 49 47.5 
% of Possible 58% 68% 35% 37% 74% 72% 
Coordination 
Avg. Score 5.5 6.5 5 4.5 8 6.5 
% of Possible 69% 81% 63% 56% 100% 81% 
Participation 
Avg. Score 17.5 20 13.5 13 20.5 19.5 
% of Possible 63% 71% 48% 46% 73% 70% 
Implementation 
Avg. Score 10.5 10.5 5.5 4 10 7.5 
% of Possible 66% 66% 34% 25% 63% 47% 
Monitoring 
Avg. Score 13 9 7.5 5.5 9 8 
% of Possible 50% 35% 29% 21% 35% 31% 
Total Avg. Score 56.45 60.18 37.26 36.62 64.70 62.89 
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4.8 Plan Status & Progress 
4.8.1 Hazard Mitigation Plan 
4.8.1.1 Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan 
Each year following the 2011 update of the Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan, 
each locality that contributed to the plan must report on the progress they have made in 
implementing the actions recommended for themselves as a part of their continued membership 
in the Community Rating System (CRS). Norfolk's report is provided to the National Flood 
Insurance Program and their City Council to serve as the implementation actions within the 
city’s Flood Mitigation Plan (Tajan, 2014). Norfolk’s most recent update report came in 2014, as 
the HRPDC began the process of producing a regional hazard mitigation plan to be completed by 
late 2016 the year after. The implementation report by the City of Norfolk was published on their 
flood awareness webpage for citizen review and also provided to the NFIP. Goals and objectives 
from the 2011 plan are reiterated in the 2014 update so that actions detailed toward reaching 
those goals can be more understandable to the public. Progress made on all 14 of the proposed 
mitigation actions for the City of Norfolk are summarized throughout the report (Tajan, 2014). 
4.8.1.2 New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan 
The annual updates to the New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan are less of a progress report 
and more of an amendment to the plan. The 2016 Annex was issued with the intention of keeping 
the 2014 plan up-to-speed with the latest changes, public input, risks, and strategies. Like an 
implementation report, it does include the monitoring of activities that had occurred since the 
approval of the plan by FEMA in 2014. Since the 2015 version of the hazard mitigation plan 
annex all of the new information and edits occurred with the planning process, the risk 
assessment, and mitigation strategies. Updates to the planning process exhibit continual meetings 
to inform about new mitigation tools and overlapping with other plans. The risk assessment had 
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events added that occurred since the 2015 update. The strategies update summarizes the results 
of the first phase of mitigation actions that had since completed, and introduces the mitigation 
actions database (Office of Emergency Management, 2016). 
4.8.2 PlaNorfolk/PlaNYC 
Both cities have issued implementation/progress reports showcasing the work completed toward 
meeting certain milestones or benchmarks as specified in the initially released reports. 
4.8.2.1 PlaNorfolk 2030 
Norfolk conducted a two-year metrics analysis and implementation analysis of the 
PlaNorfolk2030 comprehensive plan adopted on March 26, 2013. The implementation status 
report and metrics report were both published in March 2015 and summarized in the 
Implementation and Metrics Evaluation. The city tracked the implementation progress of all 542 
of the actions proposed in PlaNorfolk. Each action was categorized based on its status in March 
2014, as complete, continuing if it was an ongoing action and had commenced, underway if the 
action had a specific timeframe and had commenced, or not started. Actions were then 
categorized as complete or underway, not started – immediate or ongoing timeframe, or not 
started – short-term, mid-term and long-term timeframes, as of March 2015. Of those 542 total 
actions, at the two-year point, 84 percent of them were on target, 4 percent were lagging behind 
schedule, and the remaining 12 percent had not started (Department of Planning and Community 
Development, 2015). 
The metrics analysis performed by the city served as a platform for measuring the success at 
achieving the outlined goals. PlaNorfolk included 102 separate metrics distributed throughout. 
Metrics are subsidiary to outcomes that are then grouped by goal. Actions are also divided up 
amongst outcomes, but are generally more populous per outcome. Of the 102 plan metrics, 35 
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percent of them were making progress (best possible rating), 23 percent were lacking progress, 
24 percent were making unclear progress, and the last 18 percent did not have any available data 
(Department of Planning and Community Development, 2015). 
4.8.2.2 PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York 
Because New York uniquely approached its comprehensive plan from two different vantage 
points that work reciprocally but with two vastly different purposes, it released two versions of 
PlaNYC – one emphasizing a more sustainability approach and the other a resilience one. Both 
PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater New York and PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York are 
painstakingly examined for their implementation progress. Though they represent two different 
causes and two different reports, their symbiotic relationship is stressed in being combined into a 
single implementation report. 
The implementation analysis of A Stronger, More Resilient New York inhabits the second half 
of the report, remaining consistent with the chronological order of the plans’ releases. The 
analysis tracks the progress of all 257 of the coastline defense, building upgrade, infrastructure 
protection, and neighborhood protection actions recommended in the comprehensive report. 29 
of those actions had already been completed and 202 of them were currently underway at the 
time of the progress report. In the first phase of implementation, A Stronger, More Resilient New 
York proposed $3.7 billion worth in coastal protection across 37 initiatives. The plan addressed 
building-level improvements through code legislation, regulations, incentive programs, and best 
practices. Since these proposals in 2013, the implementation report identified multiple pieces of 
legislation passed on that front and a Flood Resiliency Text Amendment as successes. Beyond 
those, other achievements are appropriated amongst economic recovery, insurance, utilities, 
fuels, healthcare, community preparedness, telecommunications, transportation, parks, 
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environmental protection, water/wastewater, food, waste, and various coastal locations across the 
city, in emulation of categories in the original plan. 
4.8.3 RE.invest Initiative 
Following the release of the RE.invest Report commissioned by RE:focus Partners in March 
2015, Norfolk’s City Council agreed to incorporate the findings and recommendations for the 
Hague/Ghent neighborhood and the Arts District into their suite of coastal resiliency strategies. 
The flood barrier projects and other engineering upgrades proposed in the report were submitted 
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to be included in their Section 205 Flood Management 
study for implementation. Those that were recommended to the U.S. ACE have completed 
implementation and have no further federal funding or interest as of the City Council meeting on 
December 8,, 2015. Other proposed strategies for The Hague remain speculative but are still on 
the radar of Norfolk for future capital investment and/or requests for federal funds (Williams, 
2015). Soon after the publishing of the infrastructure-driven report, RE:Focus Partners outspread 
their resilience effort to model economic, insurance and property losses under different scenarios 
to leverage catastrophe bonds supplementary to the protective structures they designed in the 
RE.invest Initiative. The multidisciplinary team completed the modelling scenarios under its 
RE.bound Program for three of its eight RE.invest Initiative partner cities – Hoboken, NJ, Miami 
Beach, FL, and Norfolk (RE:focus Partners, LLC, 2015). 
4.8.4 Rebuild by Design – BIG U 
The project developed under the collaboration between Bjarke Ingels Group (BIG), One 
Architecture and several other private-sector stakeholders, the BIG U was awarded $335 million 
by HUD for being among the 7 winners of the Rebuild by Design contest. Since the initial 
award, HUD has dedicated an additional $176 million from the National Disaster Resilience 
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Competition funding, toward the implementation of The BIG U. The City of New York 
committed $305 million of its capital funding to start the first phases of the East Side Coastal 
Resiliency (ESCR), and Lower Manhattan Coastal Resiliency (LMCR) projects. Both the ESCR 
and LMCR projects evolved out of two of the original three compartments of the BIG U. In the 
BIG U plan, the ESCR was known as East River Park, while LMCR was Two Bridges and 
Chinatown. A third compartment in the BIG U, Brooklyn Bridge to the Battery, is scheduled to 
be implemented last, but is excluded from NDRC funding (Rebuild by Design, 2016). 
4.8.5 Rising Resiliency Challenge 
Since the Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge was not a formal planning initiative but a 
collaborative academic endeavor, implementation was limited to the capabilities of those 
involved and whatever grant funding was available. The Dutch Dialogues sessions, that produced 
conceptual resiliency designs for the Newmarket Creek, Newtown Creek, and Ohio Creek 
watersheds, coincided with the completion of the designs from the Rising Resiliency Challenge. 
The neighborhood that the challenge dedicated its efforts on, Chesterfield Heights, is located in 
the Ohio Creek watershed. Due to this overlap, the Dutch Dialogues borrowed the students’ 
design work and credited them with contribution. The collective design from the two efforts was 
then included in the region’s grant proposal for the National Disaster Resilience Competition. As 
will be further revealed later, some of the funding that would be received from the HUD 
competition would be allocated toward the implementation of the designs for the Ohio Creek 
Watershed/Chesterfield Heights (Stiles Jr., Andrews, & Erten-Unal, 2015). 
4.8.6 Resilient Neighborhoods – Edgewater Park 
The Resilient Neighborhoods initiative represents a micro-based endeavor enabling the City’s 
Planning Department to work with neighborhood groups and community boards for arriving at 
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site-specific strategies. In all, ten communities were selected to be the subject of neighborhood 
scale studies aimed at supporting their continued vitality and resiliency. The Edgewater Park 
study was the prototype for those to follow. The main goals of the work in the neighborhood 
were to: renew the local land use and construction code in such a way as to not impede on 
character but allows for flood resilient buildings; and communicate climate risk and associated 
resiliency measures for residents to adopt. A month after the release of the neighborhood report, 
flood resilient construction was already underway for a few homes in Edgewater Park, as the 
Edgewater Cooperative planned to continue its collaboration with the Department of City 
Planning (Wirsing, 2015). Within a year of the planning work in Edgewater Park, studies were 
completed for nine other neighborhoods across all five boroughs by virtue of federal funding. 
The Department had already located 16 other neighborhoods to be addressed in the future under 
the initiative pending further funding (Department of City Planning, 2015). 
4.8.7 100 Resilient Cities 
4.8.7.1 Norfolk Resilience Strategy 
Announced in late 2013, Norfolk was selected as a member city among the tens of other cities in 
the 100 Resilient Cities challenge to manufacture a comprehensive report on engendering and 
celebrating resilience. Part of the membership involves the hiring of a Chief Resilience Officer. 
In Norfolk’s case, this was Christine Morris, who had been employed in various roles and 
capacities across Hampton Roads (Applegate, 2014; Norfolk's Resilience Challenge, 2015; 
Nyczepir, 2015). Morris, whose position was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, was tasked 
with championing a whole-community approach focused on hazard mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery from catastrophic events and chronic stresses.  Complex issues identified 
as most relevant to be addressed in the city’s resilience strategy include flooding, sea level rise 
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and coastal erosion, violence, poverty, unemployment, and transportation (Norfolk's Resilience 
Challenge, 2015; Sweet, 2014). 
According to the contract agreement with 100 Resilience Cities, Norfolk is obligated to 
participate in monitoring activities to enable Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, the consulting 
arm of the Rockefeller Foundation, to monitor and evaluate aspects of the city’s project. 100 
Resilient Cities was also permitted to conduct an evaluation of operations under the grant, 
including possible visits by personnel, discussion of the grant, and review of grant related 
financial and other records. The 100 Resilient Cities team had continuously issued a quarterly 
report card to the Chief Resilience Officer, Morris, to provide their assessment of the progress 
and development of strategies or activities under the grant. The grant to fund Christine Morris’ 
position and all third-party resources last for two years from June 2014 to June 2016 (Sweet, 
2014). 
4.8.7.2 OneNYC: The Plan for a Strong and Just City 
Joining Norfolk and many others in the first wave of 100 Resilient Cities participants, New York 
City honed in on its insufficient transportation system, flooding threat from sea level rise and 
coastal erosion, and the present and future perils associated with tropical storms as its pillars of 
resilience challenges. Its Chief Resilience Officer, tasked with finding and highlighting solutions 
to these challenges, had ample experience in leveraging resilience to solve the city’s problems. 
Daniel Zarrilli was appointed the position of Director of the Mayor’s Office of Recovery and 
Resilience by New York’s sitting mayor, Bill de Blasio, in March 2014. With entry in the 100 
Resilient Cities challenge, he quickly became the CRO. Zarrilli lead the development and 
implementation of the city’s resilience strategy, OneNYC after having assisting in the 
 154 
implementation of PlaNYC: A Stronger More Resilient New York in 2013 (New York's 
Resilience Challenge, 2015). 
For the $20 billion in identified funds covering over 1,000 individual projects outlined in the 
report, the plan includes both City and non-City assets and programs, and assumes both expense 
and capital funding from the City and other sources. Many of the strategies addressing 
infrastructure and coastal protection are incorporated into the Ten Year Capital Strategy whilst 
others, specifically $5 billion worth, are at last reported, currently unfunded. The additional costs 
would need to be incurred from increased federal or other funding and increased City capital or 
expense funding (Stringer, 2016). 
Since New York was one of the earliest to release its resilience strategy of the first batch of 100 
Resilient Cities participants, it has had the opportunity to track the progress made since its 
participation. The City released a 2016 progress report to its OneNYC report. The progress 
report is organized in the same manner as the full report – broken down by its different visions 
for the city - except each vision is instead inundated with milestones for each initiative and the 
progress made toward reaching the milestone. The latest available accomplishments are 
compared with the corresponding figures from the original report. According to the 2016 report, 
95% of the 202 initiatives outlined in OneNYC had been launched and underway. Moreover, 
90% of indicators signaling progress are on track as intended (Department of City Planning, 
2016). 
4.8.8 NDRC – ThRIVe/Lower Manhattan Protect & Connect 
The state of Virginia and New York City were among the 40 finalists selected to participate in 
the second round for implementation. Since the entire state of Virginia did not experience the 
brunt of the effects of Hurricane Irene, the state application honed in on Hampton Roads 
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(ThRIVe: Resilience In Virginia, 2015; Gonzalez, 2016). Virginia’s ThRIVe: Resiliene In 
Virginia and New York City’s Lower Manhattan Protect and Connect Phase 2 Applications were 
both announced as winning entries in January, 2016 and thus had access to the $1 billion in 
disaster funding, alongside 11 other communities. New York City was awarded the largest 
funding amount of $176 million to aid in the recovery from Hurricane Sandy, while Virginia 
came in shortly behind with the third largest pay amount of $120.55 million (Gonzalez, 2016). 
Both projects under the guidance of the NDRC were estimated to begin in September 2015 and 
last through September 2019 (Taffet, 2014). Funding to Virginia and Hampton Roads was to 
support efforts to grow the economy through water management and community revitalization 
tasks. Virginia’s ThRIVE application drew largely from Norfolk’s resilience strategy under the 
direction of Christine Morris. $5 million of the award, in conjunction with $7 million in state 
committed funds, are directly for the Coastal Resilience Laboratory and Acceleration Center. 
The Center was set up as an independent nonprofit to serve as a hub for technological, 
organizational and innovation around community revitalization, water management and 
resilience measurement (Rodin, 2016). 
Funding to New York City was in support of the Dryline, a coastal protection system envisioned 
to incorporate retail and recreational space along Lower Manhattan. The project idea was 
inspired by the Rebuild by Design competition, the precursor to the NDRC (Rodin, 2016). In 
sum, New York City received $4.2 billion in CDBG-DR funding from HUD for the 2015-2016 
fiscal year. A portion of the funds were dedicated to the implementation of resiliency/hazard 
mitigation programs like Rebuild by Design and the NDRC project while the remainder was 
mostly distributed amongst home restoration and replacement programs, and small business 
assistance programs (Stringer, 2016). 
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
Emerging directions in research on planning to adapt to and prepare for events such as worsening 
coastal storms and sea-level rise suggest that the breadth and complexity of quality is more than 
meets the eye. In the past, studies investigating the quality of plans with the intention of 
determining their value in regards to coping with development pressures, hazards, and climate 
change have produced a legitimate argument and conclusion. When it comes to planning for 
extreme flooding and coastal storms, with the acknowledgement that certain demographics are 
compellingly vulnerable, the argument that content of a particular quality being present in plans 
is evidence for superior adaptability and preparedness is not as decisive. Though it is immensely 
supportive and implicit of exceptional plans, it does not unanimously ascertain resilience among 
those that are least resilient to these worsening events. The ensuing passages aim to surmise at 
the potential of these two sets of plans for Norfolk and New York City by piecing together the 
various avenues of collected information and objectifying their implication using evidence of 
past performance of related plans, factors that have affected these plans, and ideals for future 
plans, found in recent literature. 
5.2 Trends and Influences in Plan Quality 
Few cities in the U.S. have integrated climate adaption and disaster preparedness and recovery 
into normal planning and development activities. The plan evaluation protocol itself was 
designed to measure the quality of both typical planning efforts and specialized efforts up against 
the ideal plan to prepare for and adapt to the hazards of sea-level rise, extreme flooding and 
coastal storms. The protocol was purposely idealistic and exhaustive with the assumption that no 
planning effort would even nearly perfectly satisfy all of the content indicators. Several of the 
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evaluated plans and reports exceeded the quality and capabilities of past efforts as implied in 
recent studies of recovery, risk reduction and climate adaptation plans, especially in a social 
capacity (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Berke, 
et al., 2015). The results nevertheless still demonstrate that recent and current research is an 
instructive voice that planning efforts, via the perspective of Norfolk and New York City, are 
short of keeping pace with. Though, Norfolk and New York City are accompanied with certain 
internal and also external circumstances that have contributed to their mildly prolific range of 
efforts in recent years. Along with the internal trends in the plan quality data, external influences 
are equally as important to address. 
5.2.1 Motivations 
In their own interest, both Norfolk and New York City have placed ample attention toward 
combating the adverse impacts of a changing climate on their city, but also because of 
independent circumstances. Inland cities do not as readily experience the immediate effects of 
climate change, specifically sea-level rise and more intense storms. In recent surveys, of cities 
that engaged in adapting to the effects of climate change, three-quarters had experienced climate 
impacts, were in a state with a plan of their own, and many were at or near the coasts (Chu). 
Neither Norfolk nor New York would be as motivated to understand the personalized impacts of 
climate change, let alone combat them were it not for their geographic position and readily 
apparent impacts. Both cities are clear anomalies in their experience of climate impacts. New 
York City suffered from the most costly recent coastal storm in Sandy and Norfolk witnesses at 
the very least nuisance flooding on a regular basis. 
Despite the broad acceptance among academia of socioeconomic action as a more powerful tool 
to minimize vulnerability to worsening climate threats, minimal evidence has indicated that plans 
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are moving away from tradition because (1) social justice is an emergent theme in hazard and 
adaptation planning, and (2) studies focusing on the integration of social justice into climate and 
hazards plans are sparse (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015).  
For independent reasons, Norfolk and New York have been coerced into taking action on social 
and physical vulnerabilities, and exposure all concurrently. Not that New York City needed a 
major catalyst to motivate it to tackle environmental hazards, but Sandy exposed the social 
inequities that the city likely would not have been as adamant about otherwise. As for Norfolk, it 
is no coincidence that the areas that experience the worst flooding are also those most overrun 
with low-income affordable and public housing. Other more common motivations for initiating 
action toward climate change among cities at large – demonstrating leadership, promoting 
sustainable and resilient development, and improving community quality of life – all likely 
equally apply in the case of Norfolk and New York (Aylett, 2014). Considering New York City 
had been modelling the impacts from and strategies to adapt to climate change years prior to 
Sandy whilst most cities only began mitigating climate change impacts based on international 
research, it was an early national leader. Ensuring development is sustainable and resilient is of 
critical importance for both cities with their coastal location and thus finite developable space. 
The combination of these motives has thrust climate adaptation and flooding resilience into the 
foreground of most planning activities between the two cities since 2011. 
5.2.2 Connections 
The rapid emergence of flooding and sea-level rise as a prime focus in planning domains 
previously reserved for development, growth management and revitalization has manifested into 
previously unaccustomed associations. As climate change vulnerability is increasingly 
emphasized in practice and research, efforts previously operating in different spaces, like 
 159 
mitigation, adaptation, and preparedness are beginning to see overlaps (Lesnikowski, Ford, 
Berrang-Ford, & Heymann, 2015; Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). 
While the social justice issues of climate change have been merely conceptual in most cities, 
Norfolk and New York City are evidence that progress is being made toward climate equity 
(Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Schrock, Bassett, & Green, 2015). 
Prescriptive and investigatory studies call upon transformative goals as means to further more 
equitable action (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). Through evaluation of 
hazard plans, they discovered that goals have been all too often confined to standard convention 
like efficiency and public safety to be considered transformative. They have neglected what has 
recently been declared more essential to disaster and flooding resilience, social equity (Berke & 
Lyles, 2013). Goals might seem inconsequential toward the overall performance of plans 
specifically in accounting for measures of social vulnerability, but in fact the makeup of goals 
observed in the plans for Norfolk and New York City were predictors of equitable action. It is 
worth noting that with a future portended as being littered with extreme climatic scenarios, 
breaking from conventions is of utmost importance. 
A plan evaluation exclusive to goals would be negligible at best. However, the scope of the goals 
present in Norfolk’s plans indicate that this foundational content might truly carry planning 
efforts on a trajectory of success or lack thereof in accounting for the whole picture of 
vulnerability and susceptibility. That New York’s plans display a weaker correlation between the 
makeup of goals and subsequent propositions and actions does not repudiate this connection. As 
a trendsetting global city, New York hardly represents a typical American city, and as is 
reinforced in its plan performance. It is not the sheer level of overall performance that seems to 
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separate New York from a city with typical capabilities but the manner in which it outperformed 
Norfolk. 
New York’s plans that were facilitated through federal and nationally-renowned partners, its 
NDRC application and 100 Resilient Cities report, slightly outperformed that average of its 
plans. Its hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans outperformed the average by an essentially 
equal margin. In Norfolk, while its 100 Resilient Cities report and pertinent NDRC application 
outperformed its average, they did so by a wide margin, and likewise of its hazard mitigation and 
comprehensive plans. This trend underscores the possibilities available through strong top-level 
influence and more flexible municipal capabilities to rectify complex situations. If latter content 
exceeds the scope of goals then it is perhaps an indication of experience and familiarity whereas 
if goals eclipse tangible ideas then it is a sign of inexperience and sometimes complacency or 
overconfidence. 
When organized effectively, goals can serve as benchmarks to hold plans accountable for their 
aspirations. Thus, they can be prophetic of progress without symbolizing progress. To aspire for 
equitable progress and resilience is to facilitate a process and plan that is inclusive, democratic, 
audacious, and studious. The studious component consists of open-mindedly inquiring about the 
complexities and characteristics of appropriately scaled communities. The vulnerability 
assessment is the cornerstone of this inquisition. As social structures and processes have become 
pervasive in understanding of vulnerability and inequality, research has urged for this to reflect 
in assessments of vulnerability. Vulnerability assessments are intended as diagnostic tools to 
effectuate the appropriate actions in appropriate locations (Van Zandt, et al., 2012; Baussan, 
2015; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). 
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Norfolk’s 100 Resilience Cities report and NDRC application boast the most wide-ranging and 
equitable goals, but only the NDRC application is able to effectively diagnose contributors to 
inequality and vulnerability. If Norfolk’s Resilience Strategy were to be self-sufficient, this 
finding would severely discount the legitimacy of its proposed actions, but because of its 
superior inter-organizational coordination and collaboration it can be relieved of some of the 
responsibility. Multi-directional coordination in this way is conducive to the interchange of 
information and ideas such that the weight of legitimacy and responsibility is shared among other 
plans and initiatives. Both 100 Resilient Cities reports, Norfolk’s Resilient Strategy and New 
York’s OneNYC embody this trend of shared responsibility. Though not stating it outright, 
perhaps one element of the 100 Resilient Cities initiative was to maximize the immediate impact 
by relying immensely on preconceived assessments of vulnerability and already tailor-made 
strategies. Given the initiative is run by the financially endowed Rockefeller Foundation it is 
highly possible that investments in cities had been decided strategically based on the existence of 
efforts and resources in place rather than on absolute need. 
Shifting back to assessments of vulnerability – the NDRC applications were not the only efforts 
that adequately identified and inventoried social and physical vulnerability. The more traditional 
hazard mitigation plans also sufficiently mapped and apprehended local vulnerability, but 
evidently as a matter of requirement. Neither hazard mitigation plans set equity and cohesion as a 
goal to achieve yet they both significantly accounted for social measures of vulnerability. That is 
about all the two hazard mitigation plans had in common. Whether or not Norfolk and the other 
Southside Hampton Roads jurisdictions sought to accomplish the bare minimum or to focus on 
other planning efforts more fervently is unclear, but the Southside Hazard Mitigation plan is 
certainly emblematic of the wide disparities in municipal capabilities between Norfolk and New 
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York City. An unexpected implication is that New York City’s Hazard Mitigation might actually 
be its most socially impactful plan in delving into more typical place-based strategies, embracing 
diverse engagement, and being the most implementable. Of particular note is that the Southside 
Hazard Mitigation plan was published in 2011, a whole year earlier than any other evaluated 
plan. New York’s, contrarily, was published at the start of 2014, roughly 15 months after the 
city’s experiences with Hurricane Sandy. The more than two-year span between plans could be 
enough to explain the large gap in quality given the recent chronology of disasters and 
research/planning focuses. An obvious conclusion to make would be that Norfolk can learn 
immensely from New York’s so-called hazard mitigation effort, but it could also be that that is 
not a suitable blueprint for Norfolk. 
The city of Norfolk seems to have made the decision to invest greatly in its comprehensive 
planning effort to serve as an appropriate home for all complex issues including flooding of the 
nuisance and storm-related variety. Though Norfolk’s Southside Hazard Mitigation plan is of 
lesser quality than the evaluation average, its comprehensive plan is just a step below the two 
robust initiatives. One study, after evaluating the adaptive and preparedness quality of several 
plan types including comprehensive plans for eight states all located in the Southeast, determined 
that comprehensive plans were the least equipped to support content related to hazards and 
disasters (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). 
Considering the pair of comprehensive plans outperformed the hazard plans, Norfolk and New 
York City clearly debunk that judgment. Perhaps reinforcing the post-Sandy effect, the average 
date of publication and adoption for all four plans converges on around 2013. The 
aforementioned study evaluated plans that were adopted between 2007 and 2012. Ordinarily it 
might be surprising that a plan evaluation searching for content that contributes to adaptability 
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and resilience would favor comprehensive plans over hazard mitigation plans, but given the 
experience of these two cities and the current landscape of research since 2012, it is hardly a 
surprising result. Structural and infrastructural investments are still common in hazard mitigation 
plans because they are viewed as more sound and tangible compared with socioeconomic 
investments. Socioeconomic investments also do not attract as much buy-in amongst hazard 
mitigation since they are perceived as a trade-off from tangible actions that are subject to federal 
and state requirement (Berke & Lyles, 2013). 
5.2.3 Influencing Factors 
Undoubtedly much is gained from the results of the plan evaluation and the explicit content 
contained within the two sets of plans, but external factors also greatly contribute to their 
performance as can be assumed from other sources and the plans themselves. 
5.2.3.1 State & Federal Influence 
To the advantage of both Norfolk and New York City, some of the innovative practices and 
investment to combat the effects of flooding and coastal storms can be attributed to federal 
commitments and state-level leadership. Though most federal funding to local jurisdictions 
following a disaster declaration manifests as assistance and recovery funds to provide relief from 
the major financial setback that ensues, recent commitments have opened up new possibilities. 
During disaster relief, the federal government follows its own protocol under the Stafford Act to 
assist with a laundry list of priorities like deploying emergency support and response teams, 
public facilities and public housing, insurance losses, etc. Research has found that the ability of 
cities to plan for climate adaptation and preparedness does indeed depend on state and federal 
policies (Chu). Adaptation at the local level does not occur independent of federal or state 
government (Baker, Peterson). Consistent with the case of New York City, research also states 
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that environmentally progressive cities have excelled in planning to prepare and adapt (Shi, Chu, 
& Debats, 2015). 
If the comprehensive plans represent local government’s best efforts to prepare and adapt to 
coastal climate threats, then the 100 Resilient Cities reports and NDRC applications represent the 
current capabilities of state and federal governments. The two pairs fully demonstrate the top-
level influence effect. It has also been cited that local government can lack the dedicated capacity 
undertake certain specifics of climate adaptation and preparedness without the support of 
foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation, that operate at the national level (Shi, Chu, & 
Debats, 2015). The obvious influence of HUD and the Rockefeller Foundation on the two 
initiatives, while incalculable, does not even represent the full scope of vertical influence, at least 
on Norfolk. The leadership under Virginia’s Department of Housing and Community 
Development, as appointed by the governor, on the ThRIVe NDRC application centered on 
Norfolk certainly contributes to the application’s elevated potential. The agency was likely 
selected based on the competition’s diverse requirements for recovery, revitalization and 
development given their track-record in those areas. The combination of state and national stake 
does not account for the entirety of the superior performance of the 100 Resilient Cities and 
NDRC reports, but as has been repeatedly uncovered in other cities, it makes an impact. 
5.2.3.2 Financial Streams 
In what might be attempts to keep the federal response to future disasters as modernized and 
mistake-free as possible, the government has dedicated billions in leftover disaster recovery 
funds to coax impacted locations like New York City and to a lesser extent Norfolk to explore 
creative solutions to the problems they have faced as a result of extreme flooding and coastal 
storms. Rather than remain in the background as cities surge past state and federal governments 
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in understanding the complexities of the various stages of disaster planning, the federal 
government has taken on a listening role so that municipalities can return the favor for the 
funding and resources they received. The quality of efforts that have emerged out of this give 
and take has been bar none above the rest likely because of the high standards the federal 
government imposes on its subsidiaries, and for the desire to constantly improve outcomes for 
other locations in a manner not unlike the 100 Resilient Cities initiative. 
Ordinarily, even with supplementary funds, because of political bureaucracy and prioritized 
recovery needs, the two cities would be unable to devote labor and investment into exploring 
radical alternatives let alone implement them. There are tradeoffs to investing in one area of need 
over another as cities must prioritize certain actions over others. In many instances, cities choose 
development priorities over environmental or social priorities because they are indebted to those 
priorities (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). The state, federal and nongovernmental initiatives that 
have surfaced since the publicity of climate-related events have provided the motivation and 
resources enough for local governments to overcome this dilemma. Certain decision-makers and 
representatives of vulnerable communities might advocate for transformational change, but 
without grants and other outside resources, willpower is too weak, and the opposition holds too 
much weight. 
5.2.3.3 Regulatory Framework 
Both hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans have certain requirements that they must meet 
in order for the jurisdiction that is the subject of the plans, to qualify for certain state and federal 
government funding. Hazard mitigation plans at the local level often conform to state hazard 
mitigation plans that determine the amount of funding the locality may receive. These FEMA-
approved hazard mitigation plans may receive funding directly for mitigation projects in non-
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emergency situations, as a condition under the Stafford Act. These plans are thus of better 
quality in areas that FEMA and the Stafford Act require of them for approval and funding 
eligibility. Under the Stafford Act, all hazard mitigation plans for a jurisdiction in the U.S. must 
identify hazards, risks and vulnerabilities, describe actions to mitigate them, and establish a 
strategy to implement those actions (FEMA, 2013). Hence the better performance in those types 
of actions in the plans themselves. 
Also at the federal tier, several executive orders have been signed since 2013 regarding climate 
adaptation at the local level. Particularly, FEMA has received the directive to require state-level 
hazard mitigation plans to include future climate scenarios and projections, but they have yet to 
enforce that at the local level (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Small & Laporte, 2015). Overall, for 
the purposes of this study, the regulatory framework for hazard mitigation would have been a 
hindrance since for instance structural controls only accounted for less than one percent of the 
possible score. Studies have even found that federal and state programs for hazard mitigation 
have had only a marginally positive effect on plan quality (Berke & Lyles, 2013). 
The DMA, the successor to the Stafford Act, had intended to diffuse authority by emphasizing 
intergovernmental collaboration. Instead of reliance on formal mandates and imposed standards 
by the federal government, local governments could have more control over their hazard 
mitigation approaches. In reality, state governments coordinated risk assessment, strategy 
identification, implementation and monitoring. Unfortunately, even recently, state hazard 
mitigation plans have underperformed under measures of the same plan quality principles, 
boding poorly for local plans. Specifically, state plans the responsibility of emergency 
management agencies are of the poorest quality because they view hazards differently and pay 
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less regard for the uncertain impacts of climate change, or economic development and 
environmental protection (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012).  
The Southside Hazard Mitigation Plan was in fact prepared and updated in partnership with 
FEMA and the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM). On Hampton Roads’ 
end, the local planning committee is representative of in addition to emergency services, 
planning, zoning, public works, healthcare, and environmental offices. Since the committee is 
compliant to VDEM and their coordinating of risk assessments, strategy approaches, and 
implementation methods. By contrast, New York City’s hazard mitigation plan was far less 
reliant on state government, though it was supported by the equivalent New York State Division 
of Homeland Security and Emergency Services. The plan was instead co-developed through the 
city’s Office of Emergency Management and Department of City Planning in coordination with 
the Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability. The self-autonomy and lack of a 
dominant regulatory body with New York City’s hazard mitigation certainly would explain the 
distance in hazard mitigation quality after accounting for the city’s planning capacity. 
Comprehensive plans, like hazard mitigation plans, can serve as a symbol of qualification for a 
locality, though in a secondary role. They usually do not themselves entitle a locality to funds to 
implement actions proposed in the plan like with a hazard mitigation plan. On a state by state 
basis, comprehensive plans can have consistent structure so that they are officially recognized by 
their governing state authority. Requirements can vary immensely for comprehensive plans 
depending on the rules written in the state’s code. When state comprehensive planning mandates 
do include funding and other incentives, hazards typically receive higher priority (Berke, 
Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). Certain components of the comprehensive plans for 
Norfolk and New York City may be contingent on the requirements from Virginia and New 
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York State, respectively, but more than likely, an overwhelming majority of the quality pertinent 
to this particular evaluation is dependent on the jurisdiction itself. As an example, an added 
requirement under New York state law is for comprehensive plans to comply with state 
environmental quality requirements and to allow for full citizen comment though public hearings 
during adoption (Coon, 2015). While this is negligible given New York’s capacity combined 
with its progressiveness, it is still a requirement that is not equivalently enforced on Norfolk. 
In sum, absent regulations can either allow more freedom to plan flexibly under a 
multidisciplinary effort or withhold the accountability necessary to integrate certain essential 
planning qualities. Regulations in place can also ensure that these essential planning qualities are 
accounted for or, if outdated and overly restrictive, can themselves serve as an unbreakable 
barrier to more improved planning efforts. 
5.2.3.4 Scale 
As hypothesized, downscaling planning efforts would improve outcomes for vulnerable 
communities. As the plan closes in on a smaller geographic area, so too would its contents. It 
would be expected that with less geographic responsibility, assessments of vulnerability might be 
correspondingly more complex and wholesome, proposed strategies might be most compatible 
and constructive, participation might be all-inclusive and recurrent, implementation might be 
shared and convenient, and monitoring might be ingrained. Contrarily, the two examples of 
neighborhood-scale plans did not display these traits to much avail. The efforts seemingly 
contracted in quality as they concurrently honed in on planning territory. One explanation for the 
decrease in quality after the downsizing scale is a narrowed and more focused scope. The 
evaluation process is set up to reward those plans that incorporate a variety of actions and 
content, and for good reason. As communicated throughout, each criteria has its own function 
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and benefit that contribute to the overall potential of a plan to incite resilient transformational 
change in vulnerable communities. Since there were fewer stakeholders and fewer constituents, 
preferences were most likely more concentrated. Likewise, one single neighborhood may have 
numerous issues and vulnerabilities, but as a fraction of the total in an entire city. Proposed 
solutions and actions taken would accordingly reflect this condensed realm of problem-solving. 
5.2.3.5 Iteration 
The main similarity between a city’s comprehensive plan and its hazard mitigation plan is that 
each are updated every so many years, typically around five. A major difference between them is 
their source of funding to develop the plan. Given the latest version of a city’s hazard mitigation 
was approved by FEMA and thus subject to the rules of the Stafford Act, the mitigation planning 
committee made up of representatives from planning and zoning, emergency 
preparedness/services, and utilities would have allocated the contributions from FEMA directly 
toward the future development and updating of the plan. Comprehensive plans forged by the 
planning department do not have that same luxury. Rather, they are often a periodic 
responsibility of certain members of the planning staff whose positions are paid for through 
public revenue. Yet, due to the fact that both imminent plan types are recurring, they bear certain 
qualities that other perhaps unfamiliar planning endeavors might elude. 
Research has indicated that planning leaders have learned incrementally at different rates 
depending on the initial quality of the plans and the extent of state mandate and regulation. Plan 
series have improved over time in areas such as emergency preparedness, public engagement and 
policy-making (Brody, 2003). The hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans likewise revisit 
themselves and the areas they are planning for each time they undergo a regular renovation. The 
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community conditions that factor into vulnerability assessments and critical decisions are usually 
representative of the latest data and information available. 
If each time the plan update process commences, officials revisit their public constituents, 
barriers to participation and implementation like reluctance, distrust and opposition may degrade 
over time. Thus, the equitable and implementation capacity of the plan would have been 
enhanced. Again, since the plans are always building on the preceding version, they are also 
constantly realizing past mistakes and errors and correcting them for future versions. Over time, 
unless local bureaucracy prevents progress on the plans or a deviation from the bare minimum, 
hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans should gradually make improvements in quality. 
Their iterative nature, nevertheless, is more auspicious than an impediment. Of all the external 
influences on plan quality, the iterative nature of these plans has the least certain effect, but as 
according to research it is likely the long duration of hazard mitigation and comprehensive 
planning processes has had a positive impact. 
5.3 Overcoming Traditional Obstacles 
Similar to external influences that have either bolstered or hindered the quality of these sets of 
plans, there are certain underlying barriers that have plagued the progression of all planning for 
adaptation and preparedness. Studies have chronicled the deficiency of plans in effectively 
accounting for the whole sphere of remedial environmental, social and economic actions and 
criteria. While these barriers may be deflating and seem overbearing, research has proposed 
ways to overcome them – some of which is in practice in the plans of Norfolk and New York 
City. The interlacing theme of the ensuing passage is not to argue that the subject plans have 
successfully overcome these longstanding obstacles and that other cities can view New York and 
Norfolk as utter successes, but that they have made headways. Perhaps certain proposed 
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groundbreaking strategies that were adopted by either city are more practical than others that 
were not put into practice but are equally supported in research. 
These barriers that have continuously threatened the efficacy of planning efforts only complicate 
already desperate situations for vulnerable communities. Embracing recommended tools and 
tactics to alleviate and eliminate barriers to municipal planning can improve the future prospect 
for these communities, but only in an anticipatory sense. As the literature and this evaluation has 
established, adaptation and preparedness undertakings also need to seize socioeconomic and 
equitable action to whittle away at the incessant shortcomings of vulnerable households. 
Otherwise, a vicious cycle of defeat and failure at the hand of extreme flooding and coastal 
storms will persist. 
5.3.1 Local Leadership 
5.3.1.1 Political Prioritization 
Consistent with leadership demonstration as a motivation to pursue adaptation and preparedness 
to climate change, local leadership is a critical indicator of far-reaching support for adaptation 
planning. Leadership also serves as the foundation on which cities are able to tackle 
environmental as well as socioeconomic risks. Encouragement from local leaders for climate 
commitment early on has correlated with robust coalitions and sweeping political support. A 
history of climate change denial, unpredictability of climate impacts, and hierarchy of 
government operations have all been cited as deterrents to local leadership embrace of planning 
for climate change impacts. Just a quarter of cities have reported that elected officials are highly 
committed to adapting to climate change. Inadequate support from mayors and city councilors 
translates into challenges in supporting personnel capacity, acquiring enough funding, and 
coordinating with other departments and agencies (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Aylett, 2014). 
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Of course leadership has been more receptive over time as momentum has shifted in favor of 
climate and social progress, but the underliers behind lack of support still persists in those cities 
notably without local leadership. Most common has been a shortsightedness or a political focus 
on short-term goals linked to electoral cycles. Other city governments cite lack of leadership at 
regional or national levels of government as reason to not take initiative. There will always be 
competing priorities at the local level, but some cities still view adaptation and preparedness as at 
odds with economic expansion and improvements in community facilities. Even cities that have 
been declared more at-risk to climate-induced weather events and sea-level rise, action has been 
occasionally sluggish because of other priorities on their list receiving precedence (Berke & 
Lyles, 2013). 
All of these political barriers have been most pervasive in the U.S. Of all nations participating in 
a 2014 global survey of action on climate change by ICLEI, U.S. respondents reported the 
highest frequency of mitigation only response. Norfolk and New York are among the 58% of 
American cities that are taking mitigation and adaptation action, but 41% of 141 participating 
cities is still a substantial chunk that has been unable to break through (Aylett, 2014). Local 
leadership can be seen as both an external and an internal challenge. Influence and endorsement 
from mayors and city councilors is less tangible plan content and more procedural and integrated 
into background and authority. Norfolk and New York City are indeed special cases in that social 
interests and climate change are already intertwined and immediate rather than off in the distant 
future, as it pertains to being adaptive and prepared. Still, they have been governed by leaders 
that have championed the fight against the social, economic and environmental impacts of 
climate change. In the future, this continuous commitment to socioeconomic and climate 
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adaptation will hinge less on local leaders as momentum will have already been realized even as 
new individuals occupy leadership positions. 
5.3.1.2 Local Coalitions 
The Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, launched by then Mayor Bloomberg and made up 
of city and state agencies, is still one of the only in existence at that capacity and scale. The task 
force has served as an empowering voice behind much of the mitigation and adaption work on 
climate change prior to and since Sandy. Coincidentally, the Panel got off the ground thanks to a 
grant from the Rockefeller Foundation’s Climate Change Resilience Program (Loeser & Post, 
2008; Department of City Planning, 2015). The Foundation, which has been a partner in around 
half of the resilience initiatives involving Norfolk and New York City, happens to be 
headquartered in New York – further solidifying the city’s status as a trailblazer in combating 
climate change. It would be imperative that New York City had created better quality plans to 
foster resilience to flooding and coastal storms since it has far greater political will, capacity and 
experience. 
Concurrently, the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission has served as the regional 
liaison on climate action through support from the Virginia Department of Environmental 
Quality via NOAA and the Coastal Zone Management Program. The HRPDC with 
representation from local leaders across the region were able to commence a climate adaptation 
process relying on a three-year focal area grant beginning in 2009 and extending through 2013 
(McFarlane, 2013). To opportunistically unite the multiple municipal entities and levels of 
government, the Hampton Roads has since piloted an organizationally inclusive approach to sea 
level rise preparedness and resilience planning. The purpose of the two-stage project was to 
assemble intergovernmental arrangements and procedures comprised of federal, state and local 
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government agencies, the private sector, and the public. After the conclusion of the project the 
region now has an institutional framework of mutual accountability so that there is universal 
leadership indefinitely. 
Circling back to the evaluated plans, each set would not have been possible without the political 
approval to pursue the 100 Resilient Cities and NDRC initiatives or the adoption of the plans and 
reports by local mayors and city council members or even state political leaders. Each city’s 
mayor has delivered personalized visions and perspectives to reports like Norfolk’s Resilience 
Strategy or New York’s PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York as a way to enunciate 
their leadership role in the process. If research is accurate about the advantage to vigorous local 
leadership in the fight against climate change, then the NDRC application and 100 Resilient City 
reports were of superior quality because, not only did they incur federal support, but they 
provided spaces for leadership roles from nontraditional sources. For instance, alongside 
Norfolk’s mayor, city council members, and city manager, representatives from all sorts of 
agencies, nonprofits, community organizations, municipal services, and academic institutions 
serve in an influential capacity among four different working groups. 
5.3.1.3 Leadership in Flood Management 
A further indicator of local commitment to adaptation and preparedness is participation in the 
Community Rating System (CRS) under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) (Berke, 
Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). At face value it appears as a specific example of an 
action taken to prepare for flooding threats, but is actually a sign that a municipality has gone 
above and beyond what is considered acceptable requirements for flooding in communities 
regardless of income. The program just happens to benefit low-income communities more as a 
matter of proportional impact. The program is entirely voluntary in providing discounts to flood 
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insurance premiums for floodplain management activities that minimum NFIP or freeboard 
requirements (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). New York City proposed 
participating in the program in 2013 with its comprehensive plan and started the process later in 
its 100 Resilient Cities report in 2015 (Department of City Planning). Norfolk has been a 
participant in the program since its inception, but is among one of the lowest classes and so only 
receives a small decrease in flood insurance premiums. Even though Norfolk and New York City 
have not taken full advantage of the rating system that serves as a measure of overall flood 
excellence, they stand to improve their status as likely leaders in managing coastal flooding and 
sea-level rise. 
5.3.2 Local Information & Knowledge 
5.3.2.1 Risks 
In comparison with long-acknowledged and familiar phenomena, climate change impacts are far 
more pervasive, complicated and thus often misunderstood. Phenomena like housing shortages, 
infrastructure failures, or business closures are complex and unpredictable in their own right but 
none of them compare to the intricacy and rootedness in all facets of cities and segments of 
society as climate change. Sea-level rise and extreme flooding events, much the concern of 
coastal cities, pose a myriad of risks depending on the structural and physical characteristics, but 
also based on demographics, health, mobility, resources. Because of the all-encompassing and 
inscrutable nature of climate change, even on the coasts, modelling of these impacts and risks 
has taken place mostly at the top – internationally and nationally. Cities might have been able to 
effectively plan for coastal hazards like flooding and coastal storms before realizing the 
influence of climate change, but since, it has become an insurmountable task for many.  
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Consequently, in the U.S., those federal and state agencies responsible for assembling models of 
climate impacts share place-specific fragments of their data with those cities that do not possess 
the technical abilities to develop the data for themselves. This saves local governments and 
organizations time and resources to create the climate data, but as a tradeoff, existing staff are 
unable to discern and interpret the newfound information. Thus, cities often still need to hire 
technical consultants to interpret these models into specific impacts on the population, services, 
and infrastructure. Compounding matters, data on the cost of natural hazard losses are reported 
by storm, state, or county, but not by city. This makes it unnecessarily difficult to systematically 
examine the tactile impacts of climate and incorporate that into existing planning (Shi, Chu, & 
Debats, 2015). The main issue though with climate change and vulnerability data is not the 
breadth of information but the interpretation of that data and how the risks can be misconstrued 
in regard to how they impact vulnerable populations. Particularly, over half of cities report a lack 
of understanding and awareness among local government. Since this scientific data is collected 
and extrapolated at larger scales and disseminated to beneficiary cities, the processes through 
which the data is transformed into knowledge and action and integrated into local information is 
more critical than the data itself (Aylett, 2014). 
Nonetheless, the extent to which planners have been able to both access necessary information 
and decipher that information to supply to their adaptation and preparedness efforts is difficult to 
pin down (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). Still, there have been tactics employed at the local level to 
sidestep these knowledge barriers and enhance the ability of municipal governments to 
comprehend information regardless of whether they fully understand. It is not possible to grade 
the abilities of Norfolk and New York City to interpret their localized experienced of climate 
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change through the plans themselves, but the plans can provide insight into whether they are 
more likely to have understood the impacts on their cities. 
As it takes time to fully discern a largely complex issue like climate change risks and local 
vulnerability, both cities have surely benefited from the prolonged commitment to grasping and 
being well-informed of the local impacts. In the first stage and on through the end of their multi-
year climate adaptation process, Norfolk and the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission 
relied on local information from Virginia’s Governor’s Commission on Climate Change, the 
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, collaborative studies between state and federal agencies, 
and other studies centered on the region. Instead of being bestowed a package of information to 
discern on their own, the adaptation planning team representative of each municipality was able 
to engage directly with the authors of the information being assessed and with local leaders to 
pass along what was learned (McFarlane, 2013). The region certainly benefited from government 
buy-in early on to be able to take on the sweeping assessment approach to adaptation. The 
planning commission subsequently bypassed the middlemen that would necessary to translate 
information acquired from far-flung sources. 
New York City went above and beyond to alleviate the potential problems associated with 
receiving and interpreting heaps of convoluted information. As implied several times, the city is 
an anomaly and does not embody the capabilities of a typical American city. The city was still 
exceptional at the time in appointing local organizational leaders and relevant experts to its 
Climate Change Adaptation Task Force and Panel on Climate Change. The panel body of 
scientists and risk management experts briefed the Climate Change Adaptation Task Force to 
generate moment on climate action related to sustainability back in 2008 (Loeser & Post; Office 
of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 2014). Coincidentally, the city’s Panel on Climate 
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Change became a permanent entity in September, 2012, a month before Hurricane Sandy. The 
NPCC was then able to greatly influence the city’s recovery and rebuilding report following the 
storm, PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Office of Long-Term Planning and 
Sustainability, 2014). 
The synthesized scientific information and climate risk analyses were not incorporated into the 
content analysis simply because of their marginal relevance in directly affecting vulnerable 
communities. Contrary to that belief, the long-term cross-examination of climate risks in-house 
and locally has in fact contributed to the level of adaptation and preparedness for vulnerable 
communities. The interpretation of the plethora of incoming information has been a barrier to 
cities even being able to continue on the right path to addressing the vulnerabilities of 
communities. Since Norfolk and New York have apprehended the local sea-level rise and coastal 
storm risks that climate change poses on their cities they have had the foresight to conceive these 
initiatives and reports. Understanding the risks of climate change is a segue and precursor into 
perceiving and addressing the vulnerability of those at-risk to these threats, but it is not a direct 
correlation. 
5.3.2.2 Vulnerability 
Poor understanding and acknowledgement of the distribution of citizen vulnerability has not 
been a barrier for planning to adapt to a climate impacts, it has been a barrier to climate justice 
and for planning to reduce the susceptibility of those most at-risk (Highfield, Peacock, & Van 
Zandt, 2014; Van Zandt, et al., 2012). Given the scientific limitations of climate-change 
research, and the uncertainties of how different population groups, and stakeholder interests are 
affected by climate change, many kinds of knowledge will be important for ongoing problem-
solving (Berke & Lyles, 2013).When municipalities unpack the impacts posed in information on 
 179 
climate risk, whether it is received by external sources or locally, they can synthesize the 
knowledge with an awareness for what constitutes vulnerability to those risks. Research 
repeatedly has affirmed that those communities that are most resource scarce and 
underprivileged demographically are quintessentially socially vulnerable. Incidentally, it has also 
uncovered that socially vulnerable neighborhoods have not only been susceptible for those 
socioeconomic characteristics, but because they have tended to be more often physically 
vulnerable and exposed to climate risks (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Van Zandt, et 
al., 2012; Mearns & Norton, 2009; Ross, 2013). This has not always been the case, but 
nevertheless has been deemed significant enough to consider as a trend. Hazard exposure is of 
course more pronounced in coastal cities due to the tangible proximity to surge and flooding, 
posing as an endemic threat.  
The interdependent relationship between the three modes of vulnerability prompts the need for 
them to serve as the foundational basis of facts in plans to minimize the risk to coastal threats 
(Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014). Municipalities have either been unable or unwilling to 
address the inequities in vulnerability (Weiss, Weldman, & Bronson, 2012). Unlike climate 
change modelling, vulnerability is more familiar and even observable. Within planning for 
identified risks, efforts either identify vulnerable groups but disregard the geography of 
vulnerability, do not adequately identify vulnerability, or lack the resource capacity to address 
the underlying causes of vulnerability. Simply not having the capacity to take a vulnerability-
centric approach comes with a caveat. Cities that have the ability to pursue adaptation planning 
then have the ability to pursue vulnerability (Rumbach & Kudva, 2011). Unfortunately, many 
have not, as evident in the prevalent intersectionality of vulnerability. 
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A likely outcome of successful integration of measurement and mapping of vulnerable 
populations would be more geographically organized and impactful action. Disparities in the 
quality of vulnerability assessment and mapping between Norfolk’s and New York’s plans back 
this theory but differences between individual plans do not. The information most frequented in 
Norfolk’s plans is the foundational planning knowledge of geographic extent, land use and 
development trends, and demographics/economic characteristics. Where social capital, mobility, 
living conditions, risk perception, and a host of other socioeconomic variables are absent in its 
comprehensive plan and resilience strategy, the variety and quantity of action distributed to 
vulnerable neighborhoods was low. Except only the other planning documents that were 
conscious of more insightful knowledge did not fare better. Among its high performing plans, 
New York City actually allocated a variety of actions to vulnerable neighborhoods consistently 
and effectively. This result seems to accentuate the distributed characteristics of local and 
regional information. That the plans for both cities excelled in being coordinated strategically 
and informationally could point to the productive distribution of plan action as being dependent 
on the overall local quality of vulnerability assessment and mapping. 
Consistent with the trend unveiled in Norfolk’s and New York City’s comprehensive and 
mitigation plans, comprehensive plans have been recently remarked as having a prominent role 
in reducing vulnerability to a variety of risks. They mesh well because of their coordination of 
community programs, development and land use, and legal standing. Hazard mitigation plans are 
more logically befitting of vulnerability reduction, but FEMA has in the past incentivized 
treatment of risks as a symptom of inadequate structure and infrastructure rather than as socially 
constructed (Berke, et al., Evaluation of Networks of Plans and Vulnerability to Hazards and 
Climate Change: A Resilience Scorecard, 2015). A subset of the aforementioned data result 
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indicates that, although vulnerability assessments were a more dominant feature of the two 
hazard mitigation plans, the comprehensive plans overwhelmingly distributed action and 
proposed action to vulnerable communities, and in a more holistic manner. 
Reshaping communities whether through land use, development and/or assets has a positive 
impact on reducing vulnerability (Berke, et al., 2015; Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014). 
Plans that incorporate place-making and quality of life like comprehensive plans are directed to 
target specific locations rather than solely develop programs and policies to apply broadly. All of 
New York’s plans that placed land use, development, and quality of life actions in the 
foreground, including its comprehensive plan, distributed those actions to vulnerable 
neighborhoods. Although place-making strategies held a more enhanced function in its hazard 
mitigation plan than in the mitigation plan for Norfolk, still far fewer actions were distributed to 
specific neighborhoods let alone vulnerable ones. New York’s recent experiences with Hurricane 
Sandy certainly has helped to illuminate specific needs in locations across the city, but the better 
quality of information and knowledge in the plans still insinuates part of the responsibility. 
Now that place-making and quality of life strategies have been repeatedly affirmed as important 
vulnerability reduction approaches, land use and development documents can serve to 
complement or even outdo hazard mitigation plans in planning to adapt to and prepare for future 
coastal threats, especially when they integrate the risks into the decision-making process. 
Although, without a keen awareness for a wealth of possible threats and underlying causes at an 
appropriate scale, planning action would not be able to maximize its impact. This reinforces that 
coordinating hazard exposure and physical and social vulnerability can bridge the gap between 
planning approaches to effectively collaborate and ensure the most productive and symbiotic use 
of resources (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Rumbach & Kudva, 2011). 
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5.3.3 Public Indifference & Marginalization 
5.3.3.1 Awareness & Priority 
The public has held a similar sentiment toward climate change and climate disasters as public 
officials. They are aware of the threats but do not place them with high regard in place of 
circumstances and situations that are viewed as more immediate rather than perceived as distant 
or improbable. Planning efforts that have focused solely on infrequent hazards and unpredictable 
threats have faced considerable difficulty in exciting or even engaging constituents in 
comparison with development, community enhancement, or economic development efforts 
(Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013; Behr & Diaz, 2014). 
The public itself is not to blame for their relative indifference toward climate action and reducing 
disaster risk. Inadequate leadership on taking action has meant that information on risk and 
vulnerability has been poorly communicated to those that are most affected. Planners and 
officials, unknowingly, may have also misconstrued climate information and the exact severity 
of risks locally. The intimacy of experiencing a large-scale climate event like Hurricane Sandy 
would assumedly raise the awareness and precedence of such threats universally, but planners 
and researchers have described the phenomenon as a narrow window of opportunity (Aylett, 
2014; Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Schwab, 2014). 
A healthy combination of awareness, training, education and capacity building programs can 
greatly improve the risk perception of participants and save the lives of participants’ neighbors. 
By involving civic and community leaders and other trusted members of the community, plans 
can create a domino effect of public understanding and persuasion of the need for action. Norfolk 
and New York both effectively involved neighborhood groups and civic/community based 
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organizations. These gateways to vulnerable residents can relay information regarding strategy 
proposals, preferences, and risks back and forth between residents and planners. 
Awareness strategies like warning systems and preemptive warning can alert the general public 
of imminent danger, but if risk perception is low, investment in these warnings are 
counterproductive. Norfolk and New York were advantageous in investing more in education 
awareness campaigns in neighborhoods first over warning strategies. Engagement techniques 
like information distribution and emergency drills can also disseminate knowledge, spread 
awareness, and train leaders of the community to ultimately build confidence in risk-averse 
behavior. Training activities were seldom practiced, especially in Norfolk, but teaching 
materials, demonstrations, and use of social media were more often used to inform a broad 
audience and also augment awareness strategies. 
Evacuation and sheltering procedures are indispensable lifelines in vulnerable communities, but 
many households are not able to make intelligent critical decisions unless they had been educated 
far ahead of time. Decisions made under disaster scenarios are partly dependent on familial and 
social networks, and vulnerable households have fewer of them. Risk/strategy awareness 
campaigns are not only effective in informing risk but also of informing vulnerable households 
of the best options for them during extreme events. In Norfolk, the Rising Resiliency Challenge 
and the ThRIVe NDRC application were the only to channel their awareness strategies to 
vulnerable neighborhoods, which both efforts centered on the north shore of the Elizabeth River. 
Its Resilience Strategy and Hazard Mitigation plan had equally laudable awareness campaigns, 
but discredited their cause in not productively targeting any vulnerable neighborhoods like those 
fronting the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay or the south side of the Lafayette River. All of New 
York’s plan with proficient awareness campaigns with the exception of its Hazard Mitigation 
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plan did target vulnerable neighborhoods like in the Lower East Side of Manhattan and the 
Brooklyn/Queens waterfront, that were also impacted by Sandy. 
Planners can incite enthusiasm by underscoring problems tied to a specific place or site. The 
most logical method of arriving at such site-specific knowledge to disseminate concern is 
through vulnerability assessments accompanied by information distributed accordingly. 
Residents are universally more interested in contributing to the process when they can personally 
perceive the potential impacts on their property and safety as opposed to more abstract policy-
based issues that are less tangible (Brody, 2003). Plans generate the most buy-in among affected 
communities when they draw from human nature in demonstrating emotional intelligence and 
the ability to empathize (Schwab, 2014). More than just teaching/awareness strategies, but also 
capacity-building exercises can improve the planning process and decision behavior of the 
public. Capacity-building is predominantly relied on as a tool to involve the public more. 
5.3.3.2 Influence & Involvement 
Vulnerable groups, especially those that live in poverty, do not possess the capacity to influence 
planning that their less vulnerable and wealthier counterparts do (Baussan, 2015). Many minority 
groups in low-income neighborhoods feel abandoned by planning processes and are 
subsequently disengaged. They are especially dispassionate toward preparing for and mitigating 
coastal storms and flooding. Their distrust of decision-makers is rooted in their persistent 
discrimination and unequal treatment from urban investments, resources and services (Berke, 
Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011). Mirroring their inequities, vulnerable households 
have been vastly underrepresented politically and by stakeholders in planning processes (Burby, 
2003). Isolated and underserved residents have also been less likely to have their experiences, 
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needs, desires or concerns included in plans, contributing to their lack of control over their own 
circumstances (Aldrich, 2014). 
Given their distrust of and suspicion toward their public officials, this inability to self-govern and 
an apathy toward more abstract issues like disasters and climate change can contribute to general 
cynicism (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011; Baussan, 2015). Feeding off that 
apathy and distrust, officials, not demonstrating an awareness for the benefit of involving 
isolated residents, have been ineffective in improving mutual trust (Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 
2013). The inclinations of municipal leaders and employees combined with the low political 
capacity and cooperation of vulnerable residents has been a daunting barrier for both sides 
(Green, Kouassi, & Mambo, 2013). 
Involving a variety of demographic groups and social service providers can establish trust and 
cooperation. Mistrust and apathy may be formidable barriers but they can be transformed into 
opportunities to augment the political effectiveness of planners (Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 
2013). Special needs groups and impoverished households, often not mutually exclusive, 
represent those that have been least involved in planning yet are most socially vulnerable. In 
Norfolk, special needs groups like youth, elderly, and disabled were involved alongside the rest 
of the public, but not in any greater capacity. The plans did not target their outreach and 
participation efforts toward specific vulnerable neighborhoods. In fact, the only targeted area was 
in downtown which is of lesser vulnerability. Although, PlaNorfolk 2030, Norfolk’s Resilience 
Strategy and the Rising Resiliency Challenge involved residents and their community 
organizations in the Park  
Place, Kensington and Chesterfield Heights neighborhoods – all socially vulnerable – or at least 
indicated that they were included in some form. Generally, despite the advantage for vulnerable 
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neighborhoods, outreach, engagement and involvement was not disseminated well, or rather 
specified as such. Of course, quality-wise Norfolk’s Resilience Strategy and the ThRIVe NDRC 
application had sufficient engagement and involvement, but simply introducing it as content and 
not as action taken in specific neighborhoods does not imply a commitment to reducing 
marginalization and disenfranchisement in vulnerable neighborhoods. 
Social service, childcare, and welfare providers were all consulted with and contributed to the 
New York planning process in more than a couple plans. Norfolk involved just a few of its social 
service providers in its planning process. New York demonstrated a commitment to engaging its 
vulnerable isolated and apathetic residents through its planning processes. New York did manage 
to coordinate its planning outreach efforts in demographically diverse and socially vulnerable 
neighborhoods like in Brooklyn’s riverfront, the Brooklyn/Queens waterfront, and Lower 
Manhattan. The efforts did however notably seem to gloss over neighborhoods in the Bronx, the 
most socially vulnerable Borough overall. Norfolk may have connected with residents in a few 
of its more vulnerable neighborhoods, but it did not actually specify it as a priority. As a design-
oriented strategy, New York often proposed communal spaces to enhance social opportunities 
and interactions among vulnerable groups as a way to build mutual capacity and trust. It is not 
equivalent to granting residents the authority to shape the image of their community, but it can 
result in positive social capital outcomes. 
Socially-driven policies and capacity building activities are holistically remedial in vulnerable 
communities. They can drive up wealth, social capital, health outcomes, interdependence, local 
enthusiasm and self-governance. Strategies that satisfy other calls for action like awareness, 
preparedness, housing and involvement can secondarily build capacity and collective action. 
Volunteerism, focus group meetings and social events, visioning/charrettes, and community 
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layout planning are primarily exercised to foster capacity and equitable communication in 
disenfranchised communities. Volunteerism as a form of capacity building exercise that was not 
readily advocated for in either city. They most certainly did not enforce incentives like time 
banking and community currency to reward those who volunteer. Focus groups were much more 
popular, especially in New York, to give marginalized groups greater representation in 
moderator-led discussion of personalized planning topics. Planning workshops were most 
familiar as vision exercises for vulnerable communities between the two cities as described in 
their plans. Norfolk and New York both employed at times creative and inviting visioning 
exercises for participants to visualize proposed ideas in their community and share their own to 
influence future action. Like with its outreach, New York, rather than present its workshops and 
focus groups as applying broadly, specified those vulnerable areas of the city that were 
particularly engaged.  
Ultimately, capacity-building and educational awareness go hand-in-hand. Committing to 
increasing the awareness of vulnerable communities might ease some of their apathy toward 
adaptation and preparedness and would enhance their desire to be more involved in planning 
efforts. Similarly, deepening the capacity of these groups to influence naturally subjects them to 
a heightened awareness and understanding and thus the ability to make wiser decisions under 
critical scenarios. With the exception of the Rising Resiliency Challenge which was locked on 
the Chesterfield Heights neighborhood, not one of Norfolk’s plans indicated that they conjointly 
increased the awareness and built up the political capacity in vulnerable neighborhoods. In New 
York City, only Lower Manhattan under the BIG U Rebuild by Design project, benefited from 
both educational awareness and hands-on engagement/involvement concertedly, though 
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OneNYC and PlaNYC are both investing in awareness and capacity, just in differing vulnerable 
neighborhoods. 
5.3.4 Resources 
5.3.4.1 Planning Resources 
In face of planning to prepare and adapt to worsening coastal hazards and also generally, 
resources are both a government and a constituent obstacle. In municipal planning, the chief 
resources needed are will and revenue. Political will is especially critical for climate adaptation 
and preparedness planning, as had been outlined earlier. The resource obstacle for planners 
directly relates to the influence of state and federal government, financial streams, and local 
leadership. For instance, cities that have not had influence from higher levels of government or 
strong local will have found it especially difficult to obtain the financial and personnel resources 
to pursue climate adaptation and disaster preparedness (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Baker, 
Peterson, Brown, & McAlpine, 2012). Fairly recently, even some large cities have equally 
reported the difficulties of securing enough resources in light of competing priorities. Around 
three-quarters of cities cited insufficient funding to hire enough staff for a unit to combat climate 
change and over three-quarters of cities in fact identified short-term and long-term funds 
provided by local government itself as the most substantial source of funding for staff working 
on the local response to climate change (Aylett, 2014). Securing funding, and reallocating staff 
time and resources for climate adaptation has generally been found to be more menacing an 
obstacle than obtaining current information, communicating to the public, or garnering interest 
from businesses (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). 
Many cities have had to resort to of reallocating responsibilities and time of existing staff to 
integrate climate adaptation into ongoing planning (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). New York has 
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had the luxury of employing several dedicated teams, and Norfolk, while not having its own 
dedicated department or office, has benefitted from personnel assistance regionally. A secondary 
benefit both cities received as a part of their membership in the 100 Resilient Cities network was 
the creation of a new municipal staff position, the Chief Resilience Officer. The CRO was 
specifically hired to take on the challenge of developing a multifaceted approach to adapting to 
the specific social and environmental threats faced. The officer worked directly with leadership 
staff and also coordinated with pertinent departmental staff to act as a linking force for 
adaptation and preparedness planning. Norfolk certainly gained the most out of the inaugural 
resilience government position. Being a knowledge capital, New York City, in addition to its 
competitive planning department, has government departments specializing in recovery and 
resiliency, long-term planning and sustainability, and even a housing recovery operation. It also 
immensely benefitted from the flood of disaster recovery funds in response to Sandy. Still, every 
plan was developed by city government employees except for the BIG U Rebuild by Design 
report. Considering Norfolk nearly competed with New York in sheer volume of projects and 
reports to adapt to the imposing risks is a testament to the reliability and generosity of staff and 
organizations across the Hampton Roads region and the state of Virginia. Only PlaNorfolk 2030 
and the city’s Resilience Strategy can truly be mostly credited to municipal government staff. 
The duration of financial and staff resources is also an indicator into how plans have progressed 
during implementation. If there have not been enough resources available to adequately pursue 
climate planning then there most certainly has not been enough available to implement 
recommendations. Surveys have found that to be true, with nearly nine in ten cities reporting 
lack of funding for implementation of projects and programs to help combat climate risks 
(Aylett, 2014). That fifteen percent of cities that have been currently engaged in climate 
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adaptation are in the implementation phase serves as a parallel (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). 
Fortunately, Norfolk and New York City have surged past the resource barrier in regards to 
adoption and funding as evident by their implementation work. They diffused the load of funding 
and staff needs for implementing actions. The success in funding and implementing policies and 
programs could be attributed to the level of plan integration and horizontal coordination whereby 
plans like Norfolk’s comprehensive plan, resilience strategy and the ThRIVe NDRC application 
maximized their regional cooperation with other plans and organizations. The interoperability 
between organizations and levels of government is characteristic of flexibility and adaptability in 
implementation (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Because decision-
making authority is distributed across departments, fewer tradeoffs ensue as implementation is 
decentralized (Schwab, 2014). 
Personnel and organizational decentralization has not been the only tactic that has been 
employed to abate the resource barrier. With cities leaning on their own internal revenue sources, 
Norfolk and New York City have explored the applicability of unconventional revenue bonds. 
Norfolk had been recently exposed to social impacts bonds through one of the 100 Resilient 
Cities platform partners, Social Finance. The social impact bond behaves similarly to 
conventional revenue bonds except that instead of banking on the revenue generating prospects 
of project investments, it is contingent on successful qualitative outcomes. Social impact bonds 
marry government, philanthropic organizations, nonprofits and investors around a common goal 
of success that drives social progress (Social Investment, 2016). The bonds could have been a 
useful concept if deployed simultaneously alongside, to bet on the fiscal stabilizing effects of 
environmental progress, precisely in protection against climatic events. 
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More environmentally, New York City, specifically its Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 
explored a first of its kind risk evading form of bond, a catastrophe bond. The catastrophe bond 
as the MTA has envisioned in response to Hurricane Sandy, had little in common with social 
impact bonds and their pay for success model. Instead of depending on action that engenders the 
agreed upon positive impacts, catastrophe bonds depend upon whether a disaster of a certain 
magnitude occurs over the life of the issued bond. Immediately following Sandy in 2012, New 
York City’s MTA worked with financial entities to design and issue the first catastrophe bond 
through a reinsurer with the purpose of protecting against storm surge flooding. The bond does 
not truly protect against flooding – it provides much needed support for insurance companies in 
instances of irreparable insurance losses triggered by an event of similar magnitude to Sandy 
(Levenson Keohane, 2014). Basically, the bond serves as a sedentary emergency fund rather than 
a source of usable funding to redirect into resilience-enhancing investments. 
Since this conception, the RE.bound program, born out of the RE.invest initiative, has envisioned 
a repurposing of catastrophe bonds. The RE.invest initiative devised a financing tool to fund the 
mildly advantageous recommendations in the report so as to not place unmanageable financial 
strain on the city of Norfolk. It introduced a concept for catastrophe bonds that drew inspiration 
from the healthcare industry’s insurance policies that captured funds for upfront risk reduction 
measures on top of reducing potential insurance losses like traditional catastrophe bonds 
(RE:focus Partners, LLC, 2015). Commonly, catastrophe bonds are triggered once a certain 
threshold of total insured or economic losses is breached, meaning the bond issuer retains the 
bond value and investors lose their invested principal, like with the MTA-sponsored bond. The 
RE.bound program’s version of a catastrophe bond integrates these insurance-based protection 
together with infrastructure project finance. The argument behind this couple model is that 
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resilience projects funded through bond investors that generate social value and environmental 
benefits increase the financial benefit to investors over time and reduce the associated risk 
(RE:focus Partners, LLC, 2015). Both the catastrophe and the social impact bonds can not only 
serve to supplement existing revenue to implement projects but also as contingency funds for the 
private and public sectors to use in response to emergencies like from extreme flooding and 
coastal storm events. 
5.3.4.2 Public Resources 
Unlike municipal governments, where resource deficiencies affect their ability to pursue action 
in the burgeoning realms of climate adaptation and disaster preparedness, vulnerable 
communities have resource deficiencies that govern their quality of life and ability to survive. 
With the high financial strain that housing costs places on lower-class families, it is essential that 
planners, on top of tackling risks, help expand their assets and reduce the everyday costs that are 
deep-seated in their underserved neighborhoods. Many quality of life indicators are in fact direct 
measures of vulnerability to coastal storms and flooding. Wealth is the most inherent indicator of 
vulnerability. Impoverished families often live erratically from month to month with fragile 
assets, and thus have poorer access to the life-sustaining resources that their financial superiors 
do (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Baussan, 2015). For many low-income households, rent or mortgage 
payments comprise of the largest portion of their monthly finances (Baussan, 2015). 
Even among families that have fixed rent payments, they are unable to absorb the financial strain 
of major disruptions because of the high priority of being able to maintain a home. 
Unfortunately, housing assistance whether through recovery funds or flood insurance tends to 
benefit those that both own a home and are at least lower middle class (Ross, 2013). All too 
often, the quality of housing that a family can afford determines the safety and appeal of their 
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environment, the structural integrity of their buildings and infrastructure, the transportation 
options at their disposal, and the resources they have access to (Highfield, Peacock, & Van 
Zandt, 2014; Mearns & Norton, 2009; Ross, 2013; Van Zandt, et al., 2012). Their social 
resources then compound matters. Mirroring the indifference and priority of vulnerable 
households, they frequently have shallow networks with which to rely on during financial 
difficulties and also emergency situations. Thus, their ability to seek shelter or evacuate is 
severely compromised. Even when there are distant familial and social ties with which to rely on, 
if families reside in a detached neighborhood with poor public access their decision behavior is 
equally compromised. As has been made evident, inadequate resources is essentially equivalent 
to a potential for catastrophic impacts. Improvements to all of these resolvable resource 
disparities is equivalent to making reductions in physical and social vulnerability. 
The vulnerability of powerless families manifests both as a shortage of necessary resources to 
thrive, but also as a fragility of resources where they can most easily be stripped away. Climate 
displacement is an explicit consequence of this chain of vulnerability fueled by an inherent 
shortage of resources and decimation of fragile resources. Minimizing long-term displacement is 
accomplished through the enhancement and fortification of resources, but also through the more 
practical salvaging of resources – relocation assistance and permanent housing recovery. 
In Norfolk, relocation assistance programs were either nonexistent or widely deficient and did 
not reflect the ideas or preferences of those that would be most affected by them. The equivalent 
programs described in New York’s plans are an improvement but still lack adequate prior 
consulting with vulnerable households and enough detail to determine whether they are effective. 
New York’s permanent housing programs are collectively a step up, while Norfolk’s programs 
are virtually of the same poor quality as its interim housing programs. None of New York’s are 
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admittedly citizen-desired options, but few of them do imply a range of options to satisfy the 
needs of its diversity of resident types – homeowner, renter and landlord. Likely in response to 
the exposed deficiencies during the Sandy recovery process, there were several instances of 
strategies to improve disaster housing programs where disaster housing assistance is more 
economical and accelerated. It is also recommended that they are better coordinated with 
community support services and long-term recovery efforts. 
With housing losses relevant and fresh in the mind of many New Yorkers, it would be surprising 
that housing recovery programs were not set up in vulnerable neighborhoods across the city. 
After all, the vulnerable neighborhoods are most likely the ones with the highest number of 
property loss from Sandy. In fact, recovery programs were fairly evenly itemized in the plans for 
the Brooklyn/Queens waterfront neighborhoods, riverfront neighborhoods in 
Brooklyn/Queens/Manhattan, and in Staten Island. For Norfolk, only two neighborhoods that 
readily experience flooding from the Elizabeth River, St. Paul’s and Chesterfield Heights, were 
the only to specifically have the support of a housing recovery program. Norfolk has luckily not 
experienced an event triggering a large-scale exodus from residences or widespread damage like 
New York City has and especially New Orleans. Norfolk might perceive itself as eluding major 
coastal storms, but research has insinuated that it is equally as susceptible to such displacing 
events. 
Planners can alleviate the pressures placed on interim and permanent housing recovery programs 
following a disaster by investing in affordable housing and weatherization strategies before the 
next strike. Housing is the greatest asset to many and to vulnerable households it is often the only 
financial asset if they even happen to own their home. Regardless, a rented or owned residence – 
through their structural-integrity, location and value – has the single largest weight in individual 
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vulnerability of any facility or resource (Ross, 2013; Baussan, 2015). Projects proposed by local 
housing authorities were found to be worthy of being integrated into coastal resilience plans for 
their potential to reduce the vulnerability of residents. Smart growth strategies to deconcentrate 
poverty and reduce homelessness like housing revitalization and mixed income development 
when successful can increase the wealth and social capital of the most vulnerable. The amount of 
involvement of each city’s housing authority in the planning processes was a sort of gauge of the 
level of integration of affordable housing strategies. New York consulted with its housing 
authority regularly and explored a range of cooperative housing strategies. Norfolk involved its 
housing authority a little less and thus had a lesser diversity of housing strategies in its plans.  
Those smart growth strategies that were borrowed from housing authorities would logically 
apply to low-income neighborhoods where there is a high concentration of public and affordable 
housing. Smart growth strategies were not quite evenly dispersed amongst all vulnerable 
neighborhoods, but as a whole they were the most distributed in Norfolk. Both the Elizabeth 
River and Lafayette River watersheds benefitted. Notably, the shorefront neighborhoods were 
also included, despite being distant from any developments within the jurisdiction of the Norfolk 
Redevelopment and Housing Authority. Unlike its recovery programs, New York's smart growth 
strategies were representative of vulnerable neighborhoods fairly equally including those in the 
Bronx, rather than only those that fared the worst from Sandy. This is, as a matter of fact, a 
promising prospect as research is in agreement that smart growth and preventative development 
is among the most auspicious long-term solutions to flooding and disaster vulnerability (Brody, 
2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013; Smith, 2015; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; 
Berke, et al., 2015). 
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To address the burdens placed on families in vulnerable neighborhoods on top of personal 
burdens, improving community design, local amenities, and access to resources and facilities has 
been repeatedly affirmed as constructive. Yet, all of those strategies are far from groundbreaking. 
Both cities invested in strategies to expand community assets and services, and to improve 
quality of life. Blight removal and beautification programs were somewhat sporadic in plans for 
Norfolk and slightly more consistent in New York’s plans. Strategies varied from prolonging or 
expanding upon existing blight removal programs to initiating programs to beautify gradually 
deteriorating vulnerable neighborhoods. Plans that reflected the highest standard in quality for 
their respective city overwhelmingly had the full capacity to improve access to services and 
quality of life. In plans that expanded public transportation options, recreational space, and other 
community assets, they occasionally proposed economic development strategies for underserved 
areas to prevent the gentrifying of residents that would exacerbate their already horrific 
vulnerability. 
In the past, equity was incorporated in plans where climate or environmental hazards was the 
primary impetus when planners recognized the disparities in livability and amenities in 
communities that affects their vulnerability (Schrock, Bassett, & Green, 2015). Either through 
the experience of planners or an expanded focus in climate and hazard plans or both, strategies to 
enhance community assets and services were well represented. So much so that the level of detail 
for this type of strategy within the protocol was not conducive to the whole assortment of 
particular strategies. Interestingly, they were frequently enacted for vulnerable neighborhoods, as 
much so as smart growth strategies. Smart growth strategies like preventative development and 
affordable housing existing in neighborhoods with poor exposure and/or high social vulnerability 
is most sensible. But less of a case can be made, at least from a typical planning standpoint, for 
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quality of life enhancements to be unequivocally targeted in vulnerable neighborhoods as they 
are for both cities. 
That certain waterfront neighborhoods were saturated with numerous quality enhancement 
proposals additional to preventative code changes for instance is perhaps an indicator of the 
approach the two cities were often able to resort to. Both are rather conventional and thus more 
favorable to a range of stakeholders, but also are effective at addressing underlying factors of 
neighborhood vulnerability. Of the particulars, social and welfare services saw a larger 
investment in New York while pedestrian infrastructure received a larger investment in Norfolk. 
The earlier detailed capacity building exercises can secondarily improve social connectivity in 
neighborhoods, but so too can physical connectivity and quality of life. 
5.3.5 Accountability & Responsibility 
5.3.5.1 Implementing Action 
It is without question that the actual actions that are implemented as a result of a plan is more 
momentous than any component of the originating plan. Each successive section of any plan let 
alone a plan for adapting to stresses, breathes life into the next section. Specific to coastal storm 
and sea-level rise adaptation, strategies to resolve local vulnerabilities would not have been 
envisioned without successfully identifying and mapping the intricacies of vulnerability. They 
also would not have been possible without the involvement of those that are vulnerable. 
Heightening the awareness of vulnerable groups to both to prioritize and be more involved is a 
process of relaying information on risk and vulnerability. Lastly, none of it would have been 
achievable without securing resources to pursue planning and local leadership coalitions. Any 
momentum built through commitments to each aspect of the process can of course be halted with 
mismanagement of implementation. 
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Everything considered, the elements of implementation are nearly universal across all plan types. 
Without assigning appropriate organizational responsibility, identifying viable sources of 
continuing funding or managing it all through organized timelines, no matter the circumstances, 
a plan will fail to reach its desired potential (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Plans have fallen fate to both 
disregarding the aforementioned outlets to implement actions but also articulating 
implementation frameworks in a simplistic manner. Many planners do not work out enough 
operational detail or provide estimates of the monetary costs of implementing actions merely 
from not consulting with those that would offer expertise (Baker, Peterson, Brown, & McAlpine, 
2012). Some local governments have managed to assemble the necessary parts to complete a 
plan to adapt to and prepare for the effects of climate change, but have been incapable of 
implementing them (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Baker, Peterson, Brown, & McAlpine, 2012). 
Failure to implement proposed actions is not only a management problem but it also stems from 
the impact of deficient resources, collaboration, engagement and leadership. 
Both Norfolk and New York City had developed finance mechanisms and capitalized on federal 
and state funding opportunities to support the incremental implementation of proposed actions 
and also actions for emergency scenarios. They had coordinated with every level of government, 
most government departments, all sectors, and a diverse collection of stakeholders. By virtue of 
robust local leadership, both cities were able to understand the risks and the impacts they could 
create. Also, expectedly, the awareness and enthusiasm that was instilled in communities was 
enough to serve as an ally rather than an opponent to implementation. In terms of 
implementation, community-based organizations have proved to be instrumental in raising the 
concern for equitable action. When local government collaborates with community groups and 
other organizations their capacity to convert lofty goals, such as those for social equity, into 
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mechanisms for action is enhanced (Schrock, Bassett, & Green, 2015). Consequently, even 
though precise organization of responsibility and timetable is evident of potentially seamless 
implementation, the interplay between all of these indirect factors are clear prognosticators of 
transformative implementation over resistance and maintenance. All in all, both cities have 
instituted a favorable environment to be able to overcome foretold tradition on unavailing 
implementation specifically of adaptation and socioeconomic policy. 
Between Norfolk and New York City, plans that were high performers in overall quality did 
regularly boast active implementation. Many of them have formed a network of implementation 
where policies and programs are intersectional – that is, they have been borrowed from and by 
other planning efforts. A prime example is New York’s hazard mitigation plan, which, unlike the 
Southside Hampton Roads plan, coordinated with and involved community, social service and 
housing organizations, and engaged with vulnerable members of the public through capacity-
building exercises. As a result, instead of conforming to mitigation needs that largely satisfy 
FEMA requirements by incrementally carrying out a small set of actions, New York’s plan has 
moved a multitude of individual policies and programs into various phases of implementation 
(Tajan, 2014; Office of Emergency Management, 2016). The projects are the responsibility of a 
large portion of local agencies that overlap with other citywide resiliency and capital initiatives. 
Also, the plan has demonstrated an openness to including new projects that satisfy different 
needs for capital planning, resiliency and recovery (Office of Emergency Management, 2016).  
While both hazard mitigation plans made financial estimates, outlined sources of funding, and 
organized actions with a timeline, New York’s effectively divided up different types of roles 
amongst personnel, volunteers and the public. The discrepancies between the two identical plan 
types does not describe the entire picture, but represents a microcosm of the factors that come 
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into play to restrict or bolster implementation. It is too early to determine the effects that 
different factors have on implementation progress for several initiatives, but a common theme 
that left Norfolk’s plans a step behind New York City’s was the inability of decentralizing roles 
in the process and in implementing actions. 
In the heat of extreme flooding and coastal storm events, it is the facilitation of responsibility to 
execute actions and differentiate individual roles that is put to the test. Although vulnerability is 
a primary determinant of the impacts that will occur from a major event, some impacts that 
bypass safeguards are still mitigable and preventable through the response and recovery actions 
taken by officials, trained individuals, volunteers, and members of the public (Schwab, 2014; 
Berke & Campanella, 2006; Corbin, 2015). Recalling that Norfolk has not incorporated a 
prominent focus on recovery or simply being prepared for recovery when the moment arises, 
there is a noticeable gap in the instituting of response and recovery roles. The city’s plans might 
be making lucrative progress on implementing projects, but during times of coastal emergency, 
impacts are partly contingent on the organization of decision-making under pressure. 
5.3.5.2 Monitoring Uncertainty 
Planning to combat the convoluted and often overlooked phenomena of climate change and 
inequality compels planners to be able to recognize and react to evolving conditions. Drastic 
shifts in political and environmental conditions can and have derailed preconceived notions 
toward progress (Brody, 2003). If planners remain in a rigid predict-and-plan approach through 
process and implementation regardless of their effective quality, plans are subject to 
underperforming. Even the scientific and local knowledge that guides problem-solving is prone 
to malleability. Plans and planners can identify and solve these roadblocks as they occur by 
maintaining flexibility with monitoring programs (Berke & Lyles, 2013; Brody, 2003). 
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Monitoring not only implementation, but the various stages of the planning process and through 
response and recovery is paramount to ensure that all planners’, stakeholders’ and public 
participants’ efforts are not squandered. Successful monitoring of activities institutes indicators 
and sources of data to track progress toward meeting goals, and responsibilities for data 
collection. Moreover, those responsible continue to pursue monitoring programs, release publicly 
available progress reports, and constantly update while accounting for changing conditions 
(Berke & Lyles, 2013; Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012; Brody, 2003; Schwab, 2014). 
The two cities interpreted the monitoring of planning processes as straightforward, with 
elaborate setups to monitor the progress being made through the implementation of policies and 
programs. A more innovative-minded interpretation would entail the monitoring of each phase of 
the planning process, not just that proposed actions were implemented, during a specific time-
frame, and by those that were supposed to be responsible. This is a harsh interpretation of the 
strategies the two cities employed to track uncertainty. In fact, monitoring implementation can be 
a sensible way to observe changing conditions at their terminus. The only issue is, without 
monitoring obstacles to success as they arise, the benefit of monitoring implementation is 
discounted because planners are unable to utilize strategies to overcome obstacles if specific 
ones are even in place. Devoting monitoring efforts mainly to implementation progress also 
restricts the ability to learn. Monitoring different phases of the planning process can provide 
planners with useful knowledge for the future, especially considering many of these plans 
represent uncharted territory. Ultimately, uncertainty presents itself in many different forms. 
When those narrow windows of opportunity are capitalized on to generate political momentum 
following an extreme event, planners can further benefit planning efforts by closely tracking the 
progress made in all planning facets (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Schwab, 2014). New York City 
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had experienced the Sandy effect as an opportunistic source of interest and priority, but also as 
an event that could have undermined planners’ efforts with the resource commitments that 
accompanied it. One method of remaining up to date following chaotic change has been to 
reassess conceptions of knowledge. An expressed need in dealing with climate change and other 
data, building on the earlier described information barrier, has been to jointly analyze changing 
information (Berke & Lyles, 2013; Schwab, 2014). New York City has incorporated the impacts 
of Sandy into its latest planning efforts not as only a source of information as many hazards are 
treated, at least in the hazard mitigation process, but as a testing ground for experimentation. The 
action could be considered a part of the PlaNYC process, but in any event the city reconvened its 
Panel on Climate Change shortly after Sandy to generate new understanding and analyses on 
risks and vulnerability (Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 2014). 
Monitoring enables actions taken after an extreme event and beyond to hold relevance and 
purpose by investigating damage and economic loss assessments and evaluating actions 
accordingly. The new sources of information, however, threaten to increase the complexity of 
already complex matters, further dividing experts from the uninformed. Thus, decision-makers 
and members of the public would greatly benefit from cooperation around shared perceptions 
and experiences of changing conditions. If plans are updated before or shortly after a major 
event, they can then articulate and embody the learning that has occurred within organizations 
and also of the public for a unified agenda and so that mistakes are not repeated (Brody, 2003; 
Schwab, 2014). For the sake of planning, Norfolk has not had the advantage of a source of rapid 
growth and learning like Sandy has been for New York. Still, recognizing and overcoming 
internal contention and inertia can provide growth and preserve momentum. A major key to 
climate and social progress amidst political bureaucracy and complexity is accountability. 
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The extent to which decision-makers were held accountable in Norfolk and New York peaked at 
inter-departmental accountability. Community groups, non-profits and members of the public 
were largely rejected their ability to hold officials accountable. Most of the planning efforts 
implemented benchmarks and indicators to easily assess the progress of strategies and actions 
toward meetings goals and proposed timelines. A few of the plans reported on the progress in 
annual progress reports or updates that were released to the public, more so in New York. In 
most cases, however, the public was only satisfactorily able to monitor the progress toward their 
own stated desires. More commonly in Norfolk, process participants were given some 
jurisdiction over holding decision-makers accountable, but were not urged or empowered to act 
in this role. New York had disclosed more of the successes in implementation and meeting 
benchmarks, but whatever obstacles that might have emerged along the way certainly did not 
reveal remotely intricate strategies to overcome them, and nor did Norfolk. Neither city took the 
necessary steps to truly ensure accountability, transparency and equity in planning nor in 
recovery processes. 
Monitoring is a necessary and valuable tool to establish multiple layers of accountability. 
Performance-based monitoring and evaluation systems hold planners and decision-makers 
accountable to each other. The public, specifically the vulnerable public monitoring progress on 
proposed action in their own community or toward meeting their own needs and desires holds 
policymakers and decision-makers accountable to their constituents. In order for the public to 
even have the ability to hold their local officials accountable, decision-makers need to both 
communicate progress and results to members of the community and empower residents to 
become more involved in positive change. If it were the case that officials were not meeting their 
marks in vulnerable communities and those residents were becoming displeased, it is up to 
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planners and decision-makers to iteratively review stakeholders, analyze obstacles to inclusion 
and success, and devise strategies for overcoming those barriers along the way (Schwab, 2014; 
Brody, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013). And if decision-makers trust citizens enough to grant them 
responsibility over their own preparative action, the public can relieve some of the pressure on 
their leaders and hold each other accountable. Only members of the public, including vulnerable 
ones, would know whether strategies proposed in early decision-making processes and the 
actions being implemented are what they most desire. After all, those actions that prove to be 
most advantageous are also those outcomes that vulnerable communities most prefer. 
Though communal accountability may not have been pronounced in the sets of plans, at least 
there is one silver lining, embedded in inter-organizational coordination and accountability. 
Those plans like those arisen out of the 100 Resilient Cities initiative and NDRC that employed 
more decentralized strategizing and implementation would likely reap the most benefit. The free 
sharing of ideas that is encouraged in this organizational arrangement also lends itself well to 
implementation and monitoring. The disparate actors and stakeholders that bind together over the 
planning processes can share perspectives on challenges faced and solutions they devised or 
witnessed to forward implementation and monitoring. On the other hand, participants should be 
able to engage in the post-planning phase to offer their own perspectives on what they have 
experienced as obstacles to implementation in their own communities in the past even if the type 
of actions are not comparable to before (Berke & Lyles, 2013). 
The ability to influence leaders be it through accountability during implementation should be 
equivalent to the level of engagement and involvement in the planning process for those that are 
historically uninformed and resource-deficient. Interestingly, two of the initiatives that targeted a 
specific area and yet did not necessarily produce the highest quality plans were able to provide 
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some transparency and to a degree, ensure equitable participation. Residents of Chesterfield 
Heights in Norfolk and the Lower East Side in Manhattan, New York City can at least feel some 
satisfaction that their voices were heard and affected the direction of the Rising Resiliency 
Challenge and BIG U Rebuild by Design projects, respectively. Whether due to insufficient 
personnel resources/expertise or unawareness, planners did not devote efforts to monitor the 
discourse and action that occurred from within the planning process by themselves and those 
they engaged. Compromising the ability to self-monitor and monitor the influence of participants 
and stakeholders leaves the planning efforts susceptible to biases, unfair conflict, and 
mischievous activity. 
Individual and behavioral unpredictability is one obstacle that Norfolk and New York City have 
not prepared themselves to overcome. Not to assume that certain planners and decision-makers 
will inevitably make critical errors or diverge from their commitments; nor that certain 
stakeholders will curtail the political drive generated in vulnerable communities, but all of these 
are potential outcomes, and neither city has put the tools in place to recognize these and 
subsequently mediate them. Despite all of the progress made on barriers to being adaptive for 
members of vulnerable communities, the inherent authority of political leaders and stakeholders 
can instantaneously put a halt to momentum. 
In light of these shortcomings in accountability, equity and transparency, any expectations for 
monitoring activities are out of maintaining a certain standard. The monitoring activities that 
either city abided by would in a sense be improvisational. There is little precedence with which 
to base the capacity to monitor various stages and players in the planning process. So far, few 
adaptation planning efforts have pursued monitoring programs whether for implementation or 
otherwise, and many have been in the early stages of developing structuring monitoring activities 
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(Berke & Lyles, 2013). The same can be said of several of the initiatives facilitated in these two 
cities. The quality of monitoring activities was contingent on their descriptions within the plans 
themselves, but for plans in particular stages or facing uncertainty with funding at the time of 
their release like the 100 Resilient Cities reports and NDRC applications, monitoring, especially 
of implementation, may have been in limbo. 
5.4 Implications for Planning and Future Research 
Recent events and discoveries have shifted the thinking on the role of planners in the urban 
context. Researchers have integrated the influence of climate impacts and experiences into their 
prescriptive inquiry of planning, and so naturally have turned the dial from focus on solely the 
urban and environmental realms to the people that inhabit them. Certain coastal cities have 
experienced tangible climate impacts while others have not as much so, but, regardless, 
individual planners have expressed a desire to ensure their jurisdictions remain prepared and 
adaptive to the potential threats faced. Unfortunately, in the early going, factors at all scales, 
independent of concerned planners’ interest, combined with the novelty of the resilient lens had 
thwarted pursuits to put local conceptions of researchers’ visions into practice. Plan practitioners 
have not had the ability, the knowledge nor the tools to overcome these incessant obstacles and 
often still. These obstacles have paled in comparison with the hurdles residents of specific 
communities experience regularly to climb out of a state of deep-seated vulnerability. For coastal 
cities where socioeconomic disparity overlaps with climate impacts that are most evident, 
because of the adaptive adversity, the prospects for planning are perhaps most encouraging. 
An unintentional outcome of this wave of coastal planning is a shift in some of the conventional 
thinking for urban planning. The broad implications of planning to adapt to and prepare for 
extreme flooding and coastal storms have indirectly bridged the gaps between organizational 
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divisions, scales, and sectors. This is by no means revolutionary news for Norfolk or New York 
City, but for those cities that expect that they are able to take on all matters of planning through 
their planning departments they are wasting opportunities presented by all of their other 
agencies. Similarly, each plan, whether for a specific purpose or series of purposes, need not act 
independently of other plans. The coveted shift in planning for coastal cities is to leveraging and 
repackaging of policies and programs under, for instance, social service organizations or housing 
agencies. These policies and programs can be repurposed for this emergent planning approach, 
as after all, resilience and adaptation have not surfaced as new planning realms. Rather they are a 
coalescent lens on formerly disassociated domains. Often times, these malleable strategies 
inhabit already existing plans, thus stimulating the rise of a system of plans. While evaluating the 
content in plans for both cities, duplicate policies and programs cross-referenced across plans 
was a frequent occurrence. In the near future, planners facilitating comprehensive planning 
processes might pull all local and regional projects into a single policy document to showcase a 
municipality’s strategies for tackling rising waters, or a shortage of affordable housing options, 
and everything in between. Strategies devised in one planning process will influence another 
planning process and vice versa. 
Before either city repurposed existing programs and envisioned new ones, they were building the 
foundation for future adaptation and preparedness. Cities that have not made the conscious effort 
to commit to combatting the impacts of and vulnerability to climate change early on are at a 
severe disadvantage. Norfolk and New York bypassed some of the traditional adaptation barriers 
because the groundwork had already been in place from years of investment on that front before 
carrying out these recent plans. Of course, those that have not garnered any momentum have 
grim prospects for fending off planning obstacles, but there is immense incentive in expanding 
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awareness and motive proactively instead of waiting for disastrous impacts when it becomes 
imperative. 
Proactive adaptation planning with diverse stakeholder support and collaborative energy can 
propel planning forward through previous obstacles. Once these obstacles are overcome, which 
research suggests are beatable with the right pieces in place, planners have a clear path to 
reducing the vulnerability of those that have long been powerless. The pieces were in place in 
both Norfolk and New York City, but only have been for a short time. As both cities become 
more accustom to united planning for all urban issues under the umbrella of resilience and 
adaptation, they will over time likely improve the imperfections in their approaches. 
Tracking the progress that has been and will continue to be made in adaptation and preparedness 
planning has become increasingly complicated. No longer is simple plan content evaluation 
sufficient to convincingly substantiate the performance of plans produced. In planning to adapt to 
climate events, specifically sea-level rise and coastal storms, geography and posterior progress 
matter. In land use planning, for instance, content evaluation was effective without regard for 
spatiality because the emphasis was not on the characteristics of the people per se but on the 
land, its use, its regulation, and the overall population. The impacts of climate change require a 
humanizing approach to combat them and that ought to seep into planning evaluation as well. A 
plan for sea-level rise and storms in particular can only be effective if it not only employs 
adaptability and preparedness, but if it employs it in locations where the people are most 
vulnerable. Content evaluation might capture the quality of adaptation and preparedness but it 
ignores the most important aspect, that the most urgent communities benefit the greatest. 
 209 
Accounting for the geography of plan content certainly injects more complexity into the plan 
evaluation process, but it also allows for more constructive assessment of quality. One study 
completed and published in late 2015 reinforced this notion by formulating a resilience scorecard 
that pits positive and negative content among a series of plans for one coastal city, Washington, 
NC, against the social and physical vulnerability to flooding of that city’s individual planning 
districts. By determining how the plans improve or infringe upon the preparedness across the 
city, the study was able to critique their justification for the actions taken. The scorecard devised 
in the study also evaluated the degree of coordination between local planning programs to further 
question the merits of the planners’ decisions. The scorecard was much more condensed since it 
only concentrated on land use type strategies, but still exemplified the need for modification of 
plan evaluation for coastal hazards vulnerability (Berke, et al., 2015). The outcomes of such 
reformative plan evaluation research would help inform planners in cities that might be unaware 
of the implications of their planning actions with regards to the hazard-prone areas versus the 
more secure locations. 
The next steps in research would be to assess the merits of recommendations for the field of 
planning for adaptation and preparedness by tracking the actual changes in social and physical 
vulnerability and hazard exposure. Because hazard exposure is partly a function of the proximity 
to hazard prone areas like floodplains, changes in it would solely reflect a change in population 
and building density. At the moment it is far too early to observe any significant changes in the 
vulnerability of communities in cities that have taken initiative considering the only recent 
emergence of this planning realm onto local agendas. Even Norfolk and New York City that 
have been leaders have only been able to begin implementing progressive work in response to 
their susceptibility in the last several years. 
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Speaking of which, the success in terms of overall planning output since 2012 in both cities has 
been intelligible through the host of influencing factors that operate outside the means of 
planning, but their exact effect is unquantified. Perhaps future research might examine the 
intangible factors like scale of disaster or favorability in local government to further explain the 
reasoning behind the progress made in cities like Norfolk or New York City rather than declaring 
that they are simply outperforming others for certain reasons. Other cities would be left in the 
dark about why they are unable to overcome certain obstacles that have plagued them all along 
even while exerting effort toward informed solutions, as their situation might not be entirely 
equatable to those in more prolific cities. Future research ought to be able to prescribe solutions 
and tactics for cities of all shapes and sizes as they continue to try to combat the complicated 
phenomena of climate change and the human vulnerability to it. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions & Recommendations 
Have the recent adaptation planning efforts of Norfolk and New York City accounted for the 
vulnerability of local communities to sea-level rise and coastal storms? Research affirms that 
certain demographics are inherently more vulnerable to these threats and are concentrated in 
particular neighborhoods. Planners can relieve the risks by reducing the social and physical 
vulnerability, and exposure of these highly susceptible communities proactively. No study 
examined has determined that plans that attempt to adapt to and prepare for these climate-
induced hazards have proactively reduced the vulnerability of communities enough to prevent 
the unjust impacts of a disaster. The results of this analysis has not convincingly shifted prior 
convictions of planning practice. 
New York City and, to a lesser extent, Norfolk have made significant progress toward reducing 
the vulnerability of neighborhoods to future coastal events except in a reactive sense. New 
York’s vulnerable neighborhoods are prepared for a disaster of a conceivable magnitude after 
having already experienced the impacts of Sandy. Although the actions taken in New York’s 
plans more often benefitted vulnerable neighborhoods than safer ones, they were predictably 
responsive to the impacts of Sandy and not necessarily always the deficiencies embedded in 
communities. These targeted communities will most certainly fare better from storms like Sandy 
in the future, but perhaps those neighborhoods that were not targeted in recent efforts because 
they sustained fewer impacts even though they are equally as vulnerable will not. The 
experiences of New York City imply that the quality of plans that aim to reduce future 
vulnerability is contingent on an encounter with a disaster-declared event and federal influence. 
Norfolk has technically encountered a couple disasters in recent years, but not the full brunt of 
east coast storms. Unlike in New York, the storms to impact Norfolk have mostly grazed by or 
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been weaker and thus not capable of illuminating the disparities in safety and risk between 
neighborhoods and demographics. Its non-invasive brushes with recent coastal storms have 
allowed the city to make consistent progress due to its well-known susceptibility but have eluded 
its need to prioritize neighborhoods that have seen flashes of severe impact potential. Norfolk 
has demonstrated that it has committed as much effort as it is capable of given its experiences 
and amount of outside investment. The unfortunate reality is that transformative change, 
essential to convert vulnerable neighborhoods into prepared and adaptive, is not obtainable 
without enough incentive and motivation given existing fiscal obligations and political 
landscapes. Norfolk did make some inroads in neighborhoods fronting the Elizabeth River in part 
because of its ability to secure the funding from HUD’s National Disaster Resilience 
Competition after experience a qualified federal disaster. Had it not, two of its more admirable 
planning efforts from a neighborhood perspective would have stagnated having no future in 
sight. 
Essentially, if you remove the coastal storms the two cities have had to endure, the highest 
performing plan the cities produced would have never come to fruition. Also, if neither city had 
been awarded participation in the 100 Resilient Cities initiative, neither would have had an 
Office of Resilience, and Norfolk’s best plan, according to this research, would have been its 
comprehensive plan. It is almost a coincidence that Sandy inflicted New York with high winds 
and intense flooding in 2012 meanwhile attention to adapting to these climatic events had been 
ramping up. Thus it is unclear the extent to which the city would have invested in adaptation and 
preparedness minus Sandy, but it is certain it would have been less without excess funding from 
disaster recovery. 
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Given typical sources of funding for adaptation planning in other cities and the details of Norfolk 
and New York’s recent planning involvements, federal and state governments have sent a 
message that their level of assistance is more dependent on the disaster experiences than present 
and future vulnerability at the local level. Until state and federal government funnels more 
resources into vulnerable coastal cities in the pre-disaster phases, jurisdictions like Norfolk with 
limited budgets will only be able to make progress at their own bounded pace. If Sandy is any 
indication of the next leap forward in state and federal adaptation initiatives, it will likely require 
another large-scale event to impact a highly populated city. Norfolk and other cities that may not 
have experienced a galvanizing event still benefitted from the collateral action incited by Sandy 
that FEMA and HUD took to spread the wealth of ideas being generated. However, although it is 
true that many of the initiatives that Norfolk and New York City were able to take advantage of 
were in response to or inspired by the Sandy relief effort, they were intended to be replicable as 
constantly updated renditions. 
The overall performance of New York City’s collection of planning efforts does not warrant 
much criticism especially given the extent of potentially transformative planning that occurred, 
but among the abundance of funding and personnel at the city’s disposal, certain investments 
could have been put to better use. The Resilient Neighborhoods initiative in particular was an 
insightful concept, but did not always target the neediest neighborhoods or employ very 
groundbreaking solutions to localized issues. As a whole, in fact, neighborhoods in the Bronx, 
even some of the most underprivileged and vulnerable ones, were underrepresented in the set of 
plans. This is another case of chasing the impacts of Sandy alone and not the actual vulnerability 
to future events in addition. The Bronx, in light of its social vulnerability and exposure, largely 
evaded some of the worst impacts. Again, because of Sandy, New York was far more effective at 
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identifying actions in most of its vulnerable areas than was Norfolk. Since Norfolk’s 
neighborhoods have at least managed through recent threats, it has of course not been as 
compelled into action, but it is still not a justifiable reason to gloss over certain vulnerable areas 
of the city. With all the progress made in its resilience strategy, comprehensive plan and the 
NDRC application, Norfolk’s planners could have devoted more effort to addressing the 
vulnerabilities present in the Lafayette River watershed and the eastern parts of Ocean View. 
Where coordination of planning activity with communities of pressing vulnerability was an area 
for improvement, operational coordination was the most prized asset in both cities. Planning 
processes utilized effective coordination on multiple fronts – with different sectoral 
representatives, scales of government and organization, and plans of seemingly divergent subject 
matter. If the actions taken and proposed in the plans turn out to be overvalued or mismanaged, 
at least there will have been diverse coalitions in place to ensure an all-inclusive plan of attack in 
the future. Initiative efforts in Norfolk and New York, with some direction, paired community 
organizations with municipal agencies and institutions of education with business leaders, whom 
likely have never worked together before, in equivalent planning roles. The barriers to 
cooperation and awareness among these dissimilar groups that were lowered is itself a 
testimonial of progress. 
There is still a drawback, however, to the structure of responsibility. The roles of planning and 
implementation responsibility may have been distributed well amongst all stakeholder 
representatives, but the public was still underrepresented in certain regards. The one common 
miscue between Norfolk and New York’s plans is the inability to grant members of the public 
enough authority over the future of their communities. In an era of adapting to and preparing for 
a changing climate, it is not enough to inform and engage the public. It is now necessary to 
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assign greater responsibility to hold decision-makers accountable and have meaningful influence 
on processes in order to minimize existing vulnerability. This is accomplished, through citizen 
advisory committees, and representation of citizen leaders on planning, implementation, and 
oversight committees, or at least greater recognition. Plans like New York’s OneNYC 100 
Resilient Cities report incorporated advisory boards into the planning structure to add some level 
of accountability but these were comprised of organizational leaders as opposed to community 
leaders. 
Research released since 2012 has converged on the prescription of preparedness, adaptability and 
community resilience prior to the onslaught of a disaster. Norfolk and New York City may have 
met these recommendations to varying degrees but rarely in conjunction and never in all 
vulnerable areas or in the pre-disaster phase. Sandy to no surprise has been the greatest impetus 
for New York City and the greatest indirect influence in Norfolk. The 100 Resilient Cities 
initiative may have also been inspired by the Sandy relief effort, but regardless, it was actually a 
promising proactive formula to combat local threats like inequality and sea-level rise. The next 
wave of multi-jurisdiction initiatives should combine the intercommunal and pre-disaster focus 
of the 100 Resilient Cities initiative with the blueprint of the National Disaster Resilience 
Competition. Rather than correcting faults in neighborhoods that have been splintered by climate 
events, efforts should monitor the system of factors at play and resolve weaknesses as they 
transpire before they have the chance to materialize as impacts. This approach might seem overly 
resource-intensive, but in actuality it is reserving resources for optimal use. Instead of wasting 
precious resources on marginally impactful solutions, it is channeling them into their most 
productive outlets. 
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Now that the effectiveness of initiatives like the 100 Resilient Cities and National Disaster 
Resilience Competition approaches have been graded in areas they intended to thrive in, it will 
depend on the operationalization of their proposed actions and the growth in successive 
initiatives for increasingly positive outcomes in the future. 
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 Plan Coding Protocol 
Table 19. Plan Coding Protocol 
I. Identification and Vision  
1.1 Identification Data  
1.1.1 Evaluator   
1.1.2 Date of Evaluation   
1.2 Vision Score Page # Comments 
1.2.1 Overall vision or mission statement   Stated vision of an ideal outcome of the plan or future plans 
1.2.2 Increase resilience/reduce vulnerability 
  
Mentions vision for a place that is resilient, able to bounce back, 
withstand, emerge from threats etc. 
1.2.3 Promote sustainability   Stability, resilience, thriving over long-term; sustained for future 
generations, minimal impact, etc.  
1.2.4 Foster equity and cohesion   Equal opportunity for all, especially low-income; social 
connectedness; minimized risk, regardless of status 
1.2.5 Approach/response defined   Identification of how strategy is original; what influences strategies 
and actions, ties together (e.g. hazard mitigation, risk reduction, etc.) 
2. Goals  
2.1 General Score Page # Comments 
2.1.1 Objectives linked to goals   Connection, similarities, commonalities between objectives in 
individual sections and goals of entire plan 
2.1.2 Clearly articulated   Understandable, straightforward depiction of what is to be achieved 
2.1.3 Neighborhood specific goals   More detailed goals that correspond with specific 
neighborhoods/districts 
2.2 Coordination      
2.2.1 Increase information   To spread current knowledge and information and expand, as a part 
of goals 
2.2.2 Continuously collect information   As circumstances change, remain up to date to perform assessments, 
not to cease collecting information; part of goals 
2.2.3 Internal coordination   Acknowledges need to maintain a cohesive package or elements 
within so that everything works together and remains coordinated 
2.3 Equity and Social Cohesion      
2.3.1 Connect with socioeconomic factors   Goals to be consistently aware of and revisit socioeconomic factors 
to meet other goals for equity in the planning process 
2.3.2 Prioritize least advantaged and most 
vulnerable 
  
Serving needs of individuals and households, further emphasis on 
those that have been traditionally underserved and marginalized, on 
top of being vulnerable 
2.3.3 More equitable distribution of services 
and facilities   
Goal to redistribute essential facilities and services for highest need 
and greatest return 
2.3.4 Beautifying neighborhoods, and 
promoting diversity and connectedness 
  
Goal to remove blight and better the appearance of declining and 
vulnerable neighborhoods, while enhancing diversity and making 
them whole socially and physically 
2.4 Restoration      
2.4.1 Resumption and build back better 
  
Goal to restore housing and structural conditions following a disaster 
to a more improved state of safety, protection and function; return 
local economy into full working order 
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2.4.2 Replace/repair development   Goal to completely restore communities and repair new deficiencies 
as swiftly and appropriately as possible rather than piecemeal 
2.4.3 Regenerative design   Goal to adopt design practices that behave restoratively in face of 
hazards and disasters 
2.5 Adaptation & Anticipation      
2.5.1 Account for all scenarios/multiple 
visions 
  
Goal to be aware of extreme scenarios of unseen caliber no matter 
the unlikelihood, to ensure that no scenario will breach the capability 
of the plan; account for different visions rather than single 
2.5.2 Flexible to change and learn from 
change 
  
Goal to observe and assess changing conditions from a multitude of 
factors and to adjust accordingly rather than retain a rigid 
perspective 
2.5.3 Smart growth 
  
Goal to adopt smart growth practices or those that enhance the lives 
of people and the environment all the while allowing for inevitable 
growth 
2.5.4 Collaboration 
  
Goal to include as many people and resources and as many minds to 
solve a problem and to bridge off of others ideas and existing 
resources 
2.6 Minimal Impacts      
2.6.1 Minimize fiscal impacts 
  
Goal to adopt practices that increase the probability of lesser 
economic damages prior to the onset of a disaster and management 
during with the same positive result 
2.6.2 Maintain and enhance public safety   Goal to adopt practices that maintain the safety and protect the lives 
of people in the path of hazards and storms 
2.6.3 Minimize damage to private and public 
property 
  
Goal to adopt practices that increase the probability that private and 
public property will endure lesser damage from hazards and storms 
2.7 Sustainability      
2.7.1 Ensure continuity   Goal to adopt protocol and practices so that a gap in the continuation 
of the planning process or all other related processes does not occur 
2.7.2 Promote resilience for future 
generations 
  
Goal to not only cultivate a thriving culture around unpredictable 
scenarios for the current generation but for future generations as well 
– think forward in addition to present 
3. Fact Base  
3.1 Existing Conditions  Score Page #  Comments 
3.1.1 Geographic extent   Conveys and acknowledges the planning area and all populations 
included in the extent 
3.1.2 Demographics and economic 
characteristics 
  
Illustrates and assesses general demographics and economic 
characteristics of the planning area absent of the vulnerability 
assessment itself 
3.1.3 Land Use and development trends   Demonstrates an assessment and understanding of the characteristics 
of land use and patterns of development 
3.2 Vulnerability Assessment      
3.2.1 Identify socially and physically 
vulnerable populations 
  Distinguishes social and physical characteristics of vulnerability 
from general or combined vulnerability 
3.2.2 Inventory and map socially and 
physically vulnerable populations   
Maps depicting areas of certain types of social vulnerability, critical 
facilities & infrastructure, floodplains, building density, 
housing/building conditions; layered data for mapped index of social 
and physical vulnerability 
3.2.3 Local knowledge included in social and 
physical vulnerability 
  
Describes source of information for social and physical vulnerability 
assessment being local knowledge from members of the community 
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4. Strategies/Actions 
4.1 Awareness/Knowledge Score  Page #  Comments 
4.1.1 Continuously collected data, and 
assessment tools 
  
Description of information collection, archival and use, of flexibility 
to shifting demands, and of health and safety information collection, 
archival and use; tools relied on to increase data/info collection 
4.1.2 Public warning systems or 
communication plan 
  
Detailed description of specific policies and actions to warn and 
inform low-income, isolated and other socially vulnerable 
populations of eminent danger, evacuation and in-place protection 
4.1.3 Community educational awareness   Description of an outreach effort to improve disaster risk awareness 
and education; inform preparedness measures, for the low-income 
4.1.4 Advertisement and preemptive 
warning 
  
E.g. insurance advertising and marketing to low-income, hazards and 
risk signage in vulnerable areas, real estate hazard disclosure 
4.2 Coordination      
4.2.1 Horizontal 
  
Coordinates with policies, programs and responsibilities managed 
and operated under other agencies or departments, and with 
policies/programs from comprehensive plan or other relevant 
jurisdictional plans 
4.2.2 Internal   Informed by assessments conducted for plan, specifically 
vulnerability assessment 
4.2.3 Vertical   Coordinates with policies, programs and funds from higher level like 
state and federal or lower level 
4.3 Smart Growth & Development      
4.3.1 Increasing development density and 
population density   
E.g. density bonuses, cluster development, changes in land use 
density, density transfer provisions, transit-oriented development, 
infill development 
4.3.2 Affordable housing   
E.g. tax abatements, affordable housing set asides, mixed use/mixed 
income development, housing rehabilitation/revitalization 
4.3.3 Preventative development 
  
E.g. damage thresholds for change in building code standards, 
building acquisition and relocation, floodplain management 
regulations, freeboard requirements (requirements beyond standard 
NFIP) 
4.4 Preparedness & Response      
4.4.1 Evacuation and re-entry 
  
Jurisdiction responsible for directing pre-event evacuation of 
susceptible populations plan and/or procedures without understating 
the importance of evacuation; protocol for smooth return re-entry; 
safety provisions for evacuees 
4.4.2 Sheltering including public shelters and 
sheltering in-place   
Facilities set-up or centers designated for emergency shelters before, 
during, and after an event, with excess capacity for the most extreme 
scenarios 
4.4.3 Emergency services and resources 
distribution   
Food, water and other supplies distribution to targeted and most at-
risk populations including responsible agency, plans and/or 
procedures; expanded and tailored medical services under critical 
scenarios; volunteer management 
4.4.4 Mass search and rescue operations 
  
Plan and/or procedures and resources to seek out and rescue those 
suffering from the impacts of a disaster, may have not heeded 
warnings, or that warnings may have not reached 
4.5 Structural & Infrastructural Controls      
4.5.1 Structural reinforcement   
Reinforcement of housing and businesses while taking advantage of 
modern practices; weatherizing low-income housing 
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4.5.2 Telecommunications infrastructure 
  
Improve telecommunications infrastructure in low-income 
communities, particularly where there is a high concentration of non-
English-speaking residents 
4.5.3 Policies and programs to reduce stress 
on public infrastructure and electric 
grid 
  
Investments and incentives for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency in buildings, especially low-income housing and 
community organizations and businesses 
4.6 Design Tools      
4.6.1 Reusable and adaptable post-disaster 
buildings   
Description of materials used to mention reusable materials to cut 
down on cost; reusable, flexible buildings or modular components 
that are modifiable and adaptable in terms of spatiality and scale, and 
replicable housing (for semi-permanent or permanent low-income 
housing and critical facilities) 
4.6.2 Design for increased social interaction 
  
Describes techniques and tools employed to specifically enhance 
social opportunities and interactions among low-income and other 
socially vulnerable groups 
4.7 Recovery & Restoration      
4.7.1 Relocation assistance - transitional or 
interim housing, etc.   
Description of housing program for vulnerable and low-income 
(whom contributed to the details of the program) where housing 
provides more space and privacy than shelters, and enables families 
to resume normal activity; reconnects families back to community; 
community relocation; voluntary buyout programs 
4.7.2 Ensuring post-disaster safety 
  
Debris removal - Plan for conducting emergency clean-up and 
disposal of debris with a list of possible local contractors, actions to 
protect low-income communities from disaster debris; Building 
inspections including re-entry criteria 
4.7.3 Permanent housing 
  
Place-based and citizen-desired options for permanent housing 
recovery for a range of resident types (homeowner, renter, and 
landlord) that ensures a seamless return to stable housing; connects 
displaced individuals with resources and wealth of options 
4.7.4 Restoration of local businesses 
  
Plans and/or procedures for assisting or intervening to bring small 
and minority businesses back into operation; administration of small 
business resumption loans 
4.7.5 Correct or repair pre-disaster 
deficiencies 
  
Description of plans and responsibilities for assessing the 
deficiencies in structures, programs, and policies etc., and 
procedures for correcting them for future events 
4.8 Households & Individuals      
4.8.1 Disaster Unemployment assistance   Plans to increase unemployment insurance and disaster 
unemployment assistance and extend the benefit periods 
4.8.2 Disaster supplemental nutrition 
assistance 
  
Describes protecting SNAP to ensure the availability of Disaster 
SNAP or D-SNAP for food assistance among low-income 
households following disasters 
4.8.3 Flood insurance   
Demonstrated effort to make flood insurance more affordable or with 
fewer hurdles for lower income families 
4.8.4 Energy and water use efficiency 
consultation   
Pre-disaster planning to consult with and reach out to low-income 
households to inform them of energy efficiency products and 
retrofitting at a severely subsidized rate; products and habits for 
decreasing water use 
4.9 Community Assets & Services      
4.9.1 Community preservation 
  
Describes an emphasis on preserving the character, culture and 
aesthetic of a community to maintain or even enhance its 
connectedness and cohesion 
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4.9.2 Backup services 
  
E.g. community backup heating/cooling in low-income and more 
isolated neighborhoods, especially those with poorly performing 
existing systems 
4.9.3 Shared renewables 
  
Describes plans to transfer low-income communities under the 
direction of cooperative and shared renewable energy sources to 
minimize cost and set up an autonomous communal grid 
4.9.4 Quality of life & access to services 
  
E.g. increasing access to healthy food and public transportation, 
enhancing pedestrian infrastructure and open space, social and other 
public services, childcare, welfare 
4.9.5 Blight removal 
  
Compiles list of resources to improve the physical appearance of 
notoriously underserved low-income neighborhoods; establishes 
supplementary or new programs for blight removal in these areas 
5. Inter-Organizational Coordination  
5.1 Plan Integration      
5.1.1 Coordination with standard/required 
and other related plans   
E.g. land use, general, comprehensive plan; emergency 
management/operations; climate change plan; disaster recovery plan; 
flood mitigation plan; sustainability plan; economic development 
plan; transportation plan 
5.1.2 Coordination with housing, and 
affordability/poverty reduction plans   
Incorporates data and housing/affordability assessments that may 
have been conducted and compiled for plans, identifies and builds on 
strategies, and utilizes and/or expands on funding and 
implementation from plans 
5.2 Horizontal Coordination      
5.2.1 Coordination with other jurisdictional 
organizations & agencies   
E.g. budget/revenue/finance agency; building dep’t/permit office; 
emergency management office; planning/community development 
agency; floodplain management office; parks/environmental agency; 
contractors; public health/works; transportation agency; utilities 
5.2.2 Coordination with nonprofit and 
volunteer organizations 
  
Description of nonprofit and/or volunteer organization that work 
with/in low-income neighborhoods to coordinate with or that have 
been connected with 
6. Participation  
6.1 Planning Process      
6.1.1 Description of specific outreach and 
participation to include socially and 
physically vulnerable populations 
  
Includes a narrative of participants, the roles they played in the 
planning process, and the impact they had on the plan itself 
6.1.2 Schedule of participation   Includes an outline of the dates for specific points or steps in the 
participation and outreach process 
6.2 Public Engagement Techniques      
6.2.1 Citizen advisory committee with 
community liaison   
List of members and description of process to nominate or select 
members of the public to spearhead community-based efforts and 
represent voice of marginalized constituents; community liaison to 
serve as mediator between citizens and organizations 
6.2.2 Focus groups   Moderator-led discussions of topics in plan with intimate-sized 
group of representatives 
6.2.3 Public meetings/workshops 
  
Description of outreach strategy and inclusion of various members 
and groups demographically and geographically; periodic meetings 
or workshops to reflect different stages in the planning process; 
exploration of various options and ideas for the plan; informal or 
formal event 
6.2.4 Practice emergency protocol   Cites events specifically tailored to acting out protocol under an 
extreme weather event, emphasis on vulnerable and low-income 
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6.2.5 Volunteer opportunity 
  
Promotion and offering of volunteer opportunities for all public with 
incentives like time banking and community currency for additional 
encouragement 
6.2.6 Information distribution 
  
Teaching and informative pamphlets/brochures, educational 
videos/demonstrations; public notice – radio, television, smartphone 
app, social media, website, in-person, paper; community bulletin 
6.2.7 Public survey and targeted outreach 
  
Mailed or distributed paper survey, online survey (email, website, 
word of mouth); methods for reaching out to low-income – 
overcoming barriers 
6.3 Stakeholders/Persons Involved in 
Process     
 
6.3.1 Neighborhood groups and 
civic/community based organizations 
  
Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of 
neighborhood groups, and civic-based organizations on plan and 
process 
6.3.2 General public 
  
Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of low-
income/impoverished, minorities groups, elderly, youth, disabled 
members of the public on plan and process 
6.3.3 Housing agency/authority   Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of the local 
housing agency/authority on plan and process 
6.3.4 Social services/childcare/welfare   Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of social 
services, childcare and welfare providers on plan and process 
6.3.5 Nonprofit organization   Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of nonprofit 
organizations on plan and process 
7. Implementation  
7.1 Responsibilities of Organizations      
7.1.1 Communications 
  
Description of responsible organizations or positions, modes of 
communication employed, and communication protocol for each 
type of incident, with emphasis on extending reach out to low-
income populations 
7.1.2 Immediate responsibilities 
  
E.g. mass care, emergency assistance, housing and human services, 
public health and medical services, public safety and security, 
worker safety, warning 
7.1.3 Recovery responsibilities 
  
E.g. damage assessments, population protection, setting up programs 
and prioritizing long term recovery, management of volunteers and 
donations 
7.2 Responsibilities of Individuals      
7.2.1 Public officials and employees, and 
consultants 
  Detailed description and distribution of expert or trained individuals 
to lead each task in response and recovery 
7.2.2 Volunteers   Description of role, needs and sources of volunteers that have been 
informed and consulted with ahead of time 
7.2.3 Public participants   Description of the influence and role committed members of the 
public will have during planning, and/or response and recovery 
7.3 Timeline      
7.3.1 Detailed breakdown of actions/policies 
by timeline   
Some form of list, table, or graphic showing dates, months and/or 
years when each action or policy by grouping is expected to be 
implemented and the duration of its implementation; demonstrates 
prioritization and hierarchy 
7.4 Finances      
7.4.1 Develop revenue sources 
  
Detailed description of sources of funding that are and will be 
available during crises, and sources of funding set aside specifically 
in budget for response and recovery, and for each pre-event strategy; 
creates innovative financing mechanisms 
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8. Monitoring  
8.1 Monitoring Implementation      
8.1.1 Monitor performance of actions and 
policies 
  
Description of plans and responsibilities for monitoring the efficacy 
of implemented actions and policies; sets up easily understandable 
measurement system to benchmark actions/policies 
8.1.2 Public monitor progress of meeting 
their needs and able to   
Allowing a space for low-income and other vulnerable groups to 
hold policymakers and other decision-makers accountable to meeting 
their desires; portion of engagement for empowering residents to act 
on their democratic duty and informing them of this authority 
8.1.3 Identify new and continuous obstacles 
  
Observes and analyzes obstacles to inclusion, vision, and success, 
and/or concocts a strategy for overcoming these obstacles or if 
necessary, declare obstacles unresolvable or permanent; 
identification and acknowledgement of certain cultures and 
relationships that challenge engagement and visioning 
8.1.4 Review stakeholder group membership 
  
Persons responsible for overseeing the involvement of each 
representative stakeholder and ensuring continuous involvement of 
various types of stakeholders particularly those that are traditionally 
excluded from the process like low-income groups 
8.1.5 Ensure progress is clearly 
communicated to public and 
stakeholders 
  
Accounts methods used for communicating results and the status of 
implementation and successes associated with the plan, specifically 
notes methods for communicating to marginalized low-income 
groups 
8.2 Self-Monitoring      
8.2.1 Review biases and assumptions 
  
Demonstrates an awareness to revisit the analysis of a problem and 
identification of solutions that may have been influenced by biases 
and assumptions among the planner and plan creator, continuing the 
tradition of marginalization of low-income groups 
8.2.2 Manage conflicts and resolve disputes 
  
Mediation for managing conflicts during the planning process, and in 
the post-disaster phase, and to resolve disputes and clarify lines of 
responsibility to ensure equal opportunity and voice, specifically 
with the traditionally marginalized 
8.2.3 Assess community engagement and 
reactions 
  
Description of reactions of those involved and planned alongside 
with and how reactions influenced plan; analysis of engagement of 
public and low-income members of the community 
8.2.4 Ensure accountability, transparency, 
and equity in recovery process   
Members of planning team hold each other accountable for success 
of plan and implementation, as do members of the public; each step 
and action taken in the disaster recovery process is clearly 
communicated to all those affected and/or involved; maintains equal 
opportunity for involvement and recovery 
8.3 Updating Plan      
8.3.1 Review economic and damage loss 
assessments, and other changed 
conditions 
  
Analyzes and assesses or plans to, post-disaster damages and losses, 
and other conditions in affected communities to include in future 
versions or updates of the plan 
8.3.2 Update vulnerability assessments 
  
Acknowledges changing, or the potential for, community conditions 
economically and environmentally that warrant revisiting of 
vulnerability assessments, with plans to update them 
8.3.3 Update goals and policies 
  
Reveals goals and policies that have been altered or newly 
removed/included from plan due to changing conditions or 
unexpected conditions; intends to revisit goals and policies with 
potential to alter or update them 
8.3.4 Update organizational makeup and 
responsibility   
Review post-plan and/or post-disaster situations and conditions to 
ensure organizational flexibility to reorganize and reallocate 
responsibilities, as it pertains to low-income communities 
 237 
 Plan Evaluation Scores 
Table 20. Detailed Plan Evaluation Scores for Norfolk, VA 
   RE.Invest Haz Mit PlaNorfolk Resil. Strat. Rising Resil. ThRIVe total avg 
2
. 
G
o
al
s 
2.1 General 
2.1.1 1 2 2 2 0 2 9 1.5 
2.1.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
2.1.3 1 0 1 1 2 1 6 1.0 
ST  4 4 5 5 4 5 27 4.5 
2.2 Coordination 
2.2.1 0 1 1 2 1 1 6 1.0 
2.2.2 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 0.5 
2.2.3 2 2 1 2 2 2 11 1.8 
ST  2 4 2 4 4 4 20 3.3 
2.3 Equity & 
Cohesion 
2.3.1 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 0.7 
2.3.2 0 0 1 1 1 2 5 0.8 
2.3.3 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0.7 
2.3.4 0 0 1 2 1 2 6 1.0 
ST  0 1 3 6 3 6 19 3.2 
2.4 Restoration 
2.4.1 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 0.5 
2.4.2 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.3 
2.4.3 2 0 0 1 2 2 7 1.2 
ST  2 2 1 2 2 3 12 2.0 
2.5 Adaptation/ 
Anticipation 
2.5.1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.2 
2.5.2 0 0 2 2 0 1 5 0.8 
2.5.3 0 1 1 1 2 1 6 1.0 
2.5.4 1 1 2 2 2 2 10 1.7 
ST  1 2 5 6 4 4 22 3.7 
2.6 Minimal 
Impacts 
2.6.1 2 2 0 1 1 1 7 1.2 
2.6.2 1 2 1 2 1 1 8 1.3 
2.6.3 2 2 1 1 1 2 9 1.5 
ST  5 6 2 4 3 4 24 4.0 
2.7 Sustain 
2.7.1 0 1 1 2 0 2 6 1.0 
2.7.2 1 0 1 2 2 1 7 1.2 
ST  1 1 2 4 2 3 13 2.2 
Total  15 20 20 31 22 29 137 22.8 
  %  34% 45% 45% 70% 50% 66%   
3
. 
Fa
ct
 B
as
e
 3.1 Existing 
Conditions 
3.1.1 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
3.1.2 0 2 1 2 2 2 9 1.5 
3.1.3 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
ST  2 6 5 6 6 6 31 5.2 
3.2 Vulnerability 
Assessment 
           1 1 0.2 
3.2.1 0 1 0 0 0 2 3 0.5 
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3.2.2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 
3.2.3 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 0.5 
ST  0 3 0 1 0 4 8 1.3 
Total  2 9 5 7 6 10   
  %  17% 75% 42% 58% 50% 83%   
4
. 
St
ra
te
gi
es
/A
ct
io
n
s 
4.1 Awareness/ 
Knowledge 
 -1       1 1 1 0.2 
4.1.1 2 2 1 2 2 2 11 1.8 
4.1.2 0 1 1 2 0 1 5 0.8 
4.1.3 1 2 1 2 0 2 8 1.3 
4.1.4 0 2 1 1 0 1 5 0.8 
ST  2 7 4 7 3 7 30 5.0 
4.2 Coordination 
4.2.1 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
4.2.2 1 1 0 2 2 2 8 1.3 
4.2.3 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
ST  3 5 4 6 6 6 30 5.0 
4.3 Smart 
Growth/ 
Development 
     1 1 1 1 4 0.7 
4.3.1 0 0 2 2 0 2 6 1.0 
4.3.2 0 0 2 2 0 2 6 1.0 
4.3.3 0 2 2 2 1 2 9 1.5 
ST  0 2 7 7 2 7 25 4.2 
4.4 
Preparedness/ 
Response 
 -1 -1         -2 -0.3 
4.4.1 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 0.5 
4.4.2 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 0.5 
4.4.3 1 1 0 2 0 1 5 0.8 
4.4.4 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.3 
ST  0 1 2 4 0 4 11 1.8 
4.5 Structural 
4.5.1 1 2 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
4.5.2 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0.7 
4.5.3 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 1.2 
ST  2 3 5 5 3 4 22 3.7 
4.6 Design 
4.6.1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0.3 
4.6.2 0 0 1 2 0 2 5 0.8 
ST  1 0 1 2 1 2 7 1.2 
4.7 Recovery & 
Restoration 
     1   1   2 0.3 
4.7.1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.3 
4.7.2 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 0.7 
4.7.3 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 0.5 
4.7.4 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.3 
4.7.5 0 1 1 2 0 1 5 0.8 
ST  0 1 5 6 2 4 18 3.0 
 -1       1   0 0.0 
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4.8 Households/ 
Individuals 
4.8.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
4.8.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
4.8.3 2 2 1 1 1 1 8 1.3 
4.8.4 1 0 2 0 0 1 4 0.7 
ST  2 2 3 1 2 2 12 2.0 
4.9 Community 
Assets/ Services 
 -1   1 -1 1 1 1 0.2 
4.9.1 1 0 2 1 2 2 8 1.3 
4.9.2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 
4.9.3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.2 
4.9.4 0 0 2 2 1 2 7 1.2 
4.9.5 1 0 2 1 0 2 6 1.0 
ST  1 1 8 3 4 7 24 4.0 
Total  11 22 39 41 23 43   
  %  17% 33% 59% 62% 35% 65%   
5
. 
In
te
r-
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
 
5.1 Plan 
Integration 
5.1.1 0 2 2 2 1 2 9 1.5 
5.1.2 0 0 2 2 0 2 6 1.0 
ST  0 2 4 4 1 4 15 2.5 
5.2 Horizontal 
Coordination 
5.2.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
5.2.2 1 0 2 2 1 1 7 1.2 
ST  3 2 4 4 3 3 19 3.2 
Total  3 4 8 8 4 7   
  %  38% 50% 100% 100% 50% 88%   
6
. 
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 
6.1 Planning 
Process 
 -1           -1 -0.2 
6.1.1 0 0 1 2 0 2 5 0.8 
6.1.2 1 1 0 1 0 1 4 0.7 
ST  0 1 1 3 0 3 8 1.3 
6.2 Public 
Engagement 
Techniques 
 -1 1     1   1 0.2 
6.2.1 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 0.7 
6.2.2 0 1 1 2 2 2 8 1.3 
6.2.3 1 1 1 2 2 2 9 1.5 
6.2.4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.2 
6.2.5 2 0 1 1 0 0 4 0.7 
6.2.6 0 1 1 2 0 2 6 1.0 
6.2.7 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.8 
ST  2 5 7 9 7 8 38 6.3 
6.3 
Stakeholders/ 
Persons Involved 
 -1   1 1 1   2 0.3 
6.3.1 0 1 2 2 2 2 9 1.5 
6.3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1.0 
6.3.3 0 0 2 1 2 2 7 1.2 
6.3.4 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.3 
6.3.5 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 0.8 
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ST  1 3 8 7 6 6 31 5.2 
Total  3 9 16 19 13 17   
  %  11% 32% 57% 68% 46% 61%   
7
. 
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
7.1 
Organizational 
Responsibility 
7.1.1 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 0.5 
7.1.2 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0.3 
7.1.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
ST  0 0 2 1 0 2 5 0.8 
7.2 Individual 
Responsibility 
 -1       1   0 0.0 
7.2.1 0 1 2 1 0 2 6 1.0 
7.2.2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.2 
7.2.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1.0 
ST  0 2 3 3 2 3 13 2.2 
7.3 Timeline 7.3.1 0 2 2 2 1 1 8 1.3 
ST  0 2 2 2 1 1 8 1.3 
7.4 Finances 7.4.1 2 2 0 2 1 2 9 1.5 
ST  2 2 0 2 1 2 9 1.5 
Total  2 6 7 8 4 8 35  
  %  13% 38% 44% 50% 25% 50%   
8
. 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
8.1 Monitoring 
Implementation 
 -1     1 1 1 2 0.3 
8.1.1 1 2 2 2 0 2 9 1.5 
8.1.2 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 1.2 
8.1.3 0 2 1 1 1 0 5 0.8 
8.1.4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.2 
8.1.5 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 0.8 
ST  1 6 6 7 4 5 29 4.8 
8.2 Self-
Monitoring 
         1   1 0.2 
8.2.1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.2 
8.2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
8.2.3 0 1 1 0 2 1 5 0.8 
8.2.4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.2 
ST  0 1 1 1 3 2 8 1.3 
8.3 Updating 
Plan 
8.3.1 0 2 1 1 0 1 5 0.8 
8.3.2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 
8.3.3 0 2 2 1 0 0 5 0.8 
8.3.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 
ST  0 6 3 2 0 1 12 2.0 
Total  1 13 10 10 7 8   
  %  4% 50% 38% 38% 27% 31%   
General GT  28 48 50 65 44 60 49.167  
Specific GT  9 35 55 59 35 62 42.5  
Combined Total Score  13.8587 37.349 51.781401 58.6352657 36.26207729 59.3599 42.874  
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Table 21. Detailed Plan Evaluation Scores for New York City 
   NDRC P&C Edgewater Haz Mit One NYC PlaNYC BIG U RbD total avg 
2
. 
G
o
al
s 
2.1 General 
2.1.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
2.1.2 1 2 2 2 2 1 10 1.7 
2.1.3 2 2 0 0 0 1 5 0.8 
ST  5 6 4 4 4 4 27 4.5 
2.2 
Coordination 
2.2.1 1 2 2 1 1 0 7 1.2 
2.2.2 0 0 2 1 1 1 5 0.8 
2.2.3 2 0 2 0 0 1 5 0.8 
ST  3 2 6 2 2 2 17 2.8 
2.3 Equity & 
Cohesion 
2.3.1 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.3 
2.3.2 2 0 1 0 0 1 4 0.7 
2.3.3 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0.5 
2.3.4 2 1 0 2 0 1 6 1.0 
ST  6 1 1 5 0 2 15 2.5 
2.4 Restoration 
2.4.1 1 0 1 0 2 2 6 1.0 
2.4.2 1 0 1 0 2 2 6 1.0 
2.4.3 2 0 1 1 1 1 6 1.0 
ST  4 0 3 1 5 5 18 3.0 
2.5 Adaptation/ 
Anticipation 
2.5.1 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0.3 
2.5.2 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 0.7 
2.5.3 2 1 1 0 0 1 5 0.8 
2.5.4 2 1 2 0 0 2 7 1.2 
ST  4 3 3 2 2 4 18 3.0 
2.6 Minimal 
Impacts 
2.6.1 1 2 2 2 1 0 8 1.3 
2.6.2 2 0 2 2 1 0 7 1.2 
2.6.3 2 2 2 1 2 1 10 1.7 
ST  5 4 6 5 4 1 25 4.2 
2.7 Sustain 
2.7.1 2 2 2 2 1 0 9 1.5 
2.7.2 1 0 2 1 2 2 8 1.3 
ST  3 2 4 3 3 2 17 2.8 
Total  30 18 27 22 20 20 137 22.8 
  %  68% 41% 61% 50% 45% 45%   
3
. 
Fa
ct
 B
as
e
 
3.1 Existing 
Conditions 
3.1.1 2 2 2 1 2 2 11 1.8 
3.1.2 2 1 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
3.1.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
ST  6 5 6 5 6 6 34 5.7 
3.2 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
 1   -1 1 1 1 3 0.5 
3.2.1 1 1 2 1 1 2 8 1.3 
3.2.2 0 0 2 0 1 1 4 0.7 
3.2.3 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.3 
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ST  3 2 3 2 3 4 17 2.8 
Total  9 7 9 7 9 10   
  %  75% 58% 75% 58% 75% 83%   
4
. 
St
ra
te
gi
es
/A
ct
io
n
s 
4.1 Awareness/ 
Knowledge 
       1 1 1 3 0.5 
4.1.1 2 1 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
4.1.2 2 0 2 2 2 0 8 1.3 
4.1.3 2 2 2 2 1 1 10 1.7 
4.1.4 0 1 1 1 2 2 7 1.2 
ST  6 4 7 8 8 6 39 6.5 
4.2 
Coordination 
4.2.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
4.2.2 2 2 2 2 1 2 11 1.8 
4.2.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
ST  6 6 6 6 5 6 35 5.8 
4.3 Smart 
Growth/ 
Development 
 1   1 1 1 1 5 0.8 
4.3.1 1 2 1 2 1 0 7 1.2 
4.3.2 2 1 1 2 1 2 9 1.5 
4.3.3 2 2 2 2 2 0 10 1.7 
ST  6 5 5 7 5 3 31 5.2 
4.4 
Preparedness/ 
Response 
 1   -1 1 1   2 0.3 
4.4.1 1 1 2 1 0 1 6 1.0 
4.4.2 2 0 2 2 1 0 7 1.2 
4.4.3 2 0 2 2 2 0 8 1.3 
4.4.4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.2 
ST  6 1 6 6 4 1 24 4.0 
4.5 Structural 
4.5.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
4.5.2 2 0 2 2 2 0 8 1.3 
4.5.3 2 0 2 2 2 1 9 1.5 
ST  6 2 6 6 6 3 29 4.8 
4.6 Design 
4.6.1 1 1 2 1 1 0 6 1.0 
4.6.2 2 0 2 2 1 2 9 1.5 
ST  3 1 4 3 2 2 15 2.5 
4.7 Recovery & 
Restoration 
 1   1 1 1 1 5 0.8 
4.7.1 1 0 2 1 1 1 6 1.0 
4.7.2 1 1 1 2 1 0 6 1.0 
4.7.3 0 0 2 1 1 0 4 0.7 
4.7.4 1 0 2 1 2 0 6 1.0 
4.7.5 2 1 2 1 2 1 9 1.5 
ST  6 2 10 7 8 3 36 6.0 
4.8 
Households/ 
Individuals 
 1         1 2 0.3 
4.8.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
4.8.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
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4.8.3 2 2 2 2 2 1 11 1.8 
4.8.4 2 0 1 2 1 0 6 1.0 
ST  5 2 3 4 3 2 19 3.2 
4.9 Community 
Assets/Services 
 1     1 1 1 4 0.7 
4.9.1 2 2 1 2 1 2 10 1.7 
4.9.2 2 0 2 1 2 1 8 1.3 
4.9.3 1 0 2 2 2 1 8 1.3 
4.9.4 2 1 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
4.9.5 0 0 1 2 2 2 7 1.2 
ST  8 3 8 10 10 9 48 8.0 
Total  52 26 55 57 51 35   
  %  79% 39% 83% 86% 77% 53%   
5
. 
In
te
r-
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
 
5.1 Plan 
Integration 
5.1.1 2 2 2 2 1 2 11 1.8 
5.1.2 2 0 1 2 0 1 6 1.0 
ST  4 2 3 4 1 3 17 2.8 
5.2 Horizontal 
Coordination 
5.2.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
5.2.2 0 1 2 2 2 2 9 1.5 
ST  2 3 4 4 4 4 21 3.5 
Total  6 5 7 8 5 7   
  %  75% 63% 88% 100% 63% 88%   
6
. 
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 
6.1 Planning 
Process 
 1     1 1 1 4 0.7 
6.1.1 2 1 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
6.1.2 1 2 2 0 2 2 9 1.5 
ST  4 3 4 3 5 5 24 4.0 
6.2 Public 
Engagement 
Techniques 
 1   1   1 1 4 0.7 
6.2.1 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 1.2 
6.2.2 2 2 2 1 2 2 11 1.8 
6.2.3 2 2 2 1 1 2 10 1.7 
6.2.4 0 0 1 1 2 1 5 0.8 
6.2.5 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 0.7 
6.2.6 2 1 2 2 2 1 10 1.7 
6.2.7 2 0 2 2 0 2 8 1.3 
ST  10 6 13 9 11 10 59 9.8 
6.3 
Stakeholders/ 
Persons 
Involved 
 1     1 1 1 4 0.7 
6.3.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2.0 
6.3.2 2 1 1 2 1 2 9 1.5 
6.3.3 2 0 2 2 2 2 10 1.7 
6.3.4 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 0.7 
6.3.5 1 1 2 1 2 2 9 1.5 
ST  8 4 9 10 8 9 48 8.0 
Total  22 13 26 22 24 24   
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  %  79% 46% 93% 79% 86% 86%   
7
. 
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
7.1 
Organizational 
Responsibility 
7.1.1 0 0 2 2 1 0 5 0.8 
7.1.2 0 1 2 2 2 0 7 1.2 
7.1.3 2 0 2 0 2 0 6 1.0 
ST  2 1 6 4 5 0 18 3.0 
7.2 Individual 
Responsibility 
       1 1 1 3 0.5 
7.2.1 1 1 2 2 2 2 10 1.7 
7.2.2 0 0 2 1 2 1 6 1.0 
7.2.3 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 1.2 
ST  2 2 5 6 6 5 26 4.3 
7.3 Timeline 7.3.1 1 0 2 0 1 2 6 1.0 
ST  1 0 2 0 1 2 6 1.0 
7.4 Finances 7.4.1 2 1 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
ST  2 1 2 2 2 2 11 1.8 
Total  7 4 15 12 14 9 61  
  %  44% 25% 94% 75% 88% 56%   
8
. 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g 
8.1 Monitoring 
Implementation 
 1   -1   1 1 2 0.3 
8.1.1 2 0 2 2 2 2 10 1.7 
8.1.2 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 0.8 
8.1.3 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 0.7 
8.1.4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.2 
8.1.5 2 2 2 1 1 1 9 1.5 
ST  6 3 5 5 5 7 31 5.2 
8.2 Self-
Monitoring 
           1 1 0.2 
8.2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
8.2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
8.2.3 1 1 2 2 2 2 10 1.7 
8.2.4 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.3 
ST  1 1 3 3 2 3 13 2.2 
8.3 Updating 
Plan 
8.3.1 1 0 2 0 1 2 6 1.0 
8.3.2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.2 
8.3.3 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 0.5 
8.3.4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.2 
ST  1 0 5 0 1 4 11 1.8 
Total  8 4 13 8 8 14   
  %  31% 15% 50% 31% 31% 54%   
General GT  63 39 71 56 53 52 55.67  
Specific GT  71 38 81 80 78 67 69.17  
Combined Total Score  66.425121 36.986715 75.5435 70.77295 68.5688 60.658213 63.16  
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 Spatial Coding Scores 
Norfolk: 
Table 22. RE.invest Report Spatial Coding Scores 
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The Hague              
Downtown 
Arts 
District  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Low Vuln.  1  1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Total  -1  -1  -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1  
 
Table 23. Southside Hazard Mitigation Plan Spatial Coding Scores 
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Ballentine 
Place       1                   
Ingleside       1                   
Crown 
Point       1                   
Industrial 
Park       1                   
Fort 
Norfolk       3                   
Cottage 
Road Park                 1         
High Vuln.       2         1         
Low Vuln.       5                   
Total       -3         1         
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Table 24. PlaNorfolk 2030 Spatial Coding Scores 
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Broad 
Creek 
(area)     1                     
Moton 
(Robert's)     1                     
Grandy 
Village     1                     
South 
Brambleton     1                     
Broad 
Creek             2             
Douglas 
(Bruce's) 
Park     1                     
Spartan 
Village     1                     
Central 
Hampton 
Blvd     1       5     2       
Colonial 
Place-
Riverview     1       1             
Cottage 
Line     1       1             
Downtown     1       3             
East Little 
Creek Rd     3       3             
East Ocean 
View     4       2             
Fairmount 
Park     3       2             
Fort 
Norfolk             2             
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Ghent             1             
Norview     1       1             
Wards 
Corner     3       1             
Huntersville             2             
Mid-Town 
Industrial     1                     
Military 
Highway     2       1             
Monticello-
Granby     1                     
Park Place     2       2             
St. Paul's     4   1   5             
Southside     2       2             
West Ocean 
View             1             
High Vuln.     23   1   22     2       
Low Vuln.     8       10             
Total     15   1   12     2       
 
Table 25. Norfolk Resilience Strategy Spatial Coding Scores 
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Chesterfield 
Heights                   1       
Lafayette 
River                     1     
Downtown                 1         
Park Place     1           2     1   
Wards 
Corner                 1         
Sentara 
Norfolk             1             
Sentara 
Leigh             1             
High Vuln.     1           2     1   
Low Vuln.             2   2         
Total     1       -2   0 1 0 1   
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Table 26. Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge Spatial Coding Scores 
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Chesterfield 
Heights   1 1   1 1 1   2 2 1 1 1 
High Vuln.   1 1   1 1 1   2 2 1 1 1 
Total   1 1   1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 27. ThRIVe NDRC Phase 2 Application Spatial Coding Scores 
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Haven 
Creek             1             
Knitting 
Mill Creek             1             
Colley Bay             1             
Willoughby 
Spit             1             
St. Paul's 1   1       2         1   
Tidewater 
Gardens 1   1       2         1   
South 
Brambleton 1   1       2         1   
Harbor Park 1           2         1   
Chesterfield 
Heights 1           2         1   
ODU   1         1             
Norfolk 
State   1                       
Tidewater 
CC   1         1             
Grandy 
Village     1                     
High Vuln. 5 2 4       13         5   
Low Vuln.   1         2             
Total 5 1 4       11         5   
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New York City: 
Table 28. BIG “U” Rebuild by Design Report Spatial Coding Scores 
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Stuyvesant 
Town             2     1   1   
East 
Village             1   2 2 1 1 2 
Lower East 
Side 3 2 2     1 9 1 4 2 1 1 2 
Two 
Bridges         1   3 1 4 2   1 3 
Financial 
District             2     2   1   
Battery 
Park   1         3     2   1   
Hell's 
Kitchen                   1       
Chelsea                   1       
West 
Village                           
Tribeca                   1       
Battery 
Park City                   1       
Chinatown                   1       
Low Vuln.   1         5     6   2   
High Vuln. 3 2 2   1 1 15 2 10 8 2 4 7 
Total 3 1 2   1 1 10 2 10 2 2 2 7 
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Table 29. New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan Spatial Coding Scores 
  V
u
ln
. 
A
ss
es
s.
 
A
w
ar
e.
/ 
K
n
o
w
l. 
Sm
ar
t 
gr
o
w
th
 &
 
d
ev
. 
P
re
p
. &
 
re
sp
. 
R
ec
o
v.
 &
 
re
st
. 
H
H
 &
 
in
d
iv
. 
C
o
m
m
. 
as
se
ts
 &
 
se
rv
ic
es
 
P
la
n
n
in
g 
p
ro
ce
ss
 
P
u
b
lic
 
en
g.
 
SH
/ 
P
er
so
n
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 
R
es
p
o
n
. 
M
o
n
it
. 
im
p
le
m
. 
Se
lf
-
m
o
n
it
. 
Belmont                       1   
Brooklyn 
Heights       1               1   
Civic Center                       1   
Kew Gardens                       1   
St. George                       1   
Coney Island 1   1   1                 
Rockaway 
Beach 1       1                 
South Shore 1                         
Howard 
Beach 1                         
Breezy Point 1                         
Midland 
Beach 1                         
Rikers Island       1 1                 
Governor's 
Island             1             
Arverne East         1                 
Kips Bay     1       1             
Greenpoint     1                     
Williamsburg     1                     
Hunters 
Point   1 1                     
East Harlem             1             
Randall 
Manor                 1         
Low Vuln. 3     1     1         3   
High Vuln. 2   3   2   1         2   
Total -1 0 3 -1 2   0   1     -1   
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Table 30. PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York Spatial Coding Scores 
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Borough 
Park         1                 
Bay Ridge         1                 
Rockaway 
Park 1   2   7   3 1 1 1 1 2   
Oakwood 
Beach 1   1   3     1 1 1       
Seaside 1   2   2   3 1 1 1 1 1   
Rockaway 
Beach 1   1 1 4   4 1 1 1 1 1   
Arverne 1   2   2   5 1 1 1 1 1   
Edgemere 1   1   2   3 1 1 1 1 1   
Two Bridges 1   2   5     1 1 1       
Kips Bay 1   1 2 2   1 1 1 1       
Red Hook 1 1 2 1 6   3 2 2 2   2   
Greenpoint 1   2   4   3 1 1 1       
Long Island 
City 1   3   4   1 1 1 1       
Woodhaven 
Blvd             1             
Marine Park             1             
Canarsie             1             
Navy Yard 1   2   2     1 1 1       
Dumbo 1   1   2   1 1 1 1   1   
Gowanus 1   1   2     1 1 1       
Williamsburg 1   2   2   1 1 1 1       
Newtown 
Creek 1   1   2     1 1 1       
Sunset Park 1   1   2   1 1 1 1       
South Beach 1   2   5   1 1 1 1   1   
Midland 
Beach 1   3   4     1 1 1   1   
New Dorp 1   2   2     1 1 1   1   
Great Kills 1   2   2   1 1 1 1   2   
Eltingville 1   1   1   1 1 1 1   1   
Annadale 1   1   1   1 1 1 1   1   
Prince's Bay 1   1   2   1 1 1 1   1   
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Tottenville 1   1   5   1 1 1 1   1   
Charleston             1             
Stapleton     1                     
St. George     2                     
Howard 
Beach 1   2   3   1 1 1 1 1     
Hamilton 
Beach 1   3   2     1 1 1 1 1   
Broad 
Channel 1   3   4   1 1 1 1 1 1   
Far 
Rockaway 1   1   4   2 1 1 1 1 2   
Belle Harbor 1   1   5   1 1 1 1 1 1   
Breezy Point 1   1   2   1 1 1 1 1 1   
Sea Gate 1   1   2     1 1 2       
Gravesend 1   1   2   2 1 1 1   1   
Coney Island 1   4 1 4   6 2 1 1   2   
Brighton 
Beach 1   1   4   1 1 1 1       
Manhattan 
Beach 1   1   2     1 1 1       
Sheepshead 
Bay 1   2   7   2 1 1 2   1   
Gerritsen 
Beach 1 1 3   3   1 1 1 1       
Stuyvesant 
Town 1   2   2     1 1 1       
Lower East 
Side 1   2   5   3 1 1 1       
Lower 
Manhattan 1   5   5   8 1 1 1   2   
Battery Park 
City 1   1   2     1 1 1       
Tribeca 1   1   5   1 1 1 1       
West Village 1   1   4     1 1 1       
Chelsea 1   1   3   1 1 1 1       
Hudson 
Yards 1   2   2     1 1 1       
Low Vuln. 11   18   35   15 11 11 11 3 8   
High Vuln. 22 2 42 3 76   43 24 23 25 5 14   
Total 11 2 24 3 41   28 13 12 14 2 6   
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Table 31. OneNYC Spatial Coding Scores 
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West Farms 1   1       2             
Crotona Park 
East 1   1       3             
Longwood 1   1       4     1       
Soundview 1   1       4             
Hunts Point 1   1       4     1       
Long Island 
City             2             
Flatlands             1             
East 
Midtown     1       1             
Jerome Ave     1       1 1           
Fort Greene             1   1 1       
Canarsie   1     1   1             
East New 
York             3             
Jamaica     1       2             
Crown 
Heights             1             
North Shore     1       1             
South Shore         1   1             
Williamsburg             2             
Greenpoint             1             
Bedford 
Stuyvesant             1             
Washington 
Heights             3     1       
Tremont             1             
Coney Island   1   2 1   3             
Kips Bay       2     1             
East Harlem     1 2     3             
Roosevelt 
Island       2     1             
Harlem 
Gateway             1             
Cromwell/ 
Jerome             1             
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Zarega             1             
Ridgewood             1             
Red Hook       1     1   1 1 1     
Stapleton             2             
Edgemere             1             
Harding Park                   1       
Hudson 
Yards     1                     
Seward Park     1                     
Hunters 
Point     1                     
Averne     1       1             
Willets Point     1                     
Melrose     1       1             
Highland 
Park             1             
Dongan Hills             1             
Chelsea             1             
Gravesend             1             
Brooklyn 
Heights             1             
Rockaway 
Beach   1     2                 
Brighton 
Beach   1     1                 
Low Vuln.     3   1   5   1 1       
High Vuln.   4 11 7 5   43 1 1 5 1     
Total 5 4 8 7 4   38 1 0 4 1   8 
 
Table 32. Edgewater Park Resilient Neighborhoods Report Spatial Coding Scores 
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Edgewater 
Park 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1   1   
Total 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0   0   
 
 
 255 
Table 33. Lower Manhattan Protect & Connect NDRC Phase 2 Application Spatial Coding 
Scores 
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East Village 1   2 1 1 2 5 2 2 2   1   
Lower East 
Side 1   2 1 1 2 7 2 2 2   1   
Campos 
Plaza 1   1     1 2 1 1 1   1   
Riis 1 & 2 1   1     1 3 1 1 1   1   
Wald 
Houses 1   1     1 3 1 1 1   1   
Lavanburg 
Houses 1   1     1 3 1 1 1   1   
Baruch 
Addition 1   1     1 3 1 1 1   1   
Cooperative 
Village 2   2 1   1 3 2 2 2   1   
LaGuardia 1   1     1 2 1 1 1   1   
Two 
Bridges 2   1 1   1 4 2 3 2   1   
Smith 
Houses 1   1     1 2 1 1 1   1   
Civic Center 2   1       1 2 2 2       
Financial 
District 2           1 1 2 2       
Battery 
Park 1           1             
Battery 
Park City 2           1 1 2 2       
Tribeca 2           1 1 2 2       
Low Vuln. 9   2 1   1 7 5 8 8   1   
High Vuln. 13   13 3 2 12 35 15 16 15   10   
Total 4   11 2 2 11 28 10 8 7   9 9.2 
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 Vulnerability Maps 
 
Figure 11. Hazard Exposure in Norfolk, VA 
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Figure 12. Physical Vulnerability in Norfolk, VA 
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Figure 13. Social Vulnerability in Norfolk, VA 
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Figure 14. Hazard Exposure in New York City 
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Figure 15. Physical Vulnerability in New York City 
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Figure 16. Social Vulnerability in New York City 
